Job mobility, wages and job satisfaction by Cornelißen, Thomas
Job mobility, wages and job satisfaction
Von der Wirtschaftswissenschaftlichen Fakulta¨t der
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz Universita¨t Hannover
zur Erlangung des akademischen Grades
Doktor der Wirtschaftswissenschaften
- Doctor rerum politicarum -
genehmigte Dissertation
von
Diplom-O¨konom Thomas Cornelißen
geboren am 14.9.1976 in Krefeld
2008
Referent: Prof. Dr. Olaf Hu¨bler
Korreferent: Prof. Dr. Patrick Puhani
Tag der Promotion: 3.12.2008
Acknowledgments
I would like to thank all who have helped me along the way
while writing this thesis, especially my principal supervisor
Olaf Hu¨bler for suggesting the subject, encouraging my re-
search, co-authoring part of the research and for invaluable
discussions.
I also give my thanks to all colleagues who have discussed
my work with me and have given me valuable comments, par-
ticularly during seminars at the Leibniz Universita¨t Hannover.
This work has also strongly benefited from the discus-
sions at several conferences and workshops. I wish to ex-
press my sincere appreciation for the helpful comments re-
ceived from participants of several meetings of the German
Research Foundation (DFG) Network ’Flexibility in Hetero-
geneous Labour Markets’, of the final conference of the inter-
national wage flexibility project, of the 2nd User Conference
on the Analysis of BA and IAB Data and at other occasions.
Thomas Cornelißen, December 2008
iii
ABSTRACT
Abstract
The thesis consists of an empirical part and a methodological part. An overview of
the whole analysis and of the main findings is presented in the introduction (Chapter
1). The following three chapters form the empirical part of the thesis with empirical
analyses of the interrelation of job mobility, wages and job satisfaction. Chapter 2 uses
German household panel data to analyze the association of downward wage rigidity
with several types of external and internal job mobility. Chapter 3 uses German linked
employer-employee data to estimate wage and job duration functions with individual
and firm fixed effects. In a second step, the correlations of the unobserved heterogeneity
components (fixed effects) are analyzed. Chapter 4 then introduces job satisfaction and
non-pecuniary job characteristics into the analysis. Drawing again on household panel
data, that chapter analyzes the conditions under which low job satisfaction leads to
job search, and under which job search leads to job changes. Job satisfaction itself is
explained by a set of detailed job characteristics.
The methodological part of the thesis contains two chapters that include method-
ological tools that were developed in order to conduct the analyses presented in the
empirical part. These tools were made available for public use as programs in the
econometrics software Stata. In chapter 5 standard errors of the marginal effects in a
heteroskedastic probit model are derived analytically using the delta method. In chap-
ter 6 a sparse matrix algortihm for a memory-saving way to estimate a fixed-effects
model with two high-dimensional fixed effects is developed.
Keywords: job mobility, wages, wage rigidity, job satisfaction, heteroskedastic probit
model, fixed-effects model.
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KURZZUSAMMENFASSUNG
Kurzusammenfassung
Diese Dissertation untergliedert sich in einen empirischen und einen methodischen Teil.
Die Einleitung in Kapitel 1 gibt zuna¨chst einen U¨berblick u¨ber den Inhalt und die
Forschungsergebnisse der gesamten Dissertation. Die folgenden drei Kapitel bilden den
empirischen Teil, welcher sich mit dem Zusammenwirken von Arbeitsplatzwechseln,
Lo¨hnen und Arbeitszufriedenheit bescha¨ftigt. Auf der Basis von deutschen Haushaltspan-
eldaten arbeitet Kapitel 2 den Zusammenhang zwischen Abwa¨rtslohnstarrheit und ver-
schiedenen Formen von internen und externen Arbeitsplatzwechseln heraus. Kapitel
3 stu¨tzt sich auf die Analyse von deutschen integrierten Betriebs- und Personendaten.
Hier werden Lohn- und Bescha¨ftigungsdauerfunktionen mit fixen Betriebs- und Person-
eneffekten gescha¨tzt. Anschließend werden die Korrelationen zwischen den fixen Lohn-
und Bescha¨ftigungsdauereffekten analysiert. Kapitel 4 fu¨hrt die Arbeitszufriedenheit
und nichtmoneta¨re Arbeitsplatzeigenschaften in die Analyse ein. Hier wird auf Basis von
Haushaltspaneldaten untersucht, unter welchen Bedingungen geringe Arbeitszufrieden-
heit zu Arbeitsplatzsuche fu¨hrt, und unter welchen Bedingungen die Arbeitsplatzsuche
zu Arbeitsplatzwechseln fu¨hrt. Gleichzeitig wird die Arbeitszufriedenheit durch detail-
lierte Arbeitsplatzeigenschaften erkla¨rt.
Der methodische Teil der Dissertation entha¨lt zwei Kapitel, in denen methodische
Lo¨sungen entwickelt werden, welche fu¨r die Analyse im empirischen Teil beno¨tigt wur-
den. Diese sind als Programme fu¨r die O¨konometriesoftware Stata umgesetzt und fu¨r
andere Nutzer o¨ffentlich zuga¨nglich gemacht worden. In Kapitel 5 werden unter Verwen-
dung der Deltamethode Standardfehler fu¨r die marginalen Effekte im heteroskedastis-
chen Probitmodel analytisch hergeleitet. In Kapitel 6 wird ein Algorithmus fu¨r die
arbeitsspeichersparende Berechnung eines Fixed-Effects-Modells mit zwei hochdimen-
sionalen fixen Effekten entwickelt.
Schlagwo¨rter: Arbeitsplatzwechsel, Lo¨hne, Lohnrigidita¨t, Arbeitszufriedenheit, het-
eroskedastisches Probitmodell, Fixed-Effects-Modell.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
If in the same neighbourhood, there was any employment evidently either more
or less advantageous than the rest, so many people would crowd into it in the one
case, and so many would desert it in the other, that its advantages would soon
return to the level of other employments. [...] Every man’s interest would prompt
him to seek the advantageous, and to shun the disadvantageous employment.
Adam Smith, Wealth of Nations, Book I, Chapter X, 1776, p. 95.
Because it happens more or less routinely, the efficiency with which a market
system allocates labor in the economy is often taken for granted. It is, however,
a monumental task. How do all the different jobs and all the diverse individuals
in any one of our larger cities get matched up? How is it that there are enough
truck drivers to deliver food to grocery stores, enough tellers to wait on customers
at banks, and enough telephone repairers to keep the phone system working? A
market system solves this problem through two related mechanisms - changes in
wage rates and the mobility of labor.
B.E. Kaufman and J.L. Hotchkiss, The Economics of Labor Markets,
2006, p. 16.
The answers to questions about how people feel toward their job are not mean-
ingless but rather convey useful information about economic life that should not
be ignored. [...] Satisfaction is [...] a major determinant of labor market mobility,
in part, it is argued, because it reflects aspects of the work place not captured by
standard objective variables.
R.B. Freeman, American Economic Review, 1978, p. 135.
These quotes illustrate the importance of the interplay of job mobility, wages and job
satisfaction for the allocation of labor in a market economy. In trying to reach a better
understanding of these phenomena, this thesis presents empirical investigations of the
interrelation of job mobility, wages and job satisfaction. These analyses are presented
in the chapters 2, 3 and 4, which form part I of the thesis. Part II consists of chapters
5 and 6 presenting two methodological tools that were developed in order to conduct
the analyses of part I. They can be understood as technical appendices to the chapters
2 and 3 respectively. The remainder of this introduction summarizes the key findings
and conclusions that can be drawn from the thesis.
Although the empirical analyses in part I are based on German data, the results of
each chapter are compared to findings from other countries in order to reach an inter-
national perspective. Chapter 2 uses data from the German Socio-Economic Panel and
takes a specific approach to analyze the association between wages and job mobility.
The interest does not lie on wages per se, but on downward wage rigidity. A structural
empirical model is estimated, that allows to measure the extent of downward wage rigid-
ity at individual level. This is expressed by the ’wage sweep-up’, a measure indicating
by how much individual wage growth increases through the effect of downward wage
rigidity when compared to a counterfactual labor market with flexible wage setting. In
this chapter job mobility is measured by the occurrence of layoffs, quits and intra-firm
mobility (promotions and transfers). The findings show robust negative effects of wage
sweep-up on quits and layoffs and some evidence for a positive association of wage
sweep-up and promotion opportunities. This is consistent with a core-periphery view
of the labor force, where a core work force is protected from layoffs and wage cuts and
at the same time enjoys good promotion opportunities. On the other side a periph-
eral work force provides a buffer for adjustment and suffers from both flexible wages,
more insecure jobs and less internal promotion opportunities. This finding supports
the theory of dual labor markets. According to Rebitzer and Taylor (1991, p. 1373),
”dual labor market theory is an attempt to understand observed variation in wages and
job quality. The theory argues that market processes tend to produce ’primary’ jobs
characterized by high wages and long job tenure, and ’contingent’ (or ’secondary’) jobs
that typically offer low wages and short tenure. [...] Primary jobs result from the wage
premiums used to elicit high levels of work intensity in firms where the activities of em-
ployees are difficult to monitor.”According to that theory, a market failure (asymmetric
information) is ultimately at the root of a negative association of wages and external
job mobility.
Chapter 3 takes a different view towards wages and job mobility. Here, only external
job mobility is considered. The analysis focuses on the association of wages and job
durations. Job durations are a measure of job stability, the counterpart of job mobility.
The analysis of that chapter uses German linked employer-employee data. This allows
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to estimate wage and job duration functions with individual and firm fixed effects. The
aim of that analysis is to look into the correlations of the unobserved heterogeneity
components. The key finding is that there emerges a trade-off at firm level between
wages and job stability: High-wage firms tend to be instable firms, suggesting that job
instability is compensated by higher wages. According to the results, high-wage workers
sort into the stable low-wage firms, forgoing some of their earnings potential in favor
of job stability. Unlike the results of chapter 2, this supports a more market-oriented
view of the labor market, in which market forces assure the existence of compensating
wage differentials (Rosen 1986).
Taken together, chapters 2 and 3 draw a differentiated picture of the labor market.
The results are partly consistent with a standard market model with compensating
wage differentials and partly consistent with information asymmetries leading to effi-
ciency wages and dual labor markets. While the analysis of wages is central to labor
economics, the question whether wages are really the most important determinant of
individual decisions of labor mobility needs to be addressed. Therefore, the analysis
of chapters 2 and 3 remains incomplete unless additional non-pecuniary job aspects
are added to the analysis. Chapter 4 includes job satisfaction and non-pecuniary job
characteristics into the analysis of job mobility. Using the rich data set of the Ger-
man Socio-Economic Panel, the chapter analyzes the conditions under which low job
satisfaction leads to job search, and under which job search leads to job changes. Job
satisfaction is not taken as given, but it is itself explained by a set of detailed job
characteristics. Individual fixed effects are included into the analysis in order to hold
unobserved heterogeneity constant. Non-pecuniary job aspects are found to be very
important determinants of job satisfaction. For example, bad relations with colleagues
depress job satisfaction so heavily that pay would need to be more than doubled to
compensate for this effect. As a wage rise of this extent appears improbable, this im-
plies that a bad atmosphere in the workplace can hardly in practice be compensated by
higher wages. Task diversity, conflicts with supervisors, and worries about job security
have equally strong effects. The remaining job characteristics also have considerable
effects on job satisfaction. Furthermore, job satisfaction is an important determinant
of the self-reported probability of job search, which in turn effectively predicts actual
job changes. The effect of job search on the probability of job changes varies with job
3
satisfaction and is strongest at low levels of job satisfaction. The effects of job dissat-
isfaction on job search and of job search on quits are stronger for workers with lower
tenure, better educated workers, workers in the private sector and when the economy
and labor market are in a good condition. Indeed, this puts the results of the chapters
2 and 3 into perspective. Wages are not the most important determinants of individual
job change decisions. The results are of direct importance for employers and human re-
source managers: firms that do not provide satisfactory working conditions run the risk
of experiencing high rates of fluctuation, especially when relying on a highly educated
workforce.
The second part of the thesis (chapters 5 and 6) presents two methodological tools
that were developed in order to conduct the analyses presented in the empirical part.
These tools were made available for public use as Stata programs called mehetprob and
felsdvreg. Chapter 5 is a methodological extension of chapter 2. The effects of wage
rigidity on job mobility in chapter 2 are estimated using a heteroskedastic probit model.
In such a non-linear regression model, marginal effects need to be computed as non-
linear combinations of the regression coefficients. The standard errors of the marginal
effects needed for inference and hypothesis testing have to be derived by approximation
using methods such as the delta method. In chapter 5, the delta method is applied
to derive analytically the standard errors of the marginal effects in a heteroskedastic
probit model. Chapter 6 is a methodological extension of chapter 3. The models
estimated in chapter 3 are fixed-effects models including two high-dimensional fixed
effects (individual and firm effects). A common way to estimate such models is to take
into account one of the effects by including dummy variables, and to sweep out the
other effect by the within transformation (fixed effects transformation). If the number
of groups is high, creating and storing the dummy variables can involve prohibitively
large computer memory requirements. In chapter 6, a memory-saving way to estimate
a fixed-effects model with two high-dimensional fixed effects is presented. It relies on
the idea that a typical dummy variable matrix of fixed effects is a sparse matrix which
can be stored efficiently in compressed form.
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Part I
Empirical analyses
Chapter 2
Downward wage rigidity and job mobility1
Wage rigidity seems to be a defining characteristic of labour markets in many coun-
tries. Various studies have investigated wage rigidity and come to the conclusion that
wages are not entirely flexible. Especially downward wage rigidity is of relevance, as
labour market institutions and fairness standards usually define lower bounds for the
wage evolution, not upper bounds. Downward wage rigidity is a potential cause of
unemployment and it may distort the allocation of jobs within firms.
We study the effect of downward wage rigidity on mobility decisions in the German
labour market. Using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), we
investigate whether being individually affected by wage rigidity affects job mobility.
The extent to which an individual is affected by wage rigidity is measured within an
empirical model that allows us to estimate the counterfactual wage growth that would
prevail in the absence of rigidities.
We distinguish two types of downward wage rigidity: nominal and contractual rigid-
ity. In our empirical model downward nominal wage rigidity prevents nominal wage
cuts, whereas downward contractual wage rigidity prevents wage growth that falls short
of the wage growth stipulated by collective wage agreements. Both types of wage rigid-
ity can induce real wage rigidity which is likely to affect the allocation of workers to
jobs and hence job mobility. The data set we use contains richer information on labour
1This chapter is co-authored with Prof. Dr. Olaf Hu¨bler, Institute of Empirical Economics, Leibniz
Universita¨t Hannover. The chapter was originally published as: ’Downward wage rigidity and job
mobility’, Empirical Economics, 34(2), 2008, pp. 205-230. Publication within this thesis with kind
permission of Springer Science+Business Media.
CHAPTER 2. DOWNWARD WAGE RIGIDITY
market mobility than the data sets that have been used before to measure wage rigidity
with this methodological approach. In particular, our data allow us to identify layoffs,
quits and intra-firm mobility, namely promotions and transfers.
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 2.1 develops the theoretical background
including potential causes of downward wage rigidity and consequences with respect to
labour market mobility. On this basis, hypotheses are derived. Section 2.2 presents prior
empirical work. Section 2.3 describes our data. Section 2.4 develops the econometric
model. Section 2.5 presents results, and section 2.6 concludes. All tables referred to in
this chapter can be found in section 2.7.
2.1 Theoretical background
2.1.1 Causes of downward wage rigidity
Theoretical foundations of downward wage rigidity must explain why wages are less
responsive to negative shocks than to positive shocks, or in other words: why there is
a lower bound to the rate of change of wages. Important theoretical foundations for
the existence of lower bounds to the wage evolution are efficiency wage theory, insider-
outsider theory as well as theories of efficient contracting.
Fairness standards and reciprocal behaviour induce employers to consider efficiency
wages (Akerlof 1982, Akerlof and Yellen 1988, Fehr and Ga¨chter 2000). In order to
assess the fairness of their pay, workers compare their wage to some reference wage.
If they feel treated in a fair way they offer a high productivity (or low fluctuation) in
exchange. In the opposite case workers reciprocate with a low productivity (or high
fluctuation). When the reference wage stays relatively constant over the business cycle,
firms are likely to avoid wage cuts because the losses in productivity would more than
offset the cost savings. Danthine and Kurmann (2004, 2006) show this formally for the
two cases where the reference wage is the worker’s past wage or the firm’s unit wage
cost.
Insider-outsider theory maintains that insiders have some bargaining power due
to labour turnover costs or labour laws (Lindbeck and Snower 2001). Social norms
and fairness standards may also raise bargaining power. Insiders who are protected
7
2.1. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
from layoffs by seniority rules and employment protection legislation may withstand
wage cuts in a recession. This prompts layoffs of workers who are not insiders. In
a subsequent boom, insiders bargain for wage increases. This lowers the profitability
of firms and they do not re-hire formerly laid off workers to the same extent. Over
the business cycle, employment is reduced while wages of the employed insiders rise.
Bargaining may be mediated by unions. Individual or collective bargaining power makes
wage cuts less frequent and wage freezes or wage rises more frequent than they would
be in a counterfactual flexible labour market without bargaining power.
Efficient contracting (MacLeod and Malcomson 1993, Holden 1999) has been pro-
posed as a reason for downward nominal wage rigidity (Holden 2002, Elsby 2005). This
strand of the literature emphasises that rational agents may chose to apply a fixed nom-
inal wage contract until either side has a credible threat of disrupting trade, in which
case renegotiation takes place. The literature argues that fixing the nominal wage in
such a way induces efficient investment into specific capital, because it reduces the un-
certainty about whether the other party to the contract might capture the rents of the
investment. At fixed nominal wages, inflation leads to decreasing real wages and makes
upward renegotiation after a positive productivity shock more likely than downward
renegotiation after a negative productivity shock. This implies that zero wage growth
is frequent, and that wage cuts are comparatively rare as opposed to wage rises.
Zero wage growth may also be an important lower bound to the wage evolution
because of fairness standards. For assessing the fairness of the wage set this year,
workers take the wage received last year as an important landmark. Other important
landmarks are the rate of inflation or the wage growth rate implemented by collective
wage agreements (which itself usually depends strongly on the rate of inflation). In our
empirical analysis we model two lower bounds for the wage evolution: zero wage growth
and collectively bargained wage growth, because a large fraction of the German work
force is covered by collective wage agreements. These agreements are usually fixed in
nominal terms. They allow to set wages of covered workers above but not below the
agreed standard.
To some extent wage rigidity may be efficient. Employers accept certain lower
bounds to the wage evolution, because this enhances morale and productivity, reduces
fluctuation or encourages investments in specific capital. However, to some extent wage
8
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rigidity may be unilaterally enforced through workers’ bargaining power without any
enhancements of productivity. Employers are likely to oppose to that type of wage
rigidity. Pfeiffer (2003) proposes to speak of efficient wage rigidity and bargaining
power wage rigidity in order to distinguish these two types of wage rigidity. Indeed,
when asked for the reasons of downward wage rigidity, managers in Germany say that
not only efficiency wage considerations but also wage floors from collective bargaining
are relevant (Franz and Pfeiffer 2003).
2.1.2 The effect of wage rigidity on mobility
In our empirical analysis, the extent of downward wage rigidity at individual level is
captured by the wage sweep-up. It measures the excess wage growth due to rigid wages
in comparison to a counterfactual labour market with flexible wages. As the wage-
employment relationship is central to the economic analysis of the labour market, it
is of specific interest to ask how the extent of excess wage growth affects job mobility
decisions. We distinguish between external and internal labour mobility. The former
comprises quits and layoffs while the latter contains promotions and intra-firm trans-
fers. In the following discussion we formulate hypotheses about whether wage sweep-up
increases or decreases job mobility. In the case of layoffs we present two opposing
hypothesis, while for the other types of mobility, we restrict the discussion to one hy-
pothesis, conceding that there can also be arguments for the opposite case.
Quits: In search models, quits occur when the discounted utility stream of an al-
ternative job or activity exceeds the discounted utility stream of the current job after
mobility costs have been taken into account (Mortensen 1986). Wages as well as non-
wage job characteristics are part of the utility associated with a job. To a worker who
cares about wages, a high wage sweep-up is an advantage of his current job, as it se-
cures a high wage level and prevents downward wage adjustments in the case of adverse
shocks. Ceteris paribus, a high wage sweep-up should therefore reduce the propensity
to quit. If an employee interprets the wage sweep-up as a premium to the individual
earnings capacity, we should expect that the duration of his search to find a better
paid job lasts longer (Gerlach and Hu¨bler 1992) and this means that the probability
9
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to quit decreases. Those workers who are not affected by wage sweep-up do not only
tend to quit because they feel that they are paid too low compared to other employees
in the firm or compared to their effort level, but they may also do so due to a higher
anticipated risk of being laid off (see discussion on wage rigidity and layoffs in the next
section).
Hypothesis 1: A higher wage sweep-up reduces the propensity to quit.
Layoffs: If firms cannot or do not want to cut wages, they need some alternative ad-
justment mechanism to shocks. Firms may prefer to adjust to negative shocks through
layoffs. These do less damage to morale and productivity of the remaining workforce,
because the concerned workers exit the firm. Laid off workers suffer and would like to
react, but they are no longer in the firm. The threat of layoffs may even increase the
productivity of those who stay in the firm (Bewley 1999).
Hypothesis 2a: A higher wage sweep-up increases the risk of being laid off.
However, workers are heterogeneous with respect to their degree of wage sweep-up.
Whether or not layoffs are positively associated with wage sweep-up at individual level
will depend on whether firms lay off workers among those most affected by wage rigidity,
or whether firms lay off other groups of workers. If protecting workers from wage cuts is
a motivation and incentive device, it may be targeted towards certain groups of workers
who are likely to acquire firm-specific human capital and who have a long-term value
to the firm. When being forced to lay off personnel, firms are then unlikely to lay off
those workers. They may rather lay off other groups of workers. This implies that
workers protected against wage cuts or moderate wage growth by rigid wages benefit at
the same time from employment security, while other groups of workers simultaneously
suffer from higher earnings volatility and greater employment risks. The same is true
if, in the case of wage sweep-up due to bargaining power, intended layoffs of high wage
sweep-up workers cannot be realised because of employment protection legislation and
labour laws. Those insiders that benefit from wage rigidity may also benefit from labour
legislation with respect to layoffs. In Germany, firms have to justify layoffs for economic
reasons and they are bound to a social plan that stipulates social criteria in order to
assess which employees of the work force are actually laid off.
10
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Both explanations correspond to a core-periphery view of the labour force, where a
core work force is at the same time protected from layoffs and from wage cuts, whereas
a peripheral work force provides a buffer for adjustment and suffers from both flexible
wages and more insecure jobs. The resulting hypothesis is the inverse of hypothesis 2a.
Hypothesis 2b: A higher wage sweep-up reduces the risk of being laid off.
Another adjustment strategy would be to moderate positive wage growth rates of
those workers not directly affected by wage rigidity in order to make up for the excess
wage growth of those workers affected. The cost of downward wage adjustments may
actually not only reduce wage cuts, but may also make firms more reluctant to grant
wage increases, as they know that reversals of wage increases in the future are costly
(Elsby 2005). Such a compression of the wage growth distribution would not necessar-
ily reduce employment, although it would distort the allocation of workers of different
skills and productivity in comparison with an uncompressed wage growth distribution.
Promotions: Employers might use positional changes to adjust wages when wages
within positions are rigid (Solon, Whatley and Stevens 1997). Wage rises are realised
through promotions. Wage freezes or moderate wage growth might be implemented by
reducing promotion opportunities or even by increasing demotions or transfers. Workers
with a high wage sweep-up are less likely to receive a promotion because wage growth in
the past had exceeded productivity growth for these workers. They are less productive
per unit of wage costs and further promotions are thus unlikely.
Hypothesis 3: A higher wage sweep-up reduces the chances of being promoted.
Transfers of personnel: Workers who have accumulated a high wage sweep-up
may be transferred to positions where they are more productive relative to their wage
level or to positions where wages are less rigid. The old position can then be filled
with a worker who can be recruited internally or externally at a lower wage. If the new
position exhibits lower or more volatile wage growth, this may also have direct adverse
consequences on productivity and therefore it is questionable whether it is a feasible
option when efficiency wage considerations are an important factor. A demotion might
be as harmful to worker motivation as a wage cut. However, if in the new position
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efficiency wage considerations are a minor factor (e.g. if output can be monitored more
easily or if shirking is less costly) the impact of a transfer on productivity may be less
severe than that of a wage cut in the same position. In a setting where wages are
rigid primarily due to bargaining power, and thus efficiency wage considerations do not
play a role, aspects of motivation are less important. Adverse effects of demotions or
transfers on worker productivity are then expected to be small, thus making them a
possible strategy to circumvent wage rigidity.
Hypothesis 4: A higher wage sweep-up increases the likelihood of being transferred
to a different job within the firm.
2.2 Related literature
The earnings function approach we use to measure wage rigidity is pioneered by Al-
tonji and Devereux (2000) who explore downward rigidity in nominal wages for the U.S.
They estimate the probability of receiving a nominal wage cut at close to zero and con-
clude that nominal wage rigidity is a pervasive phenomenon in the U.S. labour market.
The earnings function approach has been applied to measure downward nominal wage
rigidity in Switzerland (Fehr and Goette 2005), Italy (Devicienti 2002) and Germany
(Knoppik and Beissinger 2003)2. Downward nominal wage rigidity, which prevents wage
cuts, translates into downward real wage rigidity at low rates of inflation3. However,
downward nominal wage rigidity is not the only reason for downward real wage rigidity,
because wages can be rigid at any rate of wage growth. The earnings function ap-
proach has therefore been extended by also considering situations where wages cannot
be increased by less than a certain rigidity threshold, for example the rate of inflation.
When in addition to nominal wage rigidity such a supplementary rigidity threshold is
considered, the literature has termed this as modelling ‘real wage rigidity’, although
2Of course a number of other methods have been applied to measure wage rigidity by analysing the
features of the wage change distribution in micro data sets. See for example Beissinger and Knoppik
(2001) and Christofides and Stengos (2002).
3We should mention that Kandil’s (2005) empirical investigation demonstrates that prices appear
more downwardly rigid than nominal wages in response to demand fluctuations in the U.S. Therefore
real wage reductions during economic downturns can be exacerbated. However, demand fluctuations
are not the only shocks of relevance for wage growth.
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the threshold is not necessarily always equal to the rate of inflation (Bauer, Bonin and
Sunde 2003, Devicienti, Maida and Sestito 2003, Barwell and Schweitzer 2005). Fehr,
Goette and Pfeiffer 2002 have equalled the rigidity threshold to the collectively bar-
gained wage growth rate and therefore termed the wage rigidity defined by their model
as contractual wage rigidity. The studies that have extended the earnings function
approach in such a way find that a higher share of the work force is affected by real
or contractual wage rigidity than by nominal wage rigidity, and that wage growth is
swept up more substantially by real or contractual wage rigidity than by nominal wage
rigidity.
Several studies that have used the earnings function approach to measure wage
rigidity also explore whether an effect of wage rigidity on unemployment and mobility
can be established. Fehr and Goette (2005), Bauer, Bonin and Sunde (2003) and
Devicienti, Maida and Sestito (2003) find positive associations between wage sweep-up
and unemployment. They all study the effects at some level of aggregation. In order
to see whether wage rigidity distorts job allocations within firms, however, one has to
look at the micro level.
At the micro level, Altonji and Devereux (2000) find modest support for the hypoth-
esis that wage sweep-up reduces quits, but their analysis shows no clear effect of wage
sweep-up on layoffs and promotions. Pfeiffer (2003), based on the model estimated in
Fehr, Goette and Pfeiffer (2002), finds that wage sweep-up decreases the individual un-
employment risk and the incidence of external job changes. While the analysis shows no
adverse consequences for those workers affected by wage rigidity, a high wage sweep-up
seems to be linked to declining employment at the firm level and to attenuated employ-
ment growth at the sectoral level. Pfeiffer (2003, p. 266) therefore concludes that wage
rigidity does not have adverse effects on those workers directly affected by the rigidity,
but on others whose wages are flexible.
To our knowledge our study is the first to include internal transfers into the analysis
of the effects of wage rigidity. For Germany, our analysis is the first to include internal
job mobility and to distinguish quits and layoffs exactly instead of proxying them by job
changes and unemployment spells. A further contribution of the study is methodologi-
cal. Under the assumption that rounding is an adequate indicator of measurement error
we assign the incidence of measurement error at individual level instead of estimating
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a global parameter of the probability that observations are affected by measurement
error as preceding studies have done (see section 2.4 for details).
2.3 Data
We use data from the German Socio-Economic panel (GSOEP) household survey that
contains a rich set of socio-economic variables. Our data cover the period from 1984 –
2004. An overview of the structure of the GSOEP is provided by Haisken-DeNew and
Frick (2003).
We restrict our sample to employed workers between 18 and 65 years of age, for whom
data on wages is available for at least two consecutive years. Apprentices are excluded.
We drop observations where monthly wages are below 250 Euros. The GSOEP states
the gross wage including overtime payment, as well as contractual working hours and
overtime. The values refer to the month prior to the interview. We construct hourly
wages by dividing the monthly gross wage by the sum of monthly contractual hours and
overtime. This measures labour costs more appropriately than if only the contractual
working hours were considered. Through the variation of overtime work firms may gain
some wage flexibility that would not show up in a measure of hourly wages that just
accounted for contractual working time.
We capture wage growth by taking the difference in the log wage for all wage obser-
vations that are available in two consecutive years. We trim the wage change distribu-
tion by dropping observations with absolute wage changes of more than 0.5 log points,
thereby removing 4 % of the observations, assuming that such high growth rates are
not correctly measured. Besides regressors from the GSOEP, we also match external
information to our data set. These are the annual inflation and unemployment rate as
well as data on collectively bargained wage growth. The inflation rate is constructed
from the consumer price index of the German Federal Statistical Office4. Unemploy-
ment rates for East and West Germany are published by the German Federal Labour
4The consumer price index is available on-line in the “prices” section of the German Federal Statisti-
cal Office homepage, http://www.destatis.de/themen/e/thm preise.htm, link accessed on 30th Septem-
ber 2004.
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Office5. The index of collectively bargained wages is published by the German Federal
Statistical Office6. The index is not available for all sectors. Notably the agricultural
sector is missing, some parts of the public sector are missing, and, apart from the hotel
and restaurants industry, large parts of the service sector are missing. This has to be
kept in mind when interpreting our results. Furthermore, for East Germany the index is
only available from 1995. When constructing collectively bargained wage growth rates
a further year is lost. East German observations thus only enter our analysis from 1996
onwards. Missing values of regressors further reduce the sample size7. Finally, from
1984 to 2003 we have 41 626 wage change observations.
The GSOEP survey includes retrospective questions on job mobility. Respondents
are asked whether there were any employment changes since the first of January of the
preceding year and, if so, which types of changes. We use the response option ’I have
started a new position with a different employer’ to identify external job mobility and
’I have changed positions within the same company’ to identify internal job mobility.
External job moves can be further classified through another question that asks how the
previous employment relationship was terminated. We use the option ’My resignation’
to identify quits and ’Dismissal’ to identify layoffs. Internal job moves can be further
classified through a question asking respondents to compare their current position with
their previous one along several dimensions, including the type of work and the income.
In our analysis, promotions qualify as those internal job moves where the worker either
states an improved income or an unchanged income alongside improvements in the type
5Monthly and yearly unemployment data by region is available at the German Federal Labour Office
on-line at http://www.pub.arbeitsamt.de/hst/services/statistik/aktuell/iiia4/zr alo qu west ostb.xls,
link accessed on 25th September 2004.
6The data is taken from the German Federal Statistical Office. Up to 2002 the data are from the
STATIS CD-ROM time series data base, segments 4031, 4033, 4037, 4039, 4055 and 4057. After 2002
they are updated from the GENESIS online data base of the German Federal Statistical Office. In our
sample collectively bargained wage growth is on average 3.1 % with a standard deviation of 1.5 % and
a maximum of 11.5 %.
7Compared to the whole sample, our estimation sample contains a higher share of male workers
(0.66 as opposed to 0.56) which is mostly due to the under sampling of the public and the service
sector. Workers in the estimation sample are on average two years older and have two more years of
tenure than workers in the whole sample. The distribution of education, firm size and employment
status is not altered much by the sample selection.
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of work. We regard the remaining internal moves as demotions or transfers. More details
on the job mobility variables are presented in Cornelißen/Hu¨bler (2005, appendix A).
The data set has strengths and weaknesses for the present purpose. The benefit from
using household survey data is that available regressors are much richer with respect to
socio-economic, demographic and work-place related information. While administrative
data may provide very accurately measured data on wages, quite often variables of
particular interest are missing. For example, comparing the GSOEP survey to the
German IAB employment sub-sample (IABS, Bescha¨ftigtenstichprobe), the GSOEP
has more detailed information on hours worked, human capital and job mobility. In
fact, the IABS lacks information on hours worked. Only the broad categories full-
and part-time are reported, and changes between the two within a given year are not
registered. Furthermore, earnings data are right censored, as wages are only recorded
up to the social security contribution ceiling. This reduces some of the alleged accuracy
of the IABS. Job changes and job separations can be identified in the IABS, but the
reason for the separation is unknown. In the GSOEP, we can identify quits, layoffs and
other separations separately, as well as internal job moves at the same employer. Job
mobility being in the focus of our analysis means we would not be able to conduct our
analysis with the IABS.
However, by using a household survey as opposed to administrative data we have
to cope with two drawbacks. Firstly, household surveys usually provide smaller sample
sizes than data sets that are provided by the social security or fiscal administration.
Secondly, household surveys are more prone to measurement error than registry data
from official sources. This makes the estimation of wage growth rates, that takes place
within the structural model presented in the next section, less precise, although it is
possible to take measurement error into account when formulating the model.
2.4 The econometric model and estimation issues
We estimate the extent of wage rigidity using the earnings function approach introduced
by Altonji and Devereux (2000). This approach models the observed wage change
through
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(i) an underlying notional wage change that is the wage change which would prevail
in absence of wage rigidity,
(ii) the effect of downward wage rigidity, and
(iii) the effect of measurement error.
The model we use is similar to the one devised by Dickens and Goette (2002), which
represents a generalisation of the original Altonji-Devereux model in that it incorporates
not only downward nominal wage rigidity but it adds another wage setting regime. As
in Fehr, Goette and Pfeiffer (2003), we add a contractually rigid wage setting regime
and we use data on collectively bargained wage growth as the rigidity threshold in this
regime.
The notional wage change w∗it for individual i at time t depends on a set of covariates
xit,
w∗it = x
′
itβ + eit, eit ∼ N(0, σ2e) (2.1)
where β is a coefficient vector and eit the error term.
Whether or not an individual actually receives her notional wage change depends on
whether the wage is set in a rigid wage setting regime, and whether wage setting within
this regime is constrained or not. There are three wage setting regimes, a flexible, a
nominally rigid regime and a contractually rigid regime.
In the flexible wage setting regime, the actual wage change of the worker, wait,
always equals the notional wage change
wait = x
′
itβ + eit (2.2)
In the two rigid regimes, the actual wage changes equals the notional wage change only
if the notional wage change exceeds a certain threshold value.
Formally, wage setting in the nominally rigid regime is then characterised by
wait = x
′
itβ + eit if x
′
itβ + eit > 0 (2.3)
= 0 otherwise
and in the contractually rigid regime by
wait = x
′
itβ + eit if x
′
itβ + eit > rit (2.4)
= rit otherwise.
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The rigid regimes are tobit models with left censoring of the distribution at the respec-
tive rigidity threshold. The variable rit is provided as data in the form of the collectively
bargained wage growth. Providing the rigidity threshold as data gives more structure
to the estimation and reduces the parameter space. Equalling it to the collectively bar-
gained wage growth takes account of the fact that in Germany a large share of employees
is covered by collective bargaining agreements.
The observed wage change is likely to differ from the notional wage change not
only because of wage rigidity, but also because of measurement error (misreporting), a
problem that is likely to be prevalent in the data set. The observed wage change, woit,
is then the actual wage, wait, change plus measurement error, mit:
woit = w
a
it +mit mit ∼ N(0, σ2m) (2.5)
We assume that mit is independent of eit.
With the measurement error term added to all observations, the three regimes in
terms of the observed wage growth become:
woit = x
′
itβ + eit +mit (2.6)
for the flexible wage setting regime,
woit = x
′
itβ + eit +mit if x
′
itβ + eit > 0 (2.7)
= mit otherwise
for the nominally rigid regime, and
woit = x
′
itβ + eit +mit if x
′
itβ + eit > rit (2.8)
= rit +mit otherwise
for the contractually rigid regime.
We model a restricted measurement error (Model 1). Instead of adding a measure-
ment error term uniformly to all observations, this is done only for individuals that have
reported a rounded value of the wage level in either of two consecutive periods, while
treating individuals that have not rounded their wage levels in any of two consecutive
periods as error free (i.e. according to equations (2.2)-(2.4)). With this definition 92.9 %
of the observations fall into the measurement error regime, the remaining 7.1 % into
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the regime without measurement error. Under the assumption that rounding is an ade-
quate indicator of measurement error this procedure has the advantage of assigning the
measurement error regime at individual level instead of estimating a global parameter
of the probability that observations are affected by measurement error. Supplementary,
we also estimate a model under the assumption of uniform measurement error (Model
2).
In order to complete the models, we have to account for the individual propensities,
pC , pN and pF , of falling into the contractually rigid, nominally rigid and flexible regime
respectively. These parameters are made dependent on explanatory variables. We
estimate the relative propensities pC/pF , and pN/pF as
pCit
pFit
= exp(z˜
′
itλ), (2.9)
and
pNit
pFit
= exp(z˜
′
itω), (2.10)
where z˜it is a vector of explanatory variables, λ and ω are the corresponding coefficient
vectors. Once the relative propensities are estimated, the absolute propensities pC , pF
and pN can be recovered, as (2.9), (2.10) and pC + pN + pF = 1 form a system of three
linear equations in three unknowns.
The model parameters β, λ, ω, as well as the standard deviations of the error terms,
can be estimated simultaneously by maximum likelihood.
Once notional wage growth and the other model parameters are estimated, we can
determine expected actual wage growth as well as the wage sweep-up, which is the
difference between expected actual wage growth and notional wage growth
su = E[wait − w∗it]. (2.11)
The subsequent analysis of mobility effects consists of heteroskedastic probit regressions
of quits, layoffs, promotions and transfers on the wage sweep-up and other control
variables. Let yit be a binary outcome variable that takes on the value 1 if job mobility
of individual i takes place at time t, and the value 0 if no job mobility takes place. We
apply a multiplicative heteroskedastic probit model, where the expected probability of
a job mobility event is
P (yit = 1) = Φ
(
x′itβ
exp(z′itγ)
)
, (2.12)
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where xit and zit are vectors of covariates influencing respectively the mean and standard
deviation of the latent variable underlying the probit model, β and γ are the related
coefficient vectors, and Φ(·) is the standard normal cumulative distribution function.
Estimated coefficients cannot be readily interpreted as marginal effects. For regressors
wk that are elements of both, x and z, marginal effects of wk on P (yit = 1) depend on
βk and γk as well as on the linear combinations x
′β and z′γ (Greene 2003, p. 680):
∂Prob(y = 1|x, z)
∂w˜k
= φ
[
x′β
exp(z′γ)
]
βk − x′β · γk
exp(z′γ)
. (2.13)
Throughout the analysis of the heteroskedastic probit model, we report marginal effects
at means. We derive the respective standard errors needed for inference using the delta
method as described in chapter 5.
2.5 Results
2.5.1 Estimates of the wage rigidity model
The tables can be found in section 2.7 (page 27). Table 2.1 reports the maximum likeli-
hood estimation results of the wage rigidity model 1 with restricted measurement error.
As a robustness check the estimation under the assumption of uniform measurement
error is presented in table 2.6. We report p-values based on robust standard errors as
well as on standard errors adjusted for clustering on the year of observation in order
to take into account biased estimates of standard errors due to heteroskedasticity and
within-group correlation of the error term. The latter may pose a problem in our es-
timation, as we have matched the unemployment and inflation rates at year level, a
procedure which magnifies the bias from within group correlation if such correlation is
present (Moulton 1990).
The coefficients of the notional wage growth equation displayed in panel A of Table
2.1 are in line with expectations. The panels B and C of the table report the coefficients
of the regime propensity equations. The regime propensities are estimated as non-
linear transformations (see equations 2.9 and 2.10). Therefore, the coefficients cannot
be interpreted as marginal effects, but their signs and significance can be assessed.
A positive coefficient on nominal GDP growth for both regime propensities indicates
that wage rigidity seems to react cyclically. In upturns, the extent of rigidity rises
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and in downturns it falls. Firms seem to have more scope to restrain wage growth in
recessionary periods. Firms that voluntarily set wages according to collective bargaining
agreements may refrain from doing so. Firms covered by union agreements can also
moderate the growth of effective wages if they reduce pay components that are not
mandatory under the collective contract and thus reduce the ‘effective coverage’. With
respect to the propensity of the nominal rigid regime, the manufacturing sector seems
not to differ from the rest of the economy. The coefficient on the manufacturing dummy
is not statistically different from zero. However, the propensity of the contractual regime
is significantly lower in manufacturing as compared to the rest of the economy. This
can be explained by the important weight of the public sector which dominates the
reference group and which is a sector with high union coverage8.
Panel D of Table 2.1 reports summary statistics for the wage rigidity model. Ob-
served wage growth over the whole period is around 4.1%. The wage growth predicted
by the model is 4.3% on average. This is decomposed into a notional wage growth of
0.9 and a wage sweep-up of 3.4%. At individual level the wage sweep-up varies between
1.4 and 6.5%. An estimated 45% of the work force are in the contractually rigid wage
setting regime, 2% in the nominally rigid regime, and for 53% wage setting is flexible9.
Model 2 presented in Table 2.6 predicts a lower notional wage growth of -0.8% and
a correspondingly higher wage sweep-up of 4.9% on average. An estimated 32% of the
work force are in the contractually rigid wage setting regime, 28% in the nominal rigid
regime, and for 40% wage setting is flexible.
Clearly, the way that measurement error is modelled has an effect on the estimated
extent of wage rigidity. Although the extent of wage sweep-up differs between the two
models, the signs and significance of the determinants in the two models are mostly
similar. The wage sweep-ups estimated from the two models are correlated with a
highly significant correlation coefficient of 0.96.
8In a different specification where we replaced the manufacturing dummy by a public sector dummy,
contractual wage rigidity was significantly higher in the public sector than in the reference group.
9In a linear regression of the wage sweep-up on worker characteristics and time and sector dummies
we find that ceteris paribus wage sweep-up is positively related to nominal GDP growth, that it is
higher in East Germany and higher for foreigners, men, high wage workers, more tenured workers, less
educated workers and workers in smaller firms (which can be explained by lower notional wage growth
in smaller firms).
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In essence our results match those of Pfeiffer (2003) in that there is a non negligible
extent of wage sweep-up, which is predominantly due to contractual rigidities, and at
the same time wage setting is flexible for more than half of the work force. That similar
results can be found on the basis of different datasets underlines the robustness of the
existence of wage rigidities in the German labour market.
Our results of the extent of wage rigidity are very robust over a range of different
specifications of the regime propensities (not reported here), such as the inclusion of
the regional unemployment rate, dummies for East German and male workers as well as
additional sector dummies, individual tenure and schooling into the regime propensity
equations. Even though the extent of wage rigidity was robust, we obtained coefficients
on some dummies of a very high magnitude (> 3). This may well be due to the fact
that some cells are too sparsely populated. Therefore, and in the vein of a parsimonious
specification, we opted for the present model. The results also carry over when the wage
rigidity model is estimated in a sample of over 25 year-olds.
2.5.2 The effects of wage rigidity on mobility
In the following analysis, heteroskedastic probit regressions of quits, layoffs, promotions
and transfers are presented, where the wage sweep-up and other controls are included
as regressors. The timing is such that mobility events between t and t+1 are explained
by labour market regressors at time t. The wage sweep-up at time t, which enters the
mobility equations, is based on the wage change observation between t-1 and t. In all
mobility regressions, the heteroskedasticity equation is specified equally and includes key
determinants of job mobility, namely the wage sweep-up, the wage level and the number
of past external job moves. Tables 2.2, 2.3, 2.4 and 2.5 report the results in terms of
marginal effects at means of the regressors on the probability of the mobility events.
For those variables that are part of the heteroskedasticity equation, the marginal effect
at means can vary in sign. This is due to the functional form of the marginal effects
under heteroskedasticity shown in equation (2.13). In the case of the wage sweep-up
we therefore also report the fraction of individuals in the sample that display a positive
marginal effect of the wage sweep-up.
For each mobility event we estimate four different specifications. Specification (1)
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is the baseline model which includes the hourly wage level besides the wage sweep-
up and a set of control variables. Specification (2) adds the regressors age and age
squared. Specification (3) replaces the absolute wage level by the residual of a wage
equation (“wage gap”). This is a measure of the individual wage relative to the wage
that one would expect given the observable individual characteristics. Such a relative
wage measure may be more important for mobility decisions than the absolute wage
level, especially in the case of quits.
The wage sweep-up is a complex non-linear interaction of collectively bargained
wage growth and of notional wage growth. It is therefore warranted to control for both
of these factors in order to isolate the effect of wage rigidity. While many individual
characteristics that determine notional wage growth are already included in the control
variables, collectively bargained wage growth is not. Specification (4), our preferred
specification, therefore adds collectively bargained wage growth as a control variable.
All four specifications include the wage sweep-up estimated by model 1. The results can
be replicated with the wage sweep-up of model 2, as both wage sweep-ups are nearly
perfectly correlated. Table 2.7 presents the results for specification (4) when the wage
sweep-up of model 2 is used.
Quits. Table 2.2 reports the probit regression of the quit decision on the wage
sweep-up and control variables. The marginal effect at means of the wage sweep-up
on the probability to quit is negative and highly significant in all specifications. This
suggests that a high wage sweep-up reduces the propensity to quit, as stated in our
hypothesis 1. The marginal effect at means is negative for all individuals in the sample.
The estimated effects suggest that for an average individual an increase in the wage
sweep-up of one percentage point, say from 3% to 4%, reduces the propensity to quit
by between 0.54 and 1.56 percentage points. This is a quite sizeable effect if compared
to the sample probability of a quit of 3.26%. This is in line with the results of Altonji
and Devereux (2000) who find support for the hypothesis that a higher wage sweep-up
reduces the propensity to quit. The wage level has no significant effect on quits, but
the wage gap reduces the propensity to quit significantly. This implies that not the
wage level per se influences quitting but the wage level relative to the wage one can
expect given relevant labour market characteristics. Collectively bargained wage growth
increases quitting. This may be because favourable collectively bargained wage growth
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in a given industry indicates good labour market conditions, which in turn encourages
job changes. Controlling for this effect increases the negative effect of wage sweep-up
on quits. The coefficients of the control variables are in line with expectations.
Layoffs. Table 2.3 reports probit regressions of layoff decisions on the wage sweep-
up and control variables. The marginal effect at means of the wage sweep-up on the
probability of a layoff is not significant in the baseline specification (1). However, when
including age as a regressor in specification (2), the effect of the wage sweep-up on
layoffs becomes negative and significant. The wage level significantly reduces layoffs,
but the wage gap does not (specification (3)). Specification (4) suggests that the risk
of layoffs rises with collectively bargained wage growth. However, layoffs then seem
to concern low wage sweep-up workers more than high wage sweep-up workers (and
low wage workers more than high wage workers). This finding confirms hypothesis
2b. Individuals with a high wage sweep-up are less likely to be laid off. The marginal
effects at means across specifications suggest that an increase in the wage sweep-up of
one percentage point reduces the propensity of being laid off by between 0.48 and 1.61
percentage points, which is quite sizeable relative to the sample probability of a layoff
of 2.98%. The marginal effect is negative not only for an average individual, but for
virtually all individuals in the sample. In the specifications where the effect is significant,
at most 2% of the individuals in the sample have a positive predicted marginal effect
of the wage sweep-up on layoffs. The coefficients of the control variables are in line
with expectations. For those sectors included in our analysis, the negative association
between wage sweep-up and layoffs is obtained holding sectors constant. Therefore
we suppose that it is not due to segregation across sectors, but that it prevails within
sectors. However, we can say nothing on whether the negative association is valid within
firms, or whether there is segregation across firms. Our results match the findings of
Pfeiffer (2003, p. 255ff) that workers with a higher wage sweep-up do not face an
increased risk of unemployment and that they have a reduced probability of changing
the establishment within the following year.
Promotions. Table 2.4 reports probit regressions of promotions on the wage sweep-
up and control variables. The marginal effect at means of the wage sweep-up on the
probability of being promoted is negative and significant in specification (1). Once age
is controlled for, the effect of the wage sweep-up becomes insignificant (specifications
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(2) and (3)). When controlling additionally for collectively bargained wage growth,
which is the case in specification (4), the effect of the wage sweep-up on promotions
becomes positive and significant and suggests that an increase of the wage sweep-up
of one percentage point increases the probability of promotions by 0.34 percentage
points. The coefficients of the control variables are in line with expectations. The
result that wage sweep-up increases promotion opportunities is the opposite of what we
have expected (hypothesis 3). An explanation for this results could be that promotion
tournaments, which can be understood as incentive devices (Lazear and Rosen 1981) are
a complementary personnel policy to efficiency wages. Both, promotion opportunities
and wage rigidity might be combined in order to set incentives and motivate workers.
Transfers. Table 2.5 reports probit regressions of transfers on the wage sweep-up
and control variables. As in the case of promotions, the effect of wage sweep-up on
transfers is negative and significant in specification (1). Once age is controlled for, the
effect becomes positive. However, it stays insignificant across the specifications (2) to
(4). Therefore we cannot confirm our hypothesis 4 that transfers are more likely for
high wage sweep-up workers. Demotions or transfers might be too damaging to morale
and therefore not be an adequate means to cope with rigid wages.
2.6 Conclusion
Using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), we have analysed the
extent of contractual and nominal downward wage rigidity as well as its effect on labour
mobility in Germany over the period of 1985-2004.
Within a structural empirical model of wage rigidity, we have estimated that down-
ward wage rigidity increases wage growth by between 3.4 and 4.9 percentage points in
the aggregate each year in comparison to a counterfactual labour market with flexible
wage setting. We have exploited the variation of this wage sweep-up at individual level
in order to estimate probit equations to measure its effect on layoffs, quits, promotions
and internal transfers of personnel. According to our results, the effect of the wage
sweep-up on quits and layoffs is negative, highly significant and robust across specifi-
cations. Wage sweep-up has a strong stabilizing effect on employment relations. The
negative association with quits suggests that wage sweep-up constitutes a job specific
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net advantage. The negative association with layoffs suggests that in the parts of the
economy represented by our data there is a dual labour market: A core work force is
at the same time protected from layoffs and from wage cuts, whereas a peripheral work
force suffers from both, flexible wages and more insecure jobs and provides a buffer
for adjustment. However, on the basis of these results for external mobility we cannot
discriminate between two concurring explanations: (i) employers aiming at motivating
the core work force and tying it to the firm by preventing it from wage cuts and layoffs,
or (ii) the core work force being endowed with bargaining power to avoid wage cuts and
simultaneously being protected from layoffs by labour legislation or norms.
According to our results for internal job mobility, wage sweep-up seems to go in hand
with increased promotion opportunities and there seem to be no effects on transfers
and demotions. The duality in the labour market seems to be even stronger than was
visible by only considering external mobility. Not only are high wage sweep-up workers
protected form layoffs but they also seem to enjoy better promotion opportunities than
their low wage sweep-up counterparts. One explanation might be that internal systems
of promotions are complementary to efficiency wages. This suggests that the duality
in the labour market is to an important extent driven by incentive and motivation
considerations and not simply by bargaining power.
We see several perspectives of future research that could extend the present analysis.
The model of wage rigidity could be extended by also incorporating symmetric rigidity
such as menu costs. Furthermore, it would be worthwhile to implement a model of
downward wage rigidity into a data set that allows international comparison, such
as the European Community Household Panel (ECHP) an thus to contribute to the
empirical literature that has carried out international comparisons in the present field
of research (Holden and Wulfsberg 2005, Knoppik and Beissinger 2005, Behr and Po¨tter
2005). Finally, a model of downward wage rigidity should be implemented in a linked-
employer-employee data set, which would allow to model the labour demand side much
more extensively by including numerous firm characteristics into the analysis.
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2.7 Tables
Tab. 2.1: Wage rigidity model with restricted measurement errors (Model 1)
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Table 1 Estimation results of the wage rigidity model with restricted measurement errors
(Model 1)
(A) Notional wage change (B) Relative propensity of nominally
rigid regime [log (pN/pF )]
Coeff.a P-val.b Coeff. P-val.b
(i) (ii) (i) (ii)
Male −0.45 0.03 0.01 Nominal GDP growth 0.56 0.00 0.00
Foreign −0.28 0.34 0.49 Manufacturing 0.94 0.20 0.39
Schooling −0.08 0.16 0.09 Constant −6.66 0.00 0.00
Tenure −0.24 0.00 0.00
Tenure squared/100 0.51 0.00 0.00 (C) Relative propensity of contractually
rigid regime [log (pC/pF )]
Experience −0.32 0.00 0.00
Experience squared/100 0.45 0.00 0.00 P-val.b
Months unempl. last year −0.17 0.50 0.55 Coeff. (i) (ii)
Firm size≥ 20 < 200 0.80 0.01 0.01 Nominal GDP growth 0.03 0.00 0.32
Firm size≥ 200 < 2,000 1.26 0.00 0.00 Manufacturing −0.30 0.00 0.00
Firm size > 2,000 1.71 0.00 0.00 Constant −0.21 0.00 0.06
Intermediate status group 0.36 0.16 0.19
High status group 1.49 0.00 0.00 (D) Summary statistics
Skill training last period 1.23 0.05 0.06
East Germany 0.85 0.29 0.22
South Germany −0.24 0.23 0.32 Wage growth (means)
Education parents −0.04 0.66 0.70 Observed 0.041
Diff. unempl. rate, t −0.93 0.31 0.40 Predicted 0.043
Diff. unempl. rate, t − 1 0.38 0.36 0.36 Notional 0.009
Diff. unempl. rate, t − 2 −1.31 0.03 0.16
Inflation −0.79 0.34 0.43 Wage sweep-up
Inflation, t − 1 1.36 0.00 0.00 Mean 0.034
Inflation, t − 2 −0.40 0.52 0.08 Standard deviation 0.007
Mining −0.50 0.43 0.51 5th percentile 0.023
Manufacturing 0.62 0.06 0.11 10th percentile 0.025
Ressource processing 0.09 0.82 0.79 25th percentile 0.029
Transp. and communication −0.39 0.38 0.19 50th percentile 0.034
Building sector −0.31 0.43 0.45 75th percentile 0.039
Services 0.45 0.72 0.75 90th percentile 0.044
Credit and insurance −0.01 0.99 0.98 95th percentile 0.047
Public utilities 0.00 0.99 0.99 Minimum 0.014
Year 1988 2.98 0.18 0.12 Maximum 0.065
Year 1989 0.10 0.98 0.98
Year 1990 −0.39 0.89 0.90 Regime propensities (means)
Year 1991 −0.45 0.91 0.93 pC 0.45
Year 1992 2.76 0.49 0.57 pN 0.02
Year 1993 0.30 0.92 0.93 pF 0.53
Year 1994 −1.89 0.13 0.20
Year 1996 3.11 0.00 0.00 Standard errors
Year 1997 −0.75 0.63 0.60 σe 0.156
Year 1998 −3.22 0.02 0.00 σm 0.052
Year 1999 −0.60 0.41 0.21
Year 2000 −0.47 0.84 0.86
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Table 1 continued
(A) Notional wage change (D) Summary statistics
Year 2001 −2.60 0.31 0.35 No. of observations 41,626
Year 2002 −1.31 0.43 0.47 Log likelihood 23,006.2
Year 2003 0.41 0.67 0.64
Constant 6.59 0.00 0.00
a All coefficients in panel A are multiplied by 100.
b P-Values are based on (i) robust Huber–White sandwich standard errors. (ii) Standard errors
adjusted for within group error term correlation, clustering on year
of the economy. The coefficient on the manufacturing dummy is not statistically
different from zero. However, the propensity of the contractual regime is sig-
nificantly lower in manufacturing as compared to the rest of the economy. This
can be explained by the important weight of the public sector which dominates
the reference group and which is a sector with high union coverage.7
Table 1 reports summary statistics for the wage rigidity model. Observed
wage growth over the whole period is around 4.1%. The wage growth predicted
by the model is 4.3% on average. This is decomposed into a notional wage
growth of 0.9% and a wage sweep-up of 3.4%. At individual level the wage
sweep-up varies between 1.4 and 6.5%. An estimated 45% of the work force
are in the contractually rigid wage setting regime, 2% in the nominally rigid
regime, and for 53% wage setting is flexible.8
Model 2 presented in Appendix A1 predicts a lower notional wage growth
of −0.8% and a correspondingly higher wage sweep-up of 4.9% on average.
An estimated 32% of the work force are in the contractually rigid wage setting
regime, 28% in the nominal rigid regime, and for 40% wage setting is flexible.
Clearly, the way that measurement error is modelled has an effect on the
estimated extent of wage rigidity. Although the extent of wage sweep-up differs
between the two models, the signs and significance of the determinants in the
two models are mostly similar. The wage sweep-ups estimated from the two
models are correlated with a highly significant correlation coefficient of 0.96.
In essence our results match those of Pfeiffer (2003) in that there is a non
negligible extent of wage sweep-up, which is predominantly due to contractual
rigidities, and at the same time wage setting is flexible for more than half of the
work force. That similar results can be found on the basis of different datasets
7 In a different specification where we replaced the manufacturing dummy by a public sector
dummy, contractual wage rigidity was significantly higher in the public sector than in the reference
group.
8 In a linear regression of the wage sweep-up on worker characteristics and time and sector dum-
mies we find that ceteris paribus wage sweep-up is positively related to nominal GDP growth, that
it is higher in East Germany and higher for foreigners, men, high wage workers, more tenured
workers, less educated workers and workers in smaller firms (which can be explained by lower
notional wage growth in smaller firms).
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Tab. 2.2: Heteroskedastic probit regression of quits in period t+ 1
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Table 2 Heteroskedastic probit regression of quits in period t + 1
(1) (2) (3) (4)
No. of observations 38,328 38,328 38,328 38,328
P-val. Wald test of joint significancea 0 0 0 0
P-val. LR test of heteroskedasticityb 0 0 0 0
Sample probability of y= 1 3.26% 3.26% 3.26% 3.26%
Mean predicted probability of y= 1 3.26% 3.26% 3.26% 3.26%
Probability of y= 1 predicted at means 1.48% 1.42% 1.42% 1.46%
dP/dX at P-val dP/dX at P-val dP/dX at P-val dP/dX at P-val
means means means means
Wage sweep-up * 100 −1.06% 0.00 −0.54% 0.05 −0.58% 0.04 −1.56% 0.00
Hourly wage level −0.001% 0.93 0.001% 0.97 − − 0.001% 0.96
Wage gap (earnings equation residual) − − − − −0.12% 0.00 − −
Collectively bargained wage growth − − − − − − 0.34% 0.01
Age − − 0.03% 0.51 −0.02% 0.63 0.15% 0.02
Age squared − − −0.001% 0.15 −0.0002% 0.69 −0.002% 0.01
Fulltime −0.46% 0.03 −0.50% 0.02 −0.54% 0.01 −0.54% 0.02
East Germany −0.84% 0.00 −0.84% 0.00 −0.48% 0.00 −0.89% 0.00
Foreign −0.40% 0.00 −0.43% 0.00 −0.45% 0.00 −0.36% 0.00
Male 0.35% 0.00 0.28% 0.02 0.10% 0.41 0.39% 0.00
Schooling 0.09% 0.00 0.09% 0.00 0.01% 0.64 0.07% 0.02
Number skill trainings 0.06% 0.43 0.05% 0.50 0.03% 0.68 0.01% 0.88
Tenure −0.15% 0.00 −0.14% 0.00 −0.16% 0.00 −0.12% 0.00
Firm size≥ 20 < 200 −0.70% 0.00 −0.58% 0.00 −0.69% 0.00 −0.77% 0.00
Firm size≥ 200 < 2,000 −0.94% 0.00 −0.79% 0.00 −0.94% 0.00 −1.06% 0.00
Firm size > 2,000 −1.38% 0.00 −1.19% 0.00 −1.41% 0.00 −1.56% 0.00
Number external moves −0.01% 0.93 −0.01% 0.85 −0.04% 0.62 −0.001% 1.00
Public sector −0.93% 0.00 −0.90% 0.00 −0.89% 0.00 −0.92% 0.00
Intermediate status group −0.09% 0.49 −0.08% 0.53 −0.23% 0.07 −0.18% 0.18
High status group −0.44% 0.02 −0.27% 0.17 −0.80% 0.00 −0.59% 0.01
Fraction with dP/d(sweep-up) > 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
All equations include time and sector dummies
a H0: “coefficients jointly insignificant”
b H0: “homoskedasticity” (The heteroskedasticity equation contains the regressors wage level,
wage sweep-up, and number of external job moves)
bargained wage growth as a control variable.9 All four specifications include
the wage sweep-up estimated by Model 1. The results can be replicated with
the wage sweep-up of Model 2, as both wage sweep-ups are nearly perfectly
correlated. Appendix A2 presents the results for specification (4) when the
wage sweep-up of Model 2 is used.
Quits
Table 2 reports the probit regression of the quit decision on the wage sweep-up
and control variables. The marginal effect at means of the wage sweep-up on
9 We thank the anonymous referees for suggesting to include a relative wage measure and collec-
tively bargained wage growth into the mobility equations.
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Tab. 2.3: Heteroskedastic probit regression of layoffs in period t+ 1
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Table 3 Heteroskedastic probit regression of layoffs in period t + 1
(1) (2) (3) (4)
No. of observations 38,328 38,328 38,328 38,328
P-Val. Wald test of joint significancea 0 0 0 0
P-Val. LR test of heteroskedasticityb 0.40 0.10 0.07 0.01
Sample probability of y= 1 2.98% 2.98% 2.98% 2.98%
Mean predicted probability of y= 1 2.98% 2.98% 2.98% 2.98%
Probability of y= 1 predicted at means 1.69% 1.64% 1.64% 1.60%
dP/dX at P-val dP/dX at P-val dP/dX at P-val dP/dX at P-val
means means means means
Wage sweep-up * 100 −0.21% 0.25 −0.48% 0.04 −0.50% 0.03 −1.61% 0.00
Hourly wage level −0.11% 0.00 −0.10% 0.00 − − −0.10% 0.00
Wage gap (earnings equation residual) − − − − −0.03% 0.57 − −
Collectively bargained wage growth − − − − − − 0.42% 0.00
Age − − −0.17% 0.00 −0.18% 0.00 −0.01% 0.94
Age squared − − 0.003% 0.00 0.003% 0.00 0.001% 0.16
Fulltime −0.03% 0.89 0.06% 0.80 0.05% 0.80 0.06% 0.79
East Germany 1.44% 0.00 1.51% 0.00 1.76% 0.00 1.26% 0.00
Foreign 0.56% 0.00 0.58% 0.00 0.57% 0.00 0.70% 0.00
Male 0.21% 0.15 0.22% 0.12 0.17% 0.30 0.34% 0.01
Schooling −0.05% 0.14 −0.04% 0.25 −0.06% 0.21 −0.06% 0.09
Number skill trainings −0.13% 0.20 −0.08% 0.40 −0.09% 0.35 −0.12% 0.22
Tenure −0.03% 0.02 −0.05% 0.00 −0.05% 0.00 −0.03% 0.02
Firm size≥ 20 < 200 −0.64% 0.00 −0.71% 0.00 −0.75% 0.00 −0.89% 0.00
Firm size≥ 200 < 2,000 −1.10% 0.00 −1.15% 0.00 −1.20% 0.00 −1.38% 0.00
Firm size > 2,000 −1.48% 0.00 −1.50% 0.00 −1.57% 0.00 −1.82% 0.00
Number external moves 0.23% 0.00 0.23% 0.00 0.22% 0.00 0.19% 0.01
Public sector −1.26% 0.00 −1.26% 0.00 −1.26% 0.00 −1.21% 0.00
Intermediate status group −0.46% 0.00 −0.43% 0.01 −0.48% 0.00 −0.52% 0.00
High status group −0.12% 0.64 −0.26% 0.26 −0.44% 0.21 −0.63% 0.00
Fraction with dP/d(sweep-up) > 0 0.14 0.02 0.02 0.00
All equations include time and sector dummies
a H0: “coefficients jointly insignificant”
b H0: “homoskedasticity” (The heteroskedasticity equation contains the regressors wage level,
wage sweep-up, and number of external job moves)
the probability to quit is negative and highly significant in all specifications. This
suggests that a high wage sweep-up reduces the propensity to quit, as stated
in our Hypothesis 1. The marginal effect at means is negative for all individu-
als in the sample. The estimated effects suggest that for an average individual
an increase in the wage sweep-up of one percentage point, say from 3 to 4%,
reduces the propensity to quit by between 0.54 and 1.56% points. This is a quite
sizeable effect if compared to the sample probability of a quit of 3.26%. This is
in line with the results of Altonji and Devereux (2000) who find support for the
hypothesis that a higher wage sweep-up reduces the propensity to quit.
The wage level has no significant effect on quits, but the wage gap reduces the
propensity to quit significantly. This implies that not the wage level per se influ-
ences quitting but the wage level relative to the wage one can expect given
relevant labour market characteristics. Collectively bargained wage growth
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Tab. 2.4: Heteroskedastic probit regression of promotions in period t+ 1
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Table 4 Heteroskedastic probit regression of promotions in period t + 1
(1) (2) (3) (4)
No. of observations 36,764 36,764 36,764 36,764
P-Val. Wald test of joint significancea 0 0 0 0
P-Val. LR test of heteroskedasticityb 0 0 0.003 0.001
Sample probability of y= 1 1.38% 1.38% 1.38% 1.38%
Mean predicted probability of y= 1 1.37% 1.38% 1.38% 1.38%
Probability of y= 1 predicted at means 0.68% 0.56% 0.56% 0.55%
dP/dX at P-val dP/dX at P-val dP/dX at P-val dP/dX at P-val
means means means means
Wage sweep-up * 100 −0.55% 0.00 0.13% 0.24 0.13% 0.24 0.34% 0.02
Hourly wage level −0.02% 0.06 −0.02% 0.06 − − −0.02% 0.07
Wage gap (earnings equation residual) − − − − −0.007% 0.79 − −
Collectively bargained wage growth − − − − − − −0.10% 0.05
Age − − −0.06% 0.00 −0.06% 0.00 −0.06% 0.00
Fulltime 0.22% 0.09 0.10% 0.46 0.09% 0.47 0.11% 0.39
East Germany 0.02% 0.86 −0.07% 0.54 −0.04% 0.82 −0.02% 0.85
Foreign −0.29% 0.00 −0.28% 0.00 −0.28% 0.00 −0.29% 0.00
Male 0.07% 0.41 −0.01% 0.89 −0.02% 0.83 −0.04% 0.61
Schooling 0.09% 0.00 0.10% 0.00 0.10% 0.00 0.10% 0.00
Number skill trainings 0.29% 0.00 0.22% 0.00 0.23% 0.00 0.22% 0.00
Tenure 0.01% 0.20 0.02% 0.00 0.02% 0.00 0.02% 0.01
Firm size≥ 20 < 200 0.30% 0.18 0.47% 0.04 0.45% 0.06 0.52% 0.03
Firm size≥ 200 < 2,000 1.12% 0.00 1.41% 0.00 1.37% 0.00 1.51% 0.00
Firm size > 2,000 1.57% 0.00 1.89% 0.00 1.84% 0.00 2.06% 0.00
Number external moves 0.13% 0.00 0.16% 0.00 0.15% 0.00 0.15% 0.00
Public sector 0.16% 0.32 0.11% 0.40 0.11% 0.41 0.11% 0.41
Intermediate status group 0.15% 0.13 0.12% 0.19 0.10% 0.30 0.13% 0.13
High status group 0.24% 0.21 0.52% 0.02 0.46% 0.16 0.64% 0.01
Fraction with dP/d(sweep-up) > 0 0.00 0.92 0.90 1.00
All equations include time and sector dummies
a H0: “coefficients jointly insignificant”
b H0: “homoskedasticity” (The heteroskedasticity equation contains the regressors wage level,
wage sweep-up, and number of external job moves)
increases quitting. This may be because favourable collectively bargained wage
growth in a given industry indicates good labour market conditions, which in
turn encourages job changes. Controlling for this effect increases the negative
effect of wage sweep-up on quits. The coefficients of the control variables are
in line with expectations.
Layoffs
Table 3 reports probit regressions of layoff decisions on the wage sweep-up
and control variables. The marginal effect at means of the wage sweep-up on
the probability of a layoff is not significant in the baseline specification (1).
However, when including age as a regressor in specification (2), the effect
of the wage sweep-up on layoffs becomes negative and significant. The wage
level significantly reduces layoffs, but the wage gap does not [specification (3)].
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Tab. 2.5: Heteroskedastic probit regression of promotions in period t+ 1
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Table 5 Heteroskedastic probit regression of transfers in period t + 1
(1) (2) (3) (4)
No. of observations 36,764 36,764 36,764 36,764
P-Val. Wald test of joint significancea 0 0 0 0.001
P-Val. LR test of heteroskedasticityb 0.07 0.20 0.07 0.13
Sample probability of y= 1 0.66% 0.66% 0.66% 0.66%
Mean predicted probability of y= 1 0.66% 0.66% 0.66% 0.66%
Probability of y= 1 predicted at means 0.38% 0.36% 0.36% 0.36%
dP/dX at P-val dP/dX at P-val dP/dX at P-val dP/dX at P-val
means means means means
Wage sweep-up * 100 −0.17% 0.03 0.03% 0.73 0.01% 0.92 0.19% 0.11
Hourly wage level 0.01% 0.11 0.01% 0.08 − − 0.01% 0.10
Wage gap (earnings equation residual) − − − − −0.026% 0.33 − −
Collectively bargained wage growth − − − − − − −0.08% 0.07
Age − − −0.02% 0.00 −0.02% 0.00 −0.02% 0.00
Fulltime 0.16% 0.05 0.13% 0.12 0.12% 0.16 0.14% 0.10
East Germany 0.13% 0.24 0.10% 0.37 0.22% 0.25 0.14% 0.22
Foreign 0.01% 0.90 −0.0001% 1.00 −0.01% 0.95 −0.01% 0.87
Male −0.12% 0.09 −0.15% 0.04 −0.18% 0.02 −0.17% 0.02
Schooling 0.06% 0.00 0.06% 0.00 0.05% 0.03 0.06% 0.00
Number skill trainings 0.11% 0.00 0.10% 0.00 0.10% 0.00 0.10% 0.00
Tenure 0.01% 0.16 0.01% 0.03 0.01% 0.14 0.01% 0.13
Firm size≥ 20 < 200 −0.001% 0.99 0.04% 0.79 0.00% 0.98 0.07% 0.62
Firm size≥ 200 < 2,000 0.19% 0.21 0.25% 0.12 0.19% 0.24 0.31% 0.07
Firm size > 2,000 0.61% 0.00 0.69% 0.00 0.58% 0.01 0.79% 0.00
Number external moves 0.05% 0.04 0.06% 0.01 0.05% 0.03 0.06% 0.01
Public sector 0.11% 0.39 0.10% 0.43 0.08% 0.53 0.10% 0.42
Intermediate status group 0.04% 0.58 0.03% 0.72 0.0003% 1.00 0.04% 0.58
High status group −0.07% 0.52 −0.02% 0.90 −0.13% 0.36 0.05% 0.74
Fraction with dP/d(sweep-up) > 0 0.01 0.71 0.59 1.00
All equations include time and sector dummies
a H0: “coefficients jointly insignificant”
b H0: “homoskedasticity” (The heteroskedasticity equation contains the regressors wage level,
wage sweep-up, and number of external job moves)
Specification (4) suggests that the risk of layoffs rises with collectively bargained
wage growth. However, layoffs then seem to concern low wage sweep-up work-
ers more than high wage sweep-up workers (and low wage workers more than
high wage workers). This finding confirms Hypothesis 2b. Individuals with a
high wage sweep-up are less likely to be laid off. The marginal effects at means
across specifications suggest that an increase in the wage sweep-up of 1% point
reduces the propensity of being laid off by between 0.48 and 1.61%points, which
is quite sizeable relative to the sample probability of a layoff of 2.98%. Themar-
ginal effect is negative not only for an average individual, but for virtually all
individuals in the sample. In the specifications where the effect is significant, at
most 2% of the individuals in the sample have a positive predicted marginal
effect of the wage sweep-up on layoffs. The coefficients of the control variables
are in line with expectations.
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Tab. 2.6: Estimation results of the wage rigidity model with uniform measurement
errors (Model 2)
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Appendix A1
Table 6 Estimation results of the wage rigidity model with uniform measurement errors
(Model 2)
(A) Notional Wage change (B) Relative propensity of nominally
rigid regime [log (pN/pF )]
Coeff.a P-val.b Coeff. P-val.b
(i) (ii) (i) (ii)
Male −0.25 0.30 0.21 Nominal GDP growth 0.03 0.13 0.46
Foreign 0.04 0.90 0.93 Manufacturing −0.19 0.17 0.19
Schooling −0.13 0.04 0.02 Constant −0.43 0.00 0.06
Tenure −0.28 0.00 0.00
Tenure squared 0.01 0.00 0.00 (C) Relative propensity of contractually
rigid regime [log (pC/pF )]
Experience −0.36 0.00 0.00
Experience squared 0.01 0.00 0.00 P-val. b)
Months unempl. last year −0.16 0.57 0.62 Coeff. (i) (iii)
Firm size≥ 20 < 200 1.00 0.00 0.00 Nominal GDP growth 0.09 0.00 0.03
Firm size≥ 200 < 2,000 1.34 0.00 0.00 Manufacturing −0.37 0.00 0.01
Firm size > 2,000 1.91 0.00 0.00 Constant −0.42 0.00 0.11
Intermediate status group 0.37 0.19 0.22
High status group 1.92 0.00 0.00 (D) Summary statistics
Skill training last period 1.31 0.06 0.06
East Germany 1.13 0.21 0.16
South Germany −0.26 0.26 0.37 Wage growth (means)
education parents −0.09 0.33 0.41 Observed 0.041
Diff. unempl. rate, t −1.19 0.24 0.36 Predicted 0.041
Diff. unempl. rate, t − 1 0.33 0.48 0.51 Notional −0.008
Diff. unempl. rate, t − 2 −1.51 0.03 0.16
Inflation −0.64 0.49 0.58 Wage sweep-up
Inflation, t − 1 1.59 0.00 0.00 Mean 0.049
Inflation, t − 2 −0.68 0.34 0.02 Standard deviation 0.010
Mining −0.59 0.40 0.49 5th percentile 0.033
Manufacturing 0.89 0.01 0.03 10th percentile 0.036
Ressource processing 0.18 0.68 0.65 25th percentile 0.042
Transp. and communication−0.57 0.25 0.10 50th percentile 0.049
Building sector −0.13 0.77 0.78 75th percentile 0.056
Services 0.61 0.65 0.69 90th percentile 0.063
Credit and insurance 0.07 0.90 0.90 95th percentile 0.067
Public utilities −0.55 0.16 0.20 Minimum 0.020
Year 1988 2.49 0.32 0.28 Maximum 0.087
Year 1989 −1.24 0.75 0.78
Year 1990 −1.75 0.59 0.63 Regime propensities (means)
Year 1991 −2.06 0.63 0.72 pC 0.32
Year 1992 1.55 0.73 0.79 pN 0.28
Year 1993 −0.37 0.91 0.93 pF 0.40
Year 1994 −2.18 0.12 0.20
Year 1996 3.50 0.00 0.00 Standard errors
Year 1997 −1.19 0.50 0.48 σe 0.169
Year 1998 −3.88 0.01 0.00 σm 0.053
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Table 6 continued
(A) Notional Wage change (D) Summary statistics
Year 1999 −0.94 0.25 0.08
Year 2000 −1.39 0.60 0.67
Year 2001 −3.71 0.20 0.26 No. of observations 41,626
Year 2002 −1.82 0.33 0.39 Log likelihood 23,512.1
Year 2003 0.33 0.76 0.74
Constant 6.53 0.00 0.00
a All coefficients in panel A are multiplied by 100
b P-Values are based on (i) Robust Huber–White sandwich standard errors. (ii) Standard errors
adjusted for within group error term correlation, clustering on year
Appendix A2
Table 7 Heteroskedastic probit regression of mobility in period t + 1 based on wage sweep-up of
the wage rigidity Model 2
Quits Layoffs Promotions Transfers
No. of observations 38,328 38,328 36,764 36,764
P-Val. Wald test of joint significancea 0 0 0 0.000
P-Val. LR test of heteroskedasticityb 0 0.07 0.003 0.09
Sample probability of y= 1 3.26% 2.98% 1.38% 0.66%
Mean predicted probability of y= 1 3.26% 2.98% 1.38% 0.66%
Probability of y= 1 predicted at means 1.45% 1.60% 0.56% 0.36%
dP/dX P-val dP/dX P-val dP/dX P-val dP/dX P-val
at means at means at means at means
Wage sweep-up * 100 −1.11% 0.00 −1.04% 0.00 0.24% 0.03 0.11% 0.19
Hourly wage level 0.004% 0.84 −0.10% 0.00 −0.02% 0.05 0.01% 0.08
Collectively bargained wage Growth 0.17% 0.03 0.18% 0.01 −0.07% 0.08 −0.06% 0.15
Age 0.17% 0.01 −0.02% 0.71 −0.06% 0.00 −0.02% 0.00
Fulltime −0.54% 0.02 0.04% 0.84 0.12% 0.35 0.14% 0.09
East Germany −0.89% 0.00 1.25% 0.00 −0.02% 0.88 0.15% 0.20
Foreign −0.47% 0.00 0.51% 0.01 −0.27% 0.00 0.001% 0.99
Male 0.31% 0.01 0.25% 0.07 −0.03% 0.71 −0.16% 0.03
Schooling 0.08% 0.00 −0.04% 0.25 0.10% 0.00 0.06% 0.00
Number skill trainings 0.01% 0.89 −0.11% 0.25 0.23% 0.00 0.10% 0.00
Tenure −0.11% 0.00 −0.02% 0.08 0.02% 0.02 0.01% 0.14
Firm size≥ 20 < 200 −0.82% 0.00 −0.91% 0.00 0.53% 0.03 0.05% 0.71
Firm size≥ 200 < 2,000 −1.05% 0.00 −1.33% 0.00 1.51% 0.00 0.28% 0.10
Firm size > 2,000 −1.57% 0.00 −1.79% 0.00 2.08% 0.00 0.75% 0.00
Number external moves −0.001% 0.99 0.20% 0.01 0.15% 0.00 0.06% 0.01
Public sector −0.90% 0.00 −1.21% 0.00 0.10% 0.42 0.09% 0.45
Intermediate status group −0.17% 0.18 −0.50% 0.00 0.13% 0.15 0.04% 0.60
High status group −0.68% 0.00 −0.65% 0.00 0.68% 0.01 0.04% 0.76
Fraction with dP/d(sweep-up) > 0 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.99
All equations include time and sector dummies)
a H0: “coefficients jointly insignificant”
b H0: “homoskedasticity” (The heteroskedasticity equation contains the regressors wage level,
wage sweep-up, and number of external job moves)
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Tab. 2.7: Heteroskedastic probit regression of mobility in period t + 1 based on wage
sweep-up of the wage rigidity Model 2
228 T. Cornelißen, O. Hübler
Table 6 continued
(A) Notional Wage change (D) Summary statistics
Year 1999 −0.94 0.25 0.08
Year 2000 −1.39 0.60 0.67
Year 2001 −3.71 0.20 0.26 No. of observations 41,626
Year 2002 −1.82 0.33 0.39 Log likelihood 23,512.1
Year 2003 0.33 0.76 0.74
Constant 6.53 0.00 0.00
a All coefficients in panel A are multiplied by 100
b P-Values are based on (i) Robust Huber–White sandwich standard errors. (ii) Standard errors
adjusted for within group error term correlation, clustering on year
Appendix A2
Table 7 Heterosked stic probit regression of mobility in period t + 1 based on wage sweep-up of
the wage rigidity Model 2
Quits Layoffs Promotions Transfers
No. of observations 38,328 38,328 36,764 36,764
P-Val. Wald test of joint significancea 0 0 0 0.000
P-Val. LR test of heteroskedasticityb 0 0.07 0.003 0.09
Sample probability of y= 1 3.26% 2.98% 1.38% 0.66%
Mean predicted probability of y= 1 3.26% 2.98% 1.38% 0.66%
Probability of y= 1 predicted at means 1.45% 1.60% 0.56% 0.36%
dP/dX P-val dP/dX P-val dP/dX P-val dP/dX P-val
at means at means at means at means
Wage sweep-up * 100 −1.11% 0.00 −1.04% 0.00 0.24% 0.03 0.11% 0.19
Hourly wage level 0.004% 0.84 −0.10% 0.00 −0.02% 0.05 0.01% 0.08
Collectively bargained wage Growth 0.17% 0.03 0.18% 0.01 −0.07% 0.08 −0.06% 0.15
Age 0.17% 0.01 −0.02% 0.71 −0.06% 0.00 −0.02% 0.00
Fulltime −0.54% 0.02 0.04% 0.84 0.12% 0.35 0.14% 0.09
East Germany −0.89% 0.00 1.25% 0.00 −0.02% 0.88 0.15% 0.20
Foreign −0.47% 0.00 0.51% 0.01 −0.27% 0.00 0.001% 0.99
Male 0.31% 0.01 0.25% 0.07 −0.03% 0.71 −0.16% 0.03
Schooling 0.08% 0.00 −0.04% 0.25 0.10% 0.00 0.06% 0.00
Number skill trainings 0.01% 0.89 −0.11% 0.25 0.23% 0.00 0.10% 0.00
Tenure −0.11% 0.00 −0.02% 0.08 0.02% 0.02 0.01% 0.14
Firm size≥ 20 < 200 −0.82% 0.00 −0.91% 0.00 0.53% 0.03 0.05% 0.71
Firm size≥ 200 < 2,000 −1.05% 0.00 −1.33% 0.00 1.51% 0.00 0.28% 0.10
Firm size > 2,000 −1.57% 0.00 −1.79% 0.00 2.08% 0.00 0.75% 0.00
Number external moves −0.001% 0.99 0.20% 0.01 0.15% 0.00 0.06% 0.01
Public sector −0.90% 0.00 −1.21% 0.00 0.10% 0.42 0.09% 0.45
Intermediate status group −0.17% 0.18 −0.50% 0.00 0.13% 0.15 0.04% 0.60
High status group −0.68% 0.00 −0.65% 0.00 0.68% 0.01 0.04% 0.76
Fraction with dP/d(sweep-up) > 0 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.99
All equations include time and sector dummies)
a H0: “coefficients jointly insignificant”
b H0: “homoskedasticity” (The heteroskedasticity equation contains the regressors wage level,
wage sweep-up, and number of external job moves)
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Chapter 3
Why are high-wage workers in low-wage firms?
An explanation of a puzzle via job stability
and unobserved heterogeneity1
Since the availability of linked employer-employee panel data sets empirical labor
economists have shown an increased interest in estimating those components of wages
that are due to unobserved characteristics of individuals and firms. This literature
started with the seminal paper ”High wage workers and high wage firms” by Abowd,
Kramarz and Margolis (1999) and was followed by several studies for different countries
(Abowd, Creecy, Kramarz 2002, Andrews et al. 2008, Alda 2006, Barth and Dale-
Olsen 2003, Gru¨tter and Lalive 2004, Goux and Maurin 1999). When analyzing the
correlations between the individual and the firm fixed effect from the wage equation,
these studies find negative correlations between the two effects. As these fixed effects
are often interpreted as reflecting person-specific and firm-specific productivity due to
unobserved characteristics (Abowd et al. 2004), that finding implies that the more pro-
ductive workers sort into the less productive firms. This negative assortative matching
has been regarded as a puzzle, because a number of theoretical considerations suggest
that one should expect the opposite. When workers and firms are heterogeneous in their
productive capacity, the assignment model of Becker (1973) implies positive assortative
1This chapter is co-authored with Prof. Dr. Olaf Hu¨bler, Institute of Empirical Economics, Leibniz
Universita¨t Hannover. The chapter is a revised version of ’Unobserved Individual and Firm Hetero-
geneity in Wage and Tenure Functions: Evidence from German Linked Employer-Employee Data’, IZA
Discussion Paper No. 2741, Bonn 2007.
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matching between workers and firms. Abowd et al. (2004) show how Becker’s model
leads to a positive correlation of the individual and firm effects in a log wage equation.
Different possible explanations for the negative assortative matching have been pro-
posed. These include statistical explanations (Andrews et al. 2008) as well as theoretical
explanations. The theoretical explanations rely primarily on job search models (Barth
and Dale-Olsen 2003, Shimer 2005, Shimer and Smith 2000, Postel-Vinay and Robin
2002). These existing explanations emphasize individual search behavior but neglect
firm behavior. We therefore propose a new explanation for the negative correlation of
the individual and firm wage effects, which emphasizes the firms’ wage and employ-
ment policy. Our approach relies on broadening the scope of the analysis by taking
job stability into account and explaining the interaction between wages and job stabil-
ity. Our main hypothesis is that, due to compensating wage differentials, firms that
provide stable jobs can pay lower wages and that high-wage workers can afford to sort
into these jobs due to their higher earnings capacity. To test this hypothesis we esti-
mate not only a wage equation but also a job duration equation controlling for worker
and firm fixed effects and taking into account the endogeneity of wages and job dura-
tions. Subsequently, we analyze the correlations of the individual and firm effects of the
job duration equation with those of the wage equation. Our hypothesis implies that we
should find a negative correlation between the firm wage effect and the firm job duration
effect in evidence of wage differentials compensating for job instability. Furthermore,
we should find a positive correlation between the individual wage effect and the firm
job duration effect, as workers with a higher earnings capacity are more likely to afford
to forgo part of their wages in favor of job stability. This would automatically explain
why the individual wage effect and the firm wage effect are negatively correlated. In
our empirical results we find these three correlations confirmed as expected and take
this as support for our hypothesis.
This analysis adds to the literature in several ways. First, we contribute to the
literature on compensating wage differentials that asks whether job insecurity is com-
pensated by higher wages. The results of this literature have thus far been mixed. There
are studies that find evidence in favor of compensating differentials (Taubman 1975 and
Duncan 1976 for the US, McNabb 1989 for the UK) or estimate a large marginal will-
ingness to pay for job security (Bonhomme and Jolivet 2006 using European data).
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Other studies, however, find that job instability or insecurity cause wage concessions
instead of compensating differentials (Hu¨bler and Hu¨bler 2006 for Germany and the
UK, Carneiro and Portugal 2006 for Portugal) or no significant wage premium for job
insecurity (Villanueva 2007 using German panel data).
Second, this study adds to the literature that investigates the determinants of job
duration or job mobility controlling for unobserved heterogeneity. We are aware of
studies that take into account individual heterogeneity in quit and separations equations
using models of binary choice (Anderson and Meyer 1994, Frederiksen 2004, Frederiksen
et al. 2007) and of studies that take into account unobserved firm heterogeneity in job
duration models (Mumford and Smith 2004, Gerlach and Stephan 2008 and Boockmann
and Steffes 2005). To our knowledge, individual and firm effects have not yet been
included jointly into a job mobility or job duration equation. However, omitting one or
the other is likely to produce biased estimates (Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis 1999).
Third, we add to the literature that takes into account the endogeneity of wages and
job durations (Abowd and Kang 2002). Simultaneous wage and mobility equations that
account largely for unobserved heterogeneity have been estimated by Abowd, Kramarz
and Roux (2006). They find a negative correlation of the intercepts from firm-specific
wage and mobility functions (”high-wage firms are low-mobility firms”). This is the
opposite finding of our hypothesis stating that firms that provide instable employment
have to pay higher wages. They take into account unobserved time-invariant person
and firm heterogeneity in the wage equation. However, the mobility equation in Abowd,
Kramarz and Roux (2006) considers only firm-specific effects.
We proceed as follows. Section 3.1 develops expectations from a theoretical per-
spective about the association of individual and firm effects from wage and job duration
functions. Section 3.2 describes the data set and discusses the model and the method of
estimation. Empirical results follow in section 3.3 and section 3.4 concludes. All tables
referred to in this text are to be found in section 3.5. An appendix contains a more
detailed description of the estimation samples (section 3.6).
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3.1 Theoretical background
In this section we develop hypotheses about the interdependence of individual and firm
fixed effects in wage and job duration functions. The fixed effects estimate those compo-
nents of wages and job durations that are due to unobserved time-invariant individual
and firm characteristics. In the subsequent discussion we will refer to ”high-wage work-
ers” and ”high-wage firms”, whereby we mean workers and firms with a high person
and firm effect estimated from the wage equation, i.e. workers and firms with unob-
served time-invariant characteristics that lead to higher wages. Similarly, when referring
to ”stable workers” and ”stable firms” we mean workers and firms with a high person
and firm effect estimated from the job duration equation, i.e. workers and firms with
unobserved time-invariant characteristics that lead to higher job durations.
Our main hypothesis concerns the interdependence of the firm job duration effect
and the firm wage effect. The starting point of our analysis is that firms differ in their
specific level of fluctuation because they face different costs of fluctuation and have
different needs of adapting the skill-composition of their work-force. This firm specific
level of fluctuation is captured by the firm job duration effect. The firm wage effect, in
turn, reflects the firm’s wage policy. We concentrate on compensating wage differentials
(Rosen 1986) as determinants of the firm wage policy. The theory of compensating wage
differentials states that in a competitive labor market undesirable job characteristics are
compensated by higher wages. One working condition that ranks as one of the the most
important from workers’ point of view is job security (Clark 2004). If compensating
differentials are operating in the labor market we therefore expect that workers in firms
with a higher fluctuation are compensated by higher wages, because their jobs are more
insecure. This implies a negative correlation between the firm wage and the firm job
duration effect.
Put differently, firms with more stable employment relationships can offer lower
wages. This implies that workers can buy job stability by accepting a lower wage. We
expect that workers who are better endowed with income will be more likely to buy
more job stability, because a higher income generally implies that one can afford more
of everything. One way to be better endowed with income is a high individual wage
effect, which is commonly interpreted as reflecting a high person-specific productivity.
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From this point of view we expect high-wage workers to sort into stable firms and
hence a positive correlation between individual wage effect and firm duration effect.
According to our hypotheses stable firms are low-wage firms and high-wage workers
sort into these firms. It follows that high-wage workers sort into low-wage firms and we
expect a negative correlation between individual wage and firm wage effect, which has
already been confirmed in different studies (see introduction to this chapter).
We also estimate the association between the individual wage and the individual job
duration effect. In line with a frequent interpretation in the literature, we interpret the
individual wage effect as reflecting unobserved personal abilities that affect a worker’s
productivity. We interpret the individual job duration effect as capturing the individual
propensity of job stability and mobility. Asking how the individual wage and the indi-
vidual job duration effect interact therefore means asking how individual abilities are
related to the individual propensity of job stability and mobility. It is likely that the
effect of unobserved abilities on job stability is similar to the effect of observed abilities,
i.e. the level of education. More educated workers may be more mobile because they
face a larger job market, search more efficiently and therefore receive more job offers
(Mincer 1988). Like education, unobserved abilities may also increase job mobility for
the same reasons. On the other hand, employers have an interest to retain workers with
higher abilities in the firm. In sum, whether workers with higher abilities are more or
less attached to their employer, and hence more or less mobile, is finally an empirical
question.
We have no independent theoretical argument for the association of the individual
duration effect with the firm wage and the firm duration effect. We consider these
associations to be consequences in the sense that once the correlations discussed in
this section are known, the sign of the remaining associations should follow logically.
Analyzing the signs and significances of the remaining associations is a way to test
whether there is an inner logic of our argument and whether the empirical results are
consistent.
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3.2 Data and empirical method
3.2.1 Data
We use the West German sample of the first version of the longitudinal model of the
German linked employer-employee data set LIAB provided by the Institute for Employ-
ment Research (IAB)2. This data set links the survey data of the IAB establishment
panel to employee registry data from the German employment service. A variable list
and descriptive statistics of the variables we include into the analysis are provided in
Table 3.5 in section 3.5 (page 54). The data cover the whole work force between 1996
and 2002 of the included firms. Out of about 446,000 workers we observe about 2,850
workers in more than one firm (”movers”) in our base sample (Sample 1). The presence
of movers is crucial to identify the firm effects.
We use the data to estimate a job duration equation and a wage equation. When
referring to the duration of employment spells it is important to distinguish between
the elapsed duration and the completed duration. The elapsed duration refers to the
duration of a spell that is still ongoing. It can be measured repeatedly, for example
each year. This measure of elapsed job duration is included as a regressor on the right
hand-side of the wage equation. In the following it is labeled ’tenure’. The completed
duration, by contrast, refers to the total length of the employment relationship. It
is measured only once, at the moment of separation. It is labeled ’job duration’ in
the analysis and constitutes the dependent variable of the the job duration equation,
because this is a more adequate measure of job stability than elapsed duration of an
ongoing spell. Consequently, we estimate the job duration equation in a sample which
contains only one observation per employment relationship (Sample 2). We estimate the
wage equation on a different sample than the job duration equation, because it would
be inefficient to discard all wage observations of ongoing spells and only retain one
observation per employment relationship. The sample for the wage equation therefore
includes all observations per employer-employee match capturing the variation of time-
varying characteristics during the match (Sample 1).
We restrict our estimations to full-time workers, because there is no information on
2Alda et al. (2005) give an overview of the LIAB data set.
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the hours worked in the data set and wages of part-timers are therefore not comparable
between workers, and for part-timers the information on the job position (blue-collar /
white-collar) is missing. The minimum age in our sample is 16 and we base the analysis
on employees in regular employment.
Table 3.1 (page 51) gives a numerical overview of the two estimation samples and the
appendix (page 56) provides a more detailed description of the samples. In the sample
for the wage equation about 446,000 person effects and 740 firm effects are identified.
In the sample for the job duration estimation these are about 250,000 person effects
and 550 firm effects. After the estimation of the wage and job duration equations in
the two samples we have one effect per person and one effect per firm in each sample.
As the same persons and firms are in both samples, we can match the wage effects and
job duration effects from both samples.
3.2.2 Model and estimation
Our aim is to estimate the determinants of wages and job durations alongside with
unobserved individual and firm effects that may be correlated with the observables. We
estimate a fixed effects model of the form
y = Xβ +Dθ + Fψ + , (3.1)
where the dependent variable y is either the log wage rate or log job duration3, X
(N∗×K) is a matrix of time varying characteristics; D (N∗×N) is a matrix of person
dummies capturing the individual effects; and F (N∗ × J) is a matrix of firm dummies
capturing the firm effects. By estimating the model as a fixed effects model we allow
for an arbitrary correlation between the individual and firm effects and the observed
time varying characteristics4. N∗ is the number of person-years in the data set, J is
3Regressing the log duration in a linear model is motivated by the fact that in several duration
models (exponential, log-logisitc and lognormal) the logarithm of the duration has linear homoscedastic
regression on the explanators (Lancaster 1990, pp. 41, 44, 47).
4At this stage we do not include job-match specific effects into the model. However, we apply an
instrumental variable estimator that relies on a fixed-effects transformation within job matches (see
section 3.2.3). This instrumental variable estimator has been proposed by Altonji and Shakotko (1987)
to cope with the endogeneity of a regressor in the presence of match-specific error components. In this
sense we take match effects into account.
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the number of firms, N is the number of persons, and K is the number of time varying
regressors. The coefficient vector β captures the effects of observed time-varying worker
and firm characteristics (including time effects). Our main quantities of interest are the
unobserved individual effects θ and the unobserved firm effects ψ.
The assumption under which we estimate the model is that the error term is or-
thogonal to all regressors, including the individual and firm effects. This implies that
the matching of workers to firms does not systematically depend on the shocks incorpo-
rated in . We compute the exact least squares solution of this fixed effects model using
a memory saving algorithm implemented in a Stata program described in chapter 6.
Firm effects are identified through the mobility of workers between firms. Of the 1,904
firms in Sample 1 (see Table 3.1, p. 51), 770 firms have ”movers”, i.e. workers that are
observed in more than one firm of the data set. No firm effects can be estimated for
the 1,134 firms without movers. The 770 firms with movers are divided into 30 groups
of firms, which are defined such that firms within one group are connected by worker
mobility, but firms of different groups are not connected by worker mobility (see Abowd,
Creecy and Kramarz (2002) for an algorithm to determine the groups). In each group,
one firm effect is not identified and serves as the reference for the remaining effects in
the group. In other words, firm effects in one group are only identified relative to each
other but not relative to the firm effects of other groups. Therefore, we do not compare
person and firm effects between different groups and base our subsequent analysis of
the person and firm effects only on effects within groups. In our data we find only one
big group (701 firms) and many small groups. For example, the second biggest group
has 6 firms and most remaining groups have only 1 or 2 firms. We therefore base the
analysis of the person and firm effects only on the biggest of the 30 groups containing
the majority of the observations. In Sample 1 these are 88% of the observations5.
After the estimation of the person and firm fixed effects we can study the correla-
tions of the effects among each other. Under the assumption that individual and firm
effects are not correlated with the other regressors, Andrews et al. (2008) and Abowd et
al. (2004) show that if Corr(θ, ψ) is positive, it is actually biased downwards if worker
mobility in the dataset is low. With arbitrary correlation between the unobserved het-
5That the biggest group contains the majority of observations is a common finding in linked
employer-employee data (see Abowd, Creecy and Kramarz 2002 using data from France and the US).
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erogeneity and the other regressors, the sign of the bias cannot be determined a priori,
but it is an empirical question. The formulae to compute the exact bias when there
is arbitrary correlation between unobserved heterogeneity and observed characteristics
require the inversion of an N∗ × N∗ matrix (Andrews et al. 2008), which is computa-
tionally not feasible with the size of our data set. Andrews et al. (2008) propose the
alternative of assuming that the observable regressors are uncorrelated with the unob-
servable heterogeneity. This assumption does not really fit the framework of a fixed
effects estimation where one explicitly allows for such correlation. Therefore, we do not
compute the bias under this assumption but we use a different finding of Andrews et
al. (2008). They show that the bias in the estimation of the correlation decreases if
the number of movers increases. We exploit this finding and compute the correlations
based on a sub-set of all firm effects that are identified by at least 1, 2, 3, 4 or 5 movers
in order to check how the number of movers affects the results. Requiring a number of
movers per firm larger than 5 would reduce our sample too much.
3.2.3 Selection of explanatory and instrumental variables
We specify the wage and job duration functions largely with similar regressors. These
include age, education, occupational status and profession. Following Munasinghe and
Sigman (2004) we construct a variable labeled ’Mobility’ that captures the number
of past job moves divided by work experience. We also include a number of firm
characteristics in the wage and job duration equation. These are firm size, business
expectations, investments into IT, the investment sum, the use of fixed-term and part-
time work, the application of collective contracts, the existence of a works council, a
dummy whether the firm provides training, and the state of the technology used by
the firm. Furthermore we include information on a firm’s reorganization (insourcing,
outsourcing, hiving-off and closure of parts of the firm) and on the structure of the firm’s
workforce (shares of male and whitecollar workers and mean age of the employees). Firm
location is captured by a dummy variable for South Germany, which is economically the
strongest region in Germany. The choice of explanatory variables in the job duration
equation is comparable to the specifications of the job duration models in Grotheer et
al. (2004) and Boockmann and Steffes (2005).
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We have to cope with endogeneity in both equations. In the wage equation job
tenure is included on the right-hand as an endogenous regressor (Altonji and Shakotko
1987). In the job duration equation, the wage at the moment of separation is included on
the right hand side as an endogenous regressor (Abowd and Kang 2002). Endogeneity
biases the estimates if the equations are estimated by OLS. Therefore, we employ an
instrumental variable (IV) estimator. Job tenure is likely to be an endogenous regressor
in the wage equation, because the wage is a determinant of the continuation of the
employment relationship. A high wage signals a good job match and is therefore likely
to reduce the probability of a separation. However, this endogenous variation of job
tenure in the wage equation is variation between job matches, not within job matches.
We therefore follow the proposition of Altonji and Shakotko (1987) who instrument job
tenure (Tit) by time-demeaned job tenure T
∗
it = Tit−T¯s. Hereby Tit denotes job tenure of
individual i at time t, and s = s(i, t) indexes the employment relationship of individual
i at time t and T¯s is the average job tenure of that employment relationship. The
between-variance (variance between employment relationships s) of the instrumental
variable T ∗it is zero and endogenous variation in T
∗
it is therefore minimized. In the job
duration equation the wage rate is an endogenous regressor, because in a job spell of
longer duration, more specific human capital has been accumulated and the wage is
therefore expected to be higher. As an instrument for the wage in the job duration
equation we therefore chose the starting wage of the employment relationship, because
the starting wage has not yet been influenced by seniority and the accumulation of firm-
specific human capital. More specifically, the IV estimator we use is the 2SLS estimator.
We include the individual and firm fixed effects in both stages. At the second stage we
adjust the standard errors as described in Wooldridge (2002, eq. 5.25, p.95).
3.3 Results
The first three columns of Table 3.2 in section 3.5 (page 52) report the results of the
wage equation. Column 1 presents a pooled OLS estimation, column 2 a fixed effects
estimation including individual and firm effects, and column 3 the same fixed effects
model estimated by the IV estimator described above. This is the preferred specifi-
cation because it takes into account the endogeneity of job tenure. In this preferred
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specification, noteworthy results are that firms that provide training seem to pay lower
wages, and that firms that employ old technology seem to pay higher wages (column 3
of Table 3.2). In the case of training this may indicate that training predominantly con-
cerns investments into general human capital, which are paid by workers through lower
wages. The result that old technology raises wages is only visible in the fixed effects
specifications. The fixed effects account for all influences that are time-constant, i.e.
that vary only in the cross-section. Fixed effects estimates are therefore more strongly
influenced by the longitudinal variation of the regressors than pooled estimates. In
order to explain the positive influence of old technology on wages in the fixed effects
estimation we therefore need to explain why wages at firm level rise if the firms’ tech-
nology becomes older. One explanation could be that old technology is correlated with
firm age, and firm age influences wages positively. Reasons for a positive influence of
firm age on wages may be that unions in older firms are stronger, that older firms are
more productive because they have had more time to develop efficient work processes
than younger firms, or that the management and the work force are more reluctant
against wage cuts or moderate wage growth.
The remaining coefficient estimates are according to expectations. However, compar-
ing the pooled and the fixed effects specifications (columns 1 and 2 of Table 3.2) reveals
that considering unobserved individual and firm heterogeneity is important because it
has a clear effect on the estimates. For example, the effects of business expectations and
of old technology change sign. Furthermore, after including fixed-effects a number of
coefficients become insignificant. These concern mostly regressors that exhibit no strong
within-firm variation over time, such as dummies for the use of part-time and fixed-term
work, information on collective contracts and the existence of the works council, and
activities of firm restructuring (outsourcing, hiving-off, insourcing, shut-down part of
firm). If the within-firm variance of these regressors is considerably smaller than the
total variance, this may lead to lower levels of statistical significance in the fixed-effects
regression.
Comparing columns 2 and 3 reveals that taking the endogeneity of job tenure into
account has the expected effect of reducing the estimated returns to tenure. The re-
maining coefficients, however, change only slightly when comparing the fixed-effects IV
estimation with the pure fixed-effects estimation.
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Columns 4 to 6 of Table 3.2 report the pooled OLS, fixed effects and IV fixed-effects
estimations of job durations. Again, the preferred specification is the last one, in which
endogeneity of wages is taken into account. In this preferred specification it can be
noted that the use of flexible work arrangements (part-time and fixed-term employ-
ment), the existence of collective bargaining agreements, and the implementation of
firm restructuring (outsourcing, hiving-off, insourcing, shut-down part of firm) in gen-
eral stabilize employment at firm level. The results also show that firms that provide
training and firms that operate with old technology have more instable employment
relationships. This matches the findings from the wage equations. Because training
is associated with a wage discount in the wage equation, it is likely to concern pre-
dominantly investments into general human capital. As general human capital can be
transferred to different employers, turnover in firms that provide such training is likely
to be higher. The finding from the wage equation that firms whose technology becomes
obsolete have higher wages than firms that renew their technology, leads us to expect
that these firms have problems to compete in the product market and are finally forced
to downward adjustments of their labor force, which can explain the destabilizing effect
of old technology on job durations.
The remaining coefficient estimates are according to expectations. Again, a few
coefficients in the job durations equation change sign (firm size and share of white-collar
workers) and a number of effects lose statistical significance (e.g. variables associated
to education and job position, investments, works council, share of male workers) when
we move from the pooled estimation to the fixed-effects estimation (from column 4 to
column 5 in Table 3.2).
The main purpose of this study is to analyze the correlations of unobserved individ-
ual and firm effects estimated from the wage and job duration functions. In Table 3.3 we
report partial correlation coefficients holding the observed characteristics age, sex and
nationality constant, because the fixed effects absorb the effects of these time-invariant
characteristics6. The first column of Table 3.3 refers to the correlations of the effects
6The variable age can be thought of as being in large parts time-invariant. It can be decomposed into
a time-invariant cross-sectional variation between individuals (year of birth) and a variation across time
(increase of 1 for each individual each year). In a fixed effects estimation, the cross-sectional variation is
absorbed by the fixed-effect and the regressor age becomes indistinguishable form a linear time trend,
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computed from the fixed effects IV estimates presented above. In order to compute the
correlations we use only firm effects of the biggest mobility group (see section 3.2.2 for
the explanation of the mobility groups). Furthermore, we only use firm effects that are
identified in both samples (sample for the estimation of the wage equation and sample
for the estimation of the job duration equation). As Table 3.4 shows, this leaves us
with 487 firms out of 1851 firms. The remaining 487 firms are considerably larger firms
than the firms from the total sample, and they also differ in other respects (compare
mean values of the variables presented in columns 1 and 2 of Table 3.4). Our results
should therefore be interpreted as being representative for large firms. Table 3.4 also
shows that restricting the sample to firms with a higher minimum number of movers
per firm makes the sample increasingly selective. Therefore, we opt for computing the
correlations based on firms with at least one mover as the benchmark case (column 1
of Table 3.3). The remaining columns of Table 3.3 are modifications of the benchmark
specification. All correlation coefficients reported in Table 3.3 are highly significant at
the 1%-level.
The results can be summarized as follows (the correlations in parentheses are taken
from the first column of Table 3.3):
1- High-wage firms are instable firms (-0.05).
2- High-wage workers sort into stable firms (0.08).
3- High-wage workers sort into low-wage firms (-0.31).
4- Stable workers sort into instable firms (-0.55).
5- Stable workers sort into high-wage firms (0.04).
6- High-wage workers are stable workers (0.06).
”High-wage” and ”stable” are shortcuts for high wage and high job duration induced by
unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity.
which also increases by 1 for each individual each year (Wooldridge 2006, p. 489). Therefore, age
cannot be included in a fixed effects regression alongside with a time trend or with a full set of year
dummies. Because we include age, one more year dummy than usual is dropped from our estimation.
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The first result is consistent with the hypothesis that job instability is compensated
by higher wages at the level of the unobserved firm heterogeneity. This implies that
workers have the choice to work at somewhat lower wages at a more stable firm, or to
work at higher wages at a more instable firm. The second result suggests that workers
with unobserved characteristics associated with higher wages are more likely to choose
to be employed in the more stable firms. Consequently they accept a wage discount,
which is visible in results 3: workers with high individual wage effects are more likely to
be employed in low-wage firms. This result is in line with the findings of Alda (2006),
Andrews et al. (2008) and Abowd et al. (2002). While it has been regarded as a puzzle
in the literature, our results allow for the following explanation: Low-wage firms are
more stable firms, hence workers can buy job stability by choosing to work at low-wage
firms. Workers that earn higher wages due to good individual characteristics are more
likely to afford a wage discount in favor of higher job stability. Results 4 and 5 also fit in.
Workers that have individual characteristics that allow them to have stable employment
do not depend on choosing a stable firm in order to have a relatively stable employment
relationship. They therefore opt for the more instable high-wage firms.
Result 6 states that unobserved individual characteristics that lead to higher wages
are related to those unobserved characteristics that lead to more stable employment.
This result is somewhat at odds with the previous results. For example, the combina-
tion of results 6 and 2 contradicts result 4. This suggests, not surprisingly, that the
association between wages and job mobility cannot be explained exclusively by compen-
sating wage differentials. The result shows that to a certain extent employers reward
good unobserved characteristics by both, higher wages and more stable jobs, or that
employers successfully manage to attach high-ability workers to the firm.
We conduct several robustness checks. First, the results do not depend on whether
we include the variable ’Mobility’, which captures the number of past job moves divided
by work experience, among the regressors. Omitting this regressor does not change the
correlations between the effects in any important way7. The correlation structure also
proved very robust when we changed single regressors or estimated different specifica-
tions. For example, we tested a more parsimonious specification of both equations by
7The results without the regressor ’Mobility’ are available upon request.
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leaving out the regressors part-time work, share of male and white-collar workers, mean
age and South Germany. This brought about qualitatively the same results as the more
comprehensive specification presented here8.
As it has be shown that the correlation of individual and firm effects from the same
equation is biased, and that the bias decreases when the number of movers between
firms increases (Andrews et al. 2008, Abowd et al. 2004), we check how the correlations
presented in column 1 of Table 3.3 change if we increase our minimum requirement for
the number of movers per firm. Columns 2 to 5 report the results if we require a
minimum number of 2, 3, 4 and 5 movers per firm. Unfortunately, we cannot increase
the minimum number of movers per firm beyond 5, because the number of firms in the
sample would shrink too much. Indeed, the correlations between individual and firm
effects from the same equation become smaller in absolute value (compare columns 1
and 5 of Table 3.3 for the values of IW-FW and ID-FD), which could be evidence that we
have a tendency to overestimate the negative correlation between individual wage and
firm wage effects and between individual tenure and firm tenure effects9. However, the
cross-equation correlations, on which our main results are based, increase if we raise the
minimum number of movers per firm. Setting this number at 5 movers per firm instead
of one mover per firm, the negative correlation between firm wage and firm duration
effect increases by a factor of 6, and the positive correlation between individual wage
and firm duration effect doubles (compare columns 1 and 5 of Table 3.3 for the values
of FW-FD and IW-FD). Hence, our main result that low-wage firms are more stable
firms, and that high-wage workers tend to sort into this type of firm gets stronger if we
chose ’better’ estimates of the unobserved effects by increasing the minimum number
8As described in the appendix (section 3.6), there are employment relationships for which we do
not observe the completed job duration. Simply dropping all of these spells would not be a satisfactory
procedure because it would induce selectivity. We therefore only dropped the ongoing employment
relationships of workers with a high expected difference of elapsed and completed job duration (see
appendix, section 3.6, for details). Nevertheless we conducted a robustness check by dropping all
of these spells. This delivered qualitatively and quantitatively very similar results to the baseline
specification (results available upon request).
9Andrews et al. (2008) and Abowd et al. (2004) also find that they overestimate the negative
correlations between individual wage and firm wage effect, but that the approximate size of the bias is
not large enough to turn the negative correlation into a positive one.
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of movers required to identify a firm effect.
Columns 6 to 10 of Table 3.3 report how the correlations between the firm and
person effects from wage and job duration equations change with varying degrees of
control variables. The benchmark specification is again column 1, where we control
for both observed and unobserved effects and estimate the wage and duration equation
using the IV approach.
Column 6 shows the correlations when we still control for both observed and unob-
served effects, but the equations are estimated without taking endogeneity into account.
The results of column 6 match closely those of column 1, hence we can say that our
results do not depend crucially on using the IV estimator. Column 7 shows the results
when we control only for unobserved effects, i.e. we estimate equation (3.1) without
X. Here, the previous result that low-wage firms are more stable firms vanishes. This
result is only valid after observed firm characteristics have been netted out. Column
8 reports the correlations from estimations that control only for observed effects, i.e.
when estimating the person effects we estimate equation (3.1) without F , and when
estimating the firm effects we estimate it without D. Here, the result that worker and
firm effects from the same equation are negatively correlated vanishes.
In column 9 we repeat the exercise without controlling neither for observed nor for un-
observed characteristics. In other words, column 9 reports the correlation of person and
firm means of wages and job durations. Here, there appear only positive correlations.
In column 10 we report an estimation that differs from the benchmark specification
only in one respect: individual fixed effects are not held constant in the job duration
equation when the firm effects of the job duration equation are estimated. The intention
is to mimic to some extent the model of Abowd, Kramarz and Roux (2006) who do not
control for individual fixed effects in their mobility equation. We do this because our first
result, that low-wage firms are stable firms, is not in line with their finding that low-wage
firms are high-mobility firms. However, our result of a negative correlation of the firm
effects from the wage and the job duration equation carry over also to that specification.
The question of why our results deviate from the findings of Abowd, Kramarz and Roux
(2006) therefore seems not to be due to the fact that we have introduced controls for
individual fixed effects in the mobility equation, but to remaining differences between
their study and ours. Remaining differences are that their study is based on data for
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France, their mobility equation is modeled by a binary separation indicator, and their
observed firm characteristics mainly consist of information on the structure of the work
force and on financial indicators of firm performance.
3.4 Conclusion
Our aim was to learn about unobserved individual and firm heterogeneity in wage and
job duration functions. We have estimated individual and firm effects that capture time-
invariant unobserved heterogeneity in wage and job duration equations and looked into
the correlation of the unobserved heterogeneity components with each other.
Our findings apply to unobserved heterogeneity components after netting out the ef-
fects of observed heterogeneity. They can be summarised as follows: High-wage workers
are more mobile workers. Stable firms are low-wage firms. They seem to ask workers
to pay an insurance premium in exchange for job stability. High-wage workers sort into
stable firms and thus use their income potential to buy job security. Low-wage workers
and stable workers, on the other hand, tend to be matched with the opposite type of
firms, i.e. with instable and high-wage firms.
It follows from this sorting mechanism that high-wage workers are employed in low-
wage firms. This negative assortative matching, which has also been found in other
empirical work, has been regarded as a puzzle. By looking at both, job stability and
wages, our explanation of this is that low-wage firms offer job stability, and therefore
it is rational for high-wage workers to forgo some of their wage potential by choosing a
low-wage firm and thus buying job stability. This implies that even high-ability workers
who can relatively easily find new jobs care for job stability. They still want to decide by
themselves when to leave a job and not being forced to leave due to employer initiated
separations.
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3.5 Tables
Tab. 3.1: Overview of estimation samples
Sample: Sample 1 Sample 2
Estimation of: Wage equation Job duration equation
Frequency of observations: At least yearly Observation at moment
of separation (end of job)
Restriction: Begin of employment Begin of employment
relationship after relationship after 1st
1st January 1990. January 1990 and right-
censored employment
spells in 2002 of over
55 year-olds only.
Observations: 1,532,526 295,196
No. Persons: 445,800 250,548
- thereof moversa: 2,851 1,423
No. Firms: 1,904 1,849
- thereof with movers 770 594
- mobility groupsb 30 45
- Identified firm effectsc 740 549
- Identified firm effects
in biggest mobility group 700 487
Notes: a) Movers are individuals observed in more than one firm of the sample.
b) Mobility groups are groups of firms defined such that firms within one group are
connected by worker mobility, but firms of different groups are not connected by
worker mobility. c) In each mobility group 1 firm effect is not identified, because
it serves as the reference for the remaining firm effects of that group.
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Tab. 3.2: Wage and job duration equations
Dependent Variable WAGE JOB DURATION
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Pooled OLS FE FE, IV Pooled OLS FE FE, IV
N 1532526 1532526 1532526 295196 295196 295196
Tenure 0.022 0.025 0.013
(210 .5) (102 .4) (32 .5)
Wage 0.006 0.003 0.005
(84 .4) (19 .5) (22 .4)
Age 0.086 0.118 0.125 0.489 0.536 0.508
(75 .7) (43 .6) (46 .3) (66 .4) (8 .1) (7 .7)
Age2/100 -0.173 -0.226 -0.223 -1.105 -1.192 -1.130
(-59 .4) (-32 .7) (-32 .2) (-58 .7) (-7 .2) (-6 .8)
Age3/10,000 0.114 0.141 0.136 0.828 0.907 0.860
(47 .8) (25 .0) (24 .1) (53 .9) (6 .9) (6 .5)
Voc. Training 0.076 0.077 0.078 0.127 0.036 0.032
(90 .7) (16 .1) (16 .4) (20 .1) (0 .6) (0 .5)
Voc. Training and A-levels 0.121 0.086 0.086 -0.101 -0.059 -0.064
(69 .3) (9 .3) (9 .3) (-7 .6) (-0 .5) (-0 .5)
University 0.261 0.171 0.172 0.069 0.140 0.129
(185 .7) (18 .9) (19 .0) (5 .9) (1 .0) (1 .0)
Skilled blue-collar 0.079 0.013 0.015 0.131 0.237 0.237
(81 .8) (4 .2) (4 .8) (16 .4) (3 .1) (3 .1)
White collar 0.154 0.081 0.084 0.123 0.206 0.188
(94 .6) (17 .6) (18 .2) (9 .6) (1 .8) (1 .7)
Log firm size 0.012 0.038 0.037 -0.097 0.738 0.738
(37 .6) (14 .9) (14 .8) (-37 .9) (13 .6) (13 .5)
Business expectations -0.012 0.010 0.008 0.271 0.488 0.476
(-4 .7) (3 .8) (3 .0) (11 .3) (4 .9) (4 .8)
IT investments (dummy) -0.007 0.001 0.001 0.501 0.609 0.608
(-6 .8) (0 .7) (0 .7) (57 .6) (21 .6) (21 .5)
Investments (in 10 mill. Euros) 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.007 -0.001 -0.001
(31 .1) (17 .3) (16 .7) (14 .4) (-0 .3) (-0 .3)
Firm uses part-time work -0.002 -0.0001 -0.0001 0.413 0.602 0.602
(-1 .3) (-0 .01) (-0 .01) (27 .7) (12 .1) (12 .1)
Firm uses fixed-term work -0.003 0.0001 0.002 0.412 0.604 0.599
(-3 .0) (0 .2) (1 .4) (47 .4) (20 .1) (19 .9)
Sector-level coll. contract 0.018 0.002 0.001 0.148 0.739 0.731
(11 .2) (0 .6) (0 .3) (12 .1) (11 .6) (11 .5)
Firm-level coll. contract 0.032 0.007 0.005 0.056 0.498 0.485
(17 .2) (2 .5) (1 .9) (3 .8) (6 .6) (6 .4)
Works council 0.144 0.003 0.003 0.041 -0.111 -0.112
(90 .2) (0 .9) (0 .9) (3 .6) (-1 .3) (-1 .3)
Firm provides training 0.011 -0.011 -0.010 -0.450 -0.460 -0.455
(3 .7) (-2 .8) (-2 .6) (-23 .8) (-6 .2) (-6 .1)
Old technology -0.006 0.002 0.002 -0.037 -0.183 -0.180
(-12 .6) (2 .9) (2 .9) (-9 .8) (-11 .5) (-11 .3)
Share males 0.358 0.044 0.038 0.385 0.517 0.491
(161 .9) (3 .0) (2 .6) (22 .7) (1 .6) (1 .5)
Share whitecollar 0.084 0.024 0.025 -0.176 1.427 1.395
(41 .5) (2 .5) (2 .6) (-11 .2) (6 .4) (6 .3)
Mean age -0.001 -0.008 -0.007 -0.032 -0.264 -0.261
(-5 .6) (-21 .8) (-19 .5) (-33 .4) (-37 .7) (-37 .3)
Mobility -0.250 -0.067 -0.084 -3.121 -0.540 -0.531
(-41 .0) (-7 .1) (-8 .8) (-97 .9) (-5 .6) (-5 .5)
South Germany 0.006 0.011 0.007 0.036 0.768 0.757
(8 .6) (4 .1) (2 .5) (7 .1) (9 .0) (8 .9)
Outsourcing -0.009 -0.001 -0.001 0.548 0.557 0.555
(-7 .0) (-1 .1) (-1 .0) (75 .4) (22 .7) (22 .6)
Hiving-Off 0.017 -0.003 -0.001 0.334 0.463 0.455
(11 .3) (-2 .1) (-0 .7) (33 .6) (13 .0) (12 .8)
Insourcing 0.021 0.000 0.000 0.195 0.694 0.690
(16 .0) (0 .2) (0 .1) (23 .9) (23 .8) (23 .6)
Shut-down part of firm -0.016 -0.002 -0.003 0.519 0.556 0.551
(-8 .4) (-1 .2) (-1 .7) (52 .0) (17 .5) (17 .3)
Note: Year, sector and profession dummies included. T-values in parentheses. Reference categories
are: No vocational training, unskilled blue-collar, no collective contract.
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Tab. 3.3: Partial correlation of unobserved effects (holding age, sex, nationality con-
stant)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Minimum # movers
per firm >=1 >=2 >=3 >=4 >=5 >=1 >=1 >=1 >=1 >=1
Observed
effects included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No Yes
Unobserved
effects included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Partlya Partlya Partlyb
IV estimation Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No Yes
IW - FW -0.31 -0.26 -0.26 -0.22 -0.20 -0.32 -0.33 0.18 0.26 -0.31
IW - ID 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.07 0.13 0.19 0.33 0.06
IW - FD 0.08 0.09 0.11 0.15 0.16 0.08 0.03 0.05 0.15 0.08
ID - FW 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.07 0.11 0.03 -0.04 0.00 0.10 0.04
FW - FD -0.05 -0.09 -0.15 -0.27 -0.30 -0.04 0.13 -0.27 0.46 -0.09
ID - FD -0.55 -0.54 -0.53 -0.53 -0.47 -0.55 -0.80 0.47 0.37 0.04
N 59520 54312 48452 44503 39305 59520 59520 59520 59520 59520
# firms 487 325 249 195 155 487 487 487 487 487
IW: individual wage effect, FW: firm wage effect, ID: individual duration effect, FD: firm duration effect; All
correlation coefficients reported in the table are statistically significant at the 1%-level; a) In column (7) and (8),
firm effects are computed without including individual effects and vice versa; b) In column (9) firm duration effects
are computed without including individual duration effects.
Tab. 3.4: Mean values of firm characteristics in samples with different minimum number
of movers per firm
Minimum # movers per firm >=0 >=1 >=2 >=3 >=4 >=5
# firms 1851 487 325 249 195 155
Log firm size 4.235 5.965 6.455 6.611 6.838 6.947
Sector-level coll. contract 0.758 0.834 0.862 0.876 0.887 0.897
Firm-level coll. contract 0.082 0.090 0.077 0.072 0.077 0.065
Works council 0.549 0.844 0.911 0.932 0.969 0.968
Business expectations 0.002 0.013 0.012 0.010 0.022 0.015
IT investments (dummy) 0.731 0.850 0.862 0.880 0.892 0.890
Investments (in 10 mill. Euros) 0.361 1.033 1.413 1.624 1.732 1.909
Old technology 2.063 2.070 2.058 2.032 2.041 2.045
Firm uses part-time work 0.869 0.947 0.972 0.980 0.990 0.994
Firm uses fixed-term work 0.600 0.850 0.892 0.912 0.933 0.923
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Tab. 3.5: Summary statistics
Sample 1 Sample 2 Sample 2ca)
Variable name Remarks N=1532526 N=259196 N=517709
Mean S.d. Mean S.d. Mean S.d.
[t] Job tenure / duration - 3.88 3.09 2.70 2.87 3.97 3.50
Log tenure / duration - 0.83 1.29 0.19 1.52 0.75 1.41
Wage Daily wage 92.45 32.15 80.81 42.20 90.65 38.42
Log wage - 4.46 0.45 4.23 0.72 4.46 0.51
Censored wage observation - 0.10 0.30 0.10 0.29 0.12 0.33
Age - 37.78 9.92 38.21 11.99 38.38 10.55
Age2/100 - 15.26 7.98 16.04 9.90 15.84 8.60
Age3/10,000 - 6.55 5.12 7.30 6.56 6.98 5.61
Voc. Training Dummy: Individual has com-
pleted a vocational training /
apprenticeship.
0.61 0.49 0.56 0.50 0.59 0.49
Voc. Training and A-levels Dummy: Individual has com-
pleted a vocational training
and A-levels (”Abitur”).
0.04 0.20 0.04 0.21 0.04 0.21
University Dummy: Individual has com-
pleted a University degree.
0.12 0.33 0.10 0.30 0.12 0.32
Reference: no vocational training and no A-levels and no University degree
Skilled blue-collar Individual is in skilled blue-
collar job position
0.23 0.42 0.20 0.40 0.22 0.41
White collar Individual is in whitecollar job
position
0.41 0.49 0.40 0.49 0.41 0.49
Reference: unskilled blue collar job position
Skilled manual Occupation classification dum-
mies
0.16 0.37 0.14 0.35 0.15 0.36
Technical -”- 0.11 0.32 0.09 0.28 0.10 0.30
Unskilled services -”- 0.10 0.30 0.11 0.31 0.10 0.30
Skilled services -”- 0.02 0.15 0.03 0.16 0.03 0.16
Semi-Professional -”- 0.04 0.21 0.05 0.23 0.05 0.22
Professional -”- 0.02 0.14 0.02 0.15 0.02 0.14
Unskilled administrative -”- 0.05 0.21 0.06 0.23 0.05 0.22
Skilled administrative -”- 0.16 0.37 0.15 0.36 0.16 0.37
Manager -”- 0.02 0.14 0.02 0.13 0.02 0.13
Refernce: unskilled manual
Log firm size Log no. of workers per firm 7.05 1.48 6.83 1.52 6.98 1.51
Business expectations Ordinal index of firm’s busi-
ness expectations ranking from
-1 to +4.
0.02 0.12 0.01 0.10 0.01 0.09
IT investments (dummy) Dummy: firm invested into IT 0.88 0.33 0.90 0.30 0.93 0.26
Investments (in 10 mill. Euros) Firm’s investment sum 4.09 8.95 3.04 7.00 3.87 8.07
Firm uses part-time work Dummy 0.96 0.19 0.97 0.17 0.98 0.15
Firm uses fixed-term work Dummy 0.86 0.35 0.88 0.33 0.90 0.29
Sector-level coll. contract Dummy: firm covered by
sector-level collective bargain-
ing agreement
0.85 0.35 0.85 0.36 0.85 0.36
Firm-level coll. contract Dummy: firm covered by
firm-level collective bargaining
agreement
0.10 0.31 0.10 0.30 0.10 0.30
continued on next page
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continued from previous page
Sample 1 Sample 2 Sample 2ca)
Variable name Remarks N=1532526 N=259196 N=517709
Mean S.d. Mean S.d. Mean S.d.
Reference: firm not covered by collective bargaining agreement
Works council Dummy: Firm has works coun-
cil
0.94 0.24 0.91 0.29 0.93 0.26
Firm provides training Dummy: Firm provides train-
ing to its work force
0.95 0.11 0.93 0.13 0.94 0.12
Old technology Ordinal index of firm’s technol-
ogy coded from 1 (state of the
art) to 5 (outdated)
1.98 0.70 1.99 0.69 1.95 0.67
Share males Share of male workers in firm 0.72 0.24 0.69 0.25 0.70 0.24
Share whitecollar Share of whitecollar workers in
firm
0.35 0.23 0.35 0.24 0.35 0.23
Mean age Mean age of firm’s workers 40.15 2.71 39.93 2.94 40.02 2.78
Mobility (Number of past job moves di-
vided by years of work experi-
ence)*10
0.0013 0.01 0.0022 0.01 0.0016 0.01
South Germany Dummy: South Germany 0.43 0.49 0.42 0.49 0.42 0.49
Insourcing Dummy: firm has insourced
parts of ist activity
0.06 0.23 0.11 0.31 0.13 0.33
Shut-down part of firm Dummy: firm has shut down
parts of ist activity
0.02 0.16 0.07 0.26 0.07 0.26
Outsourcing Dummy: firm has outsourced
parts of ist activity
0.06 0.24 0.15 0.35 0.17 0.38
Hiving-Off Dummy: firm has hived off
parts of ist activity
0.05 0.22 0.07 0.26 0.10 0.30
Reference: no restructuring of parts of activity
Year 1997 Dummy 0.11 0.31 0.10 0.30 0.06 0.23
Year 1998 Dummy 0.13 0.33 0.13 0.34 0.08 0.26
Year 1999 Dummy 0.17 0.37 0.17 0.38 0.10 0.30
Year 2000 Dummy 0.17 0.38 0.17 0.37 0.10 0.29
Year 2001 Dummy 0.19 0.39 0.18 0.39 0.10 0.30
Reference: 1996 and 2002 (two year dummies left out because age included in FE regression)
Agriculture and forrestry Sector dummy 0.002 0.04 0.003 0.05 0.002 0.05
Mining and energy -”- 0.02 0.15 0.04 0.19 0.03 0.17
Ressource processing -”- 0.19 0.39 0.16 0.37 0.17 0.37
Investments goods -”- 0.39 0.49 0.33 0.47 0.36 0.48
Consumption goods -”- 0.06 0.23 0.07 0.25 0.06 0.24
Construction -”- 0.02 0.13 0.03 0.16 0.02 0.14
Retail -”- 0.04 0.21 0.05 0.22 0.04 0.21
Logistics and Communications -”- 0.06 0.23 0.05 0.22 0.06 0.23
Credit and banking -”- 0.03 0.17 0.03 0.16 0.03 0.18
Insurance -”- 0.01 0.10 0.01 0.11 0.01 0.10
Restauration and hotel -”- 0.02 0.14 0.02 0.15 0.02 0.14
Education and publishing -”- 0.03 0.16 0.03 0.18 0.03 0.16
Health sector -”- 0.07 0.25 0.08 0.28 0.08 0.27
Liberal professions -”- 0.02 0.13 0.02 0.14 0.02 0.14
Other services -”- 0.005 0.07 0.01 0.09 0.01 0.07
Reference: Manufacturing
Note: a) In Sample 2 employment spells that are ongoing in 2002 are dropped for workers younger than 55 years (see
explanation in the appendix, section 3.6). In sample 2c no ongoing spells in 2002 are dropped. Summary statistics
for sample 2c are presented in this Table for reasons of comparison.
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3.6 Appendix: Detailed description of the samples
The employee data consists of employment spells which are generated by mandatory
notifications of firms to the German social security authorities. These notifications occur
at least once every year (typically at the end of the year). They contain information
about who is employed and how much each employee has earned on average since the
last notification. The earnings information, however, is reported only up to the social
security contribution threshold and we therefore have right-censoring of the earnings
variable for about 10% of the wage observations. Apart from the wage, firms also report
the education, sex, age, job position, profession, full-time status and other information
of each worker (see variable list in Table 3.5 in section 3.5). A typical employment spell
of a continuously employed person refers to the time period from the 1st of January
to the 31st of December of a given year, but changes in the employment relationship
during the year, e.g. change in the full-time status or a change of the health insurance,
can generate separate notifications per year and hence separate spells per year in the
data.
The job duration variable is constructed from the longitudinal employment infor-
mation which is available for each employee back to 1990. Completed job duration is
measured at the moment of separation (terminations of the employment relationship).
We define separations by (i) interruptions of employment with the present employer
of longer than 30 days (i.e. the separation is followed by a recall), (ii) changes of the
employer identifier (i.e. the separation is followed by a job-to-job move) and (iii) no
subsequent employment spell recorded (i.e. the separation is followed by unemployment
or inactivity). It follows from our definition of a separation that a worker can have sev-
eral employment spells with the same employer. About 13% of workers in the data set
have experienced a recall10.
We chose a flow-sampling approach by restricting the estimations to employment
relationships that began after the 1st of January 1990. Employment spells that are
10Evidence of Mavromaras und Rudolph (1995) based on the same underlying data source, albeit for
the time period before 1990, shows that 12% of all newly started employment relationships in Germany
are recalls. According to their findings, recalls occur mostly in sectors with seasonal fluctuations, and
are more frequent for blue collar workers in the case of men and part-time workers in the case of
women.
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ongoing in 2002 (end of the observation period) should ideally be treated as censored
spells. However, to date there is no model for censored dependent variables that allows
to estimate two-way fixed effects. Keeping the ongoing spells without treating them
as censored would induce bias because large parts of the analysis would be based on
elapsed instead of completed durations. An alternative is to base the analysis only on
completed durations. This would cause sample selection, as all ongoing spells in 2002
would be discarded. We aim at minimizing the sample selection by discarding only part
of the spells. We only drop the ’worst’ spells, i.e. only those spells with a large expected
difference between elapsed and completed durations. The expected difference between
elapsed and completed duration is higher for younger workers. We therefore only drop
the ongoing spells in 2002 of workers younger than 55 years. Table 3.5 in section 3.5
compares the mean values of our estimation sample (Sample 2) to a sample without
dropping any censored employment spells (Sample 2c, not used for estimation). The
comparison of the mean values of the regressors for Sample 2 and Sample 2c reported in
Table 3.5 shows that the main effect of dropping the ongoing spells of workers younger
than 55 years is that we have shorter job durations and lower wages in the sample.
However, the mean values of person and firm characteristics are similar between the
two samples.
In the sample for the wage equation (Sample 1) there is at least one observation
per year, but if there are several notifications during a year with changes in wages or
explanatory variables, then we keep these as different observations. We could establish
an annual panel by keeping just one spell per year. But by doing this we would lose
variation in the data and we would lose many short employer-employee matches that
last for periods of less than a year. We cannot afford to lose employer-employee matches
because they may concern movers and therefore contribute to the identification of firm
effects.
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Chapter 4
The Interaction of Job Satisfaction, Job Search, and Job Changes
- An Empirical Investigation with German Panel Data1
This chapter analyses the interdependence of job characteristics, job satisfaction and job
changes. I draw on a German household panel data set providing detailed information
on job characteristics. Most previous work has analyzed these aspects separately. A
number of studies have looked at the determinants of job satisfaction (Warr 1999, Clark
2005, van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonel 2004, Addio, Eriksson and Frijters 2004, Bo¨ck-
erman and Ilmakunnas 2006). A key result of these studies is that non-pecuniary job
aspects are very important determinants of job satisfaction. Other studies have analyzed
the effect of job satisfaction on job mobility (Freeman 1978a, Clark, Georgellis and San-
fey 1998, Akerlof/Rose/Yellen 1988, Clark 2001, Kristensen/Westergard-Nielsen 2004,
Le´vy-Garboua et al. 2007, Shields/Wheatley Price 2002, Bo¨ckerman and Ilmakunnas
2004, Griffeth et al. 2000). These studies have confirmed for different countries that
job satisfaction reduces quitting, quit intentions, and job search2.
1This chapter was originally published as: ’The Interaction of Job Satisfaction, Job Search, and Job
Changes - An Empirical Investigation with German Panel Data’, The Journal of Happiness Studies,
available online at http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10902-008-9094-5. Publication within this thesis with
kind permission of Springer Science+Business Media.
2Job satisfaction has also been analyzed as a determinant of job changes within the same organi-
zation. Delfgaauw (2007) analyzed a Dutch data set and found that dissatisfaction of public sector
employees with certain organization-specific job domains increased the probability of leaving the cur-
rent employer, while dissatisfaction with job aspects that vary sufficiently within an organization can
lead to job changes within the organization. However, the present analysis remains confined to job
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Currently, there is a lack of studies that combine these strands of the literature by
jointly analyzing job characteristics, job satisfaction, job search and job mobility. An ex-
ception is a study by Bo¨ckerman and Ilmakunnas (2007). Using a Finnish data set, they
find that job disamenities reduce job satisfaction, which in turn increases quit intentions
and job changes. The existing literature in this context has furthermore neglected to an-
alyze heterogeneous effects. In other words, it has not been analyzed how the effects of
job satisfaction on job search, and of job search on job mobility differ according to socioe-
conomic characteristics, the labor market situation, and the overall economic situation.
Previous research has allowed for heterogeneous effects in this context only between men
and women (Clark/Georgellis/Sanfey 1998, Clark 2001, Kristensen/Westergard-Nielsen
2004). Moreover, while individual fixed effects have been included in the research on
the determinants of job satisfaction (Ferrer-i-Carbonel and Frijters 2004) as well as in
studies that analyze job mobility (for example as early as Freeman 1978b), most of
the research that has looked at job satisfaction as a determinant of job search and job
mobility has employed either pooled regressions or random-effects regressions (Clark
et al. 1998, Clark 2001, Kristensen / Westergaard-Nielsen 2004, Le´vy-Garboua et al.
2007, Freeman 1978a)3. However, Including fixed effects is especially important when
subjective data, such as job satisfaction, are analyzed, because it can to some extent
alleviate the problem of inter-personal non-comparability of subjective data.
To sum up, the contribution of the present chapter is threefold. First, it checks
whether the results by Bo¨ckerman and Ilmakunnas (2007) with a Finnish data set can
be confirmed for Germany. Second, the analysis adds to the literature by estimating
heterogeneous effects of job satisfaction on job search, and of job search on job changes.
Third, this chapter pays attention to individual fixed effects in order to investigate
how taking into account unobserved heterogeneity affects the answers to the above-
mentioned questions.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.1 presents the theoretical consider-
ations and the empirical model. Section 4.2 presents the data and the methodology.
changes to a new employer.
3An exception is D’Addio, Eriksson and Frijters (2004), who find that including fixed-effects into
the estimation affects the results importantly, and that the random-effects specification is rejected in
favor of the fixed effects specification.
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4.1. THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS AND THE EMPIRICAL MODEL
Section 4.3 presents results, and section 4.4 contains conclusions. All tables referred to
in this chapter are to be found in section 4.5 and section 4.6 contains an appendix with
details of the estimation.
4.1 Theoretical considerations and the empirical model
Job satisfaction
As job satisfaction is related to objective job characteristics, it can be viewed as
a proxy of on-the-job utility. This utility is likely to depend on pecuniary and non-
pecuniary job characteristics. From a theoretical viewpoint, Warr (1999) classified the
job-related determinants of job satisfaction into 10 job features, these being personal
control, opportunity for skill-use, job demands, variety, environmental clarity (including
job security), income, physical security, supportive supervision, interpersonal contact,
and a valued social position. The present analysis uses detailed data on job charac-
teristics, which are similar to the dimensions proposed by Warr (1999). Table 4.1 (p.
74) gives an overview of the job characteristics included in the analysis. As a measure
of job security, the type of contract is included among the regressors (dummy for a
fixed-term contract), because Deloffre and Rioux (2004) have shown that the type of
contract is a major determinant of the satisfaction with job security. Furthermore, a
subjective measure of job security is also introduced into the analysis (worries about job
security). This is useful, because this subjective measure may carry private information
about the security of the job not yet captured by the type of contract. Such private
information may be the economic situation of the firm or the individual risk of being
laid off (Deloffre and Rioux 2004).
Self-reported job satisfaction as a proxy for utility is influenced not only by job
outcomes, but also by subjective factors. Satisfaction with job outcomes is determined
in an individual reference framework relative to the outcomes of relevant peer groups as
well as relative to expectations, aspirations, and values (Warr 1999). Personality traits
and other individual unobserved aspects therefore influence self-reported job satisfac-
tion and hence need to be included in the analysis. Some of these subjective factors can
be proxied by socio-demographic aspects, such as gender, schooling, age, etc. For exam-
ple, highly educated workers may have higher aspirations and therefore may on average
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report lower satisfaction. Socio-demographic characteristics will therefore be included
as regressors in the job satisfaction equation. However, not all the individual character
traits are observed or can be proxied by observable variables. Furthermore, according to
the set point model of happiness, individuals have their own long-run level of well-being,
determined by genetic predispositions and personality, around which their well-being
fluctuates according to more short-term life circumstances (Diener et al. 1999, Lykken
and Tellegen 1996, Myers and Diener 1995). If the unobserved personality traits and
genetic predispositions that influence job satisfaction are related to the observed char-
acteristics, estimates of the effect of these characteristics on job satisfaction will be
biased. This problem is especially relevant when both the dependent and the indepen-
dent variable are subjective measures (Hamermesh 2004), because both then include
a person-specific effect and the estimates are affected by this effect and do not reveal
the true relationship of the underlying objective measures. It is therefore important
to account for unobserved individual heterogeneity when estimating job satisfaction
equations. Including individual fixed effects in the regression will hold time-invariant
unobserved heterogeneity constant. These considerations related to the determinants
of job satisfaction lead to the estimation of the following equation:
SATISit = x
′
itβ + e1i + u1it, (4.1)
where SATISit denotes job satisfaction of individual i at time t, xit is the vector of
explanatory variables, β is the corresponding vector of regression coefficients, e1i is
the individual fixed effect, and u1it is the error term. Besides the job characteristics
summarized in table 4.1, the explanatory variables of the job satisfaction equation
include the regional unemployment rate, a dummy variable for a public sector job,
socioeconomic regressors such as gender, age, years of job tenure, years of education,
job position, and a dummy for being new in the job. As further control variables,
dummies for year, firm size and sector are included.
Job search
In models of on-the-job search (Mortensen 1986, Mortensen and Pissarides 1999),
employed workers engage in job search if the marginal return from searching exceeds
its marginal cost. Search effort is adjusted so as to equate the marginal return and
the marginal cost of searching. The marginal return increases if the difference between
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the utility derived from the current job and the expected utility from alternative jobs
is high. The lower the utility from the current job (proxied by job satisfaction), the
higher is the probability of finding alternative jobs of higher quality, and the higher is
the probability of engaging in job search and of choosing a high level of search effort.
Search costs, costs of job mobility, the time preference, and the payoff period of a
new job (the remaining time up to retirement) also influence job search. From this
theoretical framework, the following hypotheses on the effects of job satisfaction and
socioeconomic characteristics can be derived. Older people are closer to retirement
and have a shorter payoff period in the new job. They are therefore less likely to
engage in on-the-job search. Labor market flows are known to respond to cyclical
fluctuations. For example, Frederiksen and Westergaard-Nielsen (2007) estimate that
an increase in growth in the economy increases flows into new jobs, and Erlinghagen
and Knuth (2002) find for Germany that job entry and exit rates are procyclical, i.e.
labor mobility is greater during upswings. A good labor market situation (high growth
rates and low regional unemployment rates) increases the likelihood of finding good job
offers and therefore can be expected to increase the probability of on-the-job search.
In downswings, when job vacancies are generally lower, on-the-job search is less likely.
However, a poor individual job situation, as opposed to poor labor market conditions
in general, is likely to increase job search. The threat of losing one’s job is likely to
increase on-the-job search. A high individual level of education is likely to affect the
chances of receiving outside job offers and makes job search more likely. In the public
sector, outside job offers are likely to be less frequent than in the private sector, so that
on-the-job search by public sector employees is likely to be lower. Finally, male and
female workers may differ in their propensity to engage in on-the-job search. A dummy
for gender is therefore also included among the determinants.
Human capital theory (Becker 1962) also provides an important argument for the
determinants of job search. The longer an employee has worked for a given employer,
the more firm-specific capital he / she has accumulated. Firm-specific capital designates
those abilities of the worker that are of value to the current employer but which are of
no value to different employers. Firm-specific capital therefore creates a wedge between
the wage earned with the current employer and the wage that can be expected with a
different employer. From the view of human capital theory, long job tenure makes it
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less likely that a better-paying job with a different employer can be found and therefore
lowers search effort and makes job search less likely.
One of the main aims of this chapter is to investigate how job satisfaction affects
the probability of job search differently according to different circumstances. The job
search equation accordingly not only includes job tenure, the growth rate of gross do-
mestic product (GDP), the regional unemployment rate, subjective job insecurity, age,
education, public sector affiliation, and gender as simple determinants of the proba-
bility of job search, but the interaction terms of these variables with job satisfaction
are also included. The coefficients of the interaction terms indicate whether the effect
of one regressor on the dependent variable depends on the values of another regressor
(Wooldridge 2006, p. 204). For example, a negative coefficient for the interaction term
of job satisfaction and education would imply that the effect of job satisfaction on job
search is more negative (and hence stronger) for highly educated individuals than for
less educated individuals.
It is important to control for unobserved heterogeneity in the job mobility regres-
sions. If unobserved heterogeneity is correlated with the observed determinants of job
search and job changes, the coefficients of the observed determinants are biased in a
pooled regression. For example, there is an ongoing debate on whether the negative
effect of tenure on job mobility is due to unobserved heterogeneity in mobility rates
(Farber 1999). Self-selection of workers with different intrinsic mobility rates into jobs
with different characteristics would lead to biased estimates in the framework of the
present analysis. Holding fixed individual effects constant can alleviate these problems.
The job search equation therefore becomes:
SEARCHit = α0 + α1SATISi,t−1 +
l∑
j=1
γjSATISi,t−1zjit + c′itλ+ e2i + u2it, (4.2)
where SEARCHit denotes the self-reported probability of job search of individual
i at time t. It is likely that job search influences contemporaneous job satisfaction.
Including job satisfaction at time t as a regressor would therefore cause a simultane-
ity problem4. To avoid simultaneity, I include job satisfaction lagged by one period
(SATISi,t−1). The vector zjit contains explanatory variables, which are interacted with
4Simultaneity arises when an explanatory variable is jointly determined with the dependent variable.
Simultaneity biases the estimates of the structural coefficients (Wooldridge 2006, p. 552-555).
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job satisfaction. These include gender, job tenure, the German national GDP growth
rate, the regional unemployment rate, subjective job insecurity (some or strong worries
about job security), age, education, and a dummy for a public sector job. All the regres-
sors zj that where interacted with job satisfaction are also included in simple form (not
interacted) in the regressor vector cit. Besides these variables, cit also includes age and
dummies for year, sector, and firm size as control variables. The regression coefficients
are α0, α1, γj (j = 1 . . . l) and the vector λ, while e2i is the individual fixed effect, and
u2it is the error term of the equation.
Job changes
Kristensen and Westergard-Nielsen (2004) have validated empirically that job search
is a strong predictor of quits. However, whether job search leads to an actual job
changes depends on the circumstances. Of two individuals with the same probability of
job search, the one who searches more intensively and who receives better job offers is
more likely to change his / her job. Determinants of search effort and of the probability
to receive a good job offer should therefore be included. Search effort is likely to be
related to job satisfaction and job tenure, whereas the probability of receiving a good
job offer is likely to depend on GDP growth, regional unemployment, work experience,
education, and public sector affiliation. Hence, these are included as the determinants
of job changes. As before, these determinants are included in simple form and as
interaction terms, in this case interacted with the probability of job search. Gender is
again included as a determinant to capture the different behavior of men and women.
Individual fixed effects are also added to the analysis. The job change equation is
JOBCHANGEit = δ0 + δ1SEARCHit +
m∑
j=1
χjSEARCHitsjit + t
′
itκ+ e3i + u3it, (4.3)
where the dependent variable JOBCHANGEit is a dummy variable indicating whether
an individual i changes his / her job between period t and t+1. Throughout the anal-
ysis, only job changes initiated by the employee are considered5. The key explanatory
5Consequently, quits that lead to unemployment or withdrawals from the labor force are not con-
sidered. The reason is that they are not natural outcomes of job search, and job search is central to the
analysis. Considering job changes initiated by the employee does not imply that these are voluntary
separations. In particular, job changes occurring in anticipation of future job loss can be viewed as
involuntary (Manski and Straub 2000).
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variables are SEARCHit, the self-reported probability of job search, as well as the inter-
action terms of SEARCHit with other explanatory variables summarized in zjit. These
include job satisfaction, gender, job tenure, GDP growth, the regional unemployment
rate, years of work experience, years of education, and a dummy for a public sector job.
The remaining explanatory variables tit also include these variables in their simple form
as well as dummies for year, sector, and firm size as control variables. The regression
coefficients are δ0, δ1, χj (j = 1 . . .m) and the vector κ, while e3i is the individual fixed
effect, and u3it is the error term of the equation.
The detailed job characteristics that are determinants of job satisfaction in equation
(4.1) are not included as determinants in the equations (4.2) and (4.3), because I argue
that job characteristics influence job search and job changes via utility, and utility is
proxied by job satisfaction. Job satisfaction therefore embodies the job aspects that
matter according to the preferences and the reference framework of the individual.
Equations (4.2)-(4.3) form a system of three regression equations. The appendix in
section 4.6 contains details of how this system is estimated.
The present analysis is limited, as not all factors that influence the decision to
search for a job or to change a job can be included in the analysis. Omitted factors are
satisfaction with the place or location of work, with local community services or with
social contacts, and personal events, such as child birth, job changes of spouse, etc.
These factors are not included in the model because of data restrictions, and because
they are not central to the present analysis of the role of job satisfaction in explaining
job search and of how job satisfaction and job search interact in explaining job changes.
4.2 Data
I used data from the German Socio-Economic panel (GSOEP) household survey, which
contains a rich set of socioeconomic variables. The data cover the period from 1984 to
2003. An overview of the structure of the GSOEP is provided by Wagner et al. (2007).
I restrict the sample to employed West German workers between 16 and 60 years of
age.
Job satisfaction of employed respondents is surveyed each year by the question ’How
satisfied are you today with your job? Please answer using the following scale [ranging
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from 0 to 10]: 0 means totally unhappy, 10 means totally happy.’ The survey also con-
tained different job characteristics. Some of them, such as wages, work time, and worries
about job security are surveyed each year. The more detailed job characteristics, such
as task diversity, hard manual labor, relations with colleagues, etc. have been surveyed
only in recent years. Table 4.1 gives an overview of the job characteristics included in
the analysis and presents the lists of questions associated with each characteristic.
The GSOEP survey also includes several questions about job mobility. In most
years, there is a question on the subjective probability of job search. The wording is
’How probable is it in the next two years that you will look for a new job?’ The answer to
the job search question is coded in 4 integers from ’unlikely’ to ’certain’6. Furthermore,
there are retrospective questions on objective job mobility events. Respondents are
asked whether there were any employment changes since 1 January of the preceding
year and, if so, what types of change. I use the response option ’I have started a new
position with a different employer’ to identify job changes. Respondents are also asked
how the previous employment relationship was terminated. I use the response ’My
resignation’ to restrict the job changes to those that are initiated by the employee.
Besides a set of socioeconomic control variables available in the GSOEP, the un-
employment rates of the different Federal States and the national GDP growth rate as
published by the German Federal Statistical Office are used in the analysis. Matching
the unemployment rate at regional level to the micro data can magnify any bias in the
estimates of the standard errors if there is within-region correlation of the error term
(Moulton 1990). When estimating the job search and the job change equation, standard
errors are therefore adjusted for clustering on regions.
For each of the three equations, job satisfaction, job search, and job changes, data
are missing in some years, because the information has not been surveyed in each year.
The sample sizes and the years on which the estimation of the respective equations are
based are indicated in the results tables.
6Since 1999, respondents are asked to indicate the probability in percent, choosing between 11
options ranging from 0%, 10%, 20% etc. up to 100%. I harmonize the reply options by recoding 0%
as unlikely, 10%-50% as probably not, 60%-90% as probable, and 100% as certain. The recoding is
chosen in such a way that in the years before and after the change of the reply options similar fractions
of respondents are found in the four categories.
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4.3 Results
4.3.1 Descriptive statistics
All tables referred to in this chapter are to be found in section 4.5 (p. 74). Table
4.2 presents the descriptive statistics by gender for 21 job characteristics and overall
job satisfaction. According to this report, West German workers seem on average to
be satisfied with their jobs. Mean job satisfaction is about 7.3 on the ordinal scale,
which ranges from 0 to 10. Judging from the mean of the ordinal job satisfaction vari-
able, men report slightly higher job satisfaction than women, although the difference is
small. With respect to the detailed job characteristics, men enjoy higher fringe bene-
fits, more influence, learning and promotion opportunities, a higher task diversity and
higher wages. But they also report more worries about job security, being more ex-
posed to environmental risks, hard manual labor, stress, shift work, being more strictly
controlled, and longer working hours. For the remaining job characteristics there are
only small differences between men and women.
In the following sections, the estimation results of the equations (4.1)-(4.3) are pre-
sented. The estimations will first be made without the individual fixed effects, and
then fixed effects will be included. When fixed effects are included, the time-invariant
characteristics (gender and education) are dropped. Age is also dropped in the fixed-
effects estimations, because in a fixed-effects model age is perfectly collinear with the
time dummies.
4.3.2 The effects of job characteristics on job satisfaction
Table 4.3 presents the effects of detailed job characteristics on job satisfaction. The first
two columns refer to the pooled regressions, and the last column refers to the fixed-
effects regression. Comparing the pooled ordered probit regression with the pooled
linear regression, all effects are similar in sign and significance. In the present analysis,
using a linear model instead of an ordered probit model does not affect the results
significantly.
In the pooled regressions most effects of job characteristics on job satisfaction have
the expected sign. Fringe benefits, good relations with colleagues, independence, influ-
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ence, learning opportunities, task diversity, promotion opportunities, wage level, and
wage growth increase job satisfaction. Perceived job insecurity, conflict with supervi-
sors, adverse environmental effects, hard manual labor, stress, strict control at work,
and a deviation of desired from actual work time reduce job satisfaction. The effects
are statistically highly significant and continue to hold in the fixed-effects specification
with the exception that hard manual labor is not statistically significant any more.
These results are very similar to the results found using Finnish data by Bo¨ckerman
and Ilmakunnas (2006). They also confirm that physical harm, physically demanding
work, the social atmosphere in the workplace, having a voice and the existence of pro-
motion prospect are important determinants of job satisfaction. By comparison with
wages, wage growth and fringe benefits, some of the non-pecuniary job characteristics
affect job satisfaction extremely strongly. Trade-offs can be computed by comparing
the coefficients of different job characteristics. For example, the estimated fixed-effects
model (last column of table 4.3) predicts that if the relations with colleagues are not
good, a wage rise of 110% is required to maintain the same level of job satisfaction as
if relations with colleagues were good7. A lack of task diversity, strong worries about
job security and conflicts with the supervisor are valued even more highly in terms of
wages. The results match Clark’s (2005) findings that good relations, job content and
other nonpecuniary job aspects have a stronger effect on job satisfaction than income.
Similarly, van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonel (2004) found that satisfaction with the work
itself is more important than pay in determining overall job satisfaction.
In the pooled regression, somewhat counter-intuitively, the effect of shift work on job
satisfaction is positive. This effect becomes insignificant once controlled for individual
fixed effects. One possible interpretation of the fixed effect in the satisfaction equation
is intrinsic satisfaction. For example, the fact that hard manual labor has a negative
and statistically significant influence on job satisfaction in a pooled regression but no
statistically significant effect in a fixed-effects regression suggests that intrinsically less
7In the fixed-effects specification, the coefficient of good relations with colleagues is 0.203, while
that on the log wage is 0.275. This implies that the log wage would need to rise by 0.203 / 0.275 = 0.74
log points in order to compensate (hold job satisfaction constant) when relations with colleagues are
bad instead of good. A rise of the log wage by 0.74 point is equal to a wage raise of about 110%, as
exp(0.74)-1=1.1
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satisfied workers seem to work in jobs with hard manual labor. In this context, “intrin-
sically less satisfied” means that a worker is less satisfied because of a time-invariant
characteristic. This may be a subjective characteristic, such as a personality trait, or it
may be an objective characteristic, such as the profession a worker works in, insofar as
it is unobserved and time-constant.
Some characteristics have no statistically significant effect after holding the large
number of job characteristics constant. These insignificant effects include the infor-
mation whether the activity corresponds to the job that the worker was trained for,
whether the job is a fixed-term job, and how long the actual working time is.
According to the effects of the control variables, highly educated workers are less
satisfied, which may be explained by their higher aspirations. Male workers are less
satisfied, a result which has been previously discussed by Clark (1997). Furthermore,
workers seem to be happier with their jobs when unemployment is high, at least in the
pooled regression. As their own perceived job security is held constant in the regres-
sion, higher regional unemployment means that the relative position of a given worker
improves, which can explain higher job satisfaction8. In the fixed-effects regression,
there emerges a negative and significant effect of job tenure on job satisfaction. In a
fixed-effect regression, the coefficient is only identified by the variation of tenure for a
given individual, not by the variation of tenure between individuals. The negative effect
therefore implies that job satisfaction tends to decrease in a given job. This may reflect
a return to the baseline satisfaction as predicted by the set point model of happiness.
The result obtained by Bo¨ckerman and Ilmakunnas (2006) that job satisfaction rises
again after 8 years of job tenure is not confirmed in the dataset used here. Another
interesting result is that after holding constant the broad set of job characteristics, there
remains no statistical significant effect of being a public sector worker, age, job position,
and whether a worker has just moved into a new job.
8This result is in contrast to Clark’s (2003) finding, with British panel data, that higher unemploy-
ment reduces the well-being of employed (and increases the well-being of unemployed) individuals.
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4.3.3 The effects of job satisfaction on job search
The subjective probability of job search is an ordinal variable coded in 4 categories
(from ’unlikely’ to ’certain’). The results of the job search equation (4.2) are presented
in Table 4.4. As before, columns 1 and 2 present the pooled ordered probit and pooled
linear regression, whereas column 3 presents the fixed-effects regression. The ordered
probit regression shows that, as expected, job satisfaction is a strong predictor of job
search. High job satisfaction reduces the probability of being in search of a new job.
The influence of job satisfaction on job search is stronger for more educated workers,
as the respective interaction term has a negative sign and is statistically significant.
The influence of job satisfaction on the probability of job search is weaker when job
tenure is high, when job insecurity is high, at a higher age, and in the public sector.
These influences match the expectations that were discussed in section 4.1. While
subjective job security and its interaction with job satisfaction are highly significant,
the interaction terms of job satisfaction with the regional unemployment rate and the
national GDP growth rate are not statistically significant. One reason may be that the
insecurity of a job is much more precisely captured by subjective job security than by
aggregate measures such as unemployment and GDP growth rates. A further result is
that the effect of satisfaction on job search is not significantly different between men
and women.
Comparing the columns 1 and 2 of table 4.4 reveals that the signs and statistical
significance of the effects are not much altered when a linear model instead of an ordered
probit model is used, with the sole exception of the interaction term of job satisfaction
with perceived job insecurity. Including fixed effects into the analysis (column 3 of
table 4.4) leaves most of the results unchanged. However, the interaction effect of job
satisfaction and education becomes insignificant.
4.3.4 The effects of job search on job changes
Table 4.5 reports the estimation of equation (4.3). In all three specifications presented
in the table, a higher subjective probability of job search is associated with a higher
probability of changing jobs, as was hypothesized in section 4.1. However, the remaining
effects differ quite substantially in some cases between the nonlinear probit model and
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the pooled linear model (columns 1 and 2 of the table). The most frequent difference is
that effects are not significant in the probit model but become significant in the linear
model. This is true of the interaction terms of job search with GDP growth, the regional
unemployment rate, and the public sector, as well as for the regional unemployment
rate and job satisfaction as regressors on their own. In the following, I interpret the
results of the linear probability model, but it should be kept in mind that some of
these results are not robust against employing the nonlinear probit model and should
therefore be interpreted with caution.
With these reservations, the results of the pooled linear probability model suggest
that the effect of job search on actual job changes is stronger when workers are more
dissatisfied. Higher dissatisfaction hence increases search effort and raises the chances of
finding a new job. However, job satisfaction as a regressor in simple form (not interacted
with job search) increases job changes9. Job satisfaction may increase job changes,
because more satisfied people (holding search effort constant) give a better impression
in job interviews and are therefore more likely to get a job. This interpretation is
supported by empirical results from personnel psychology that show a link between
success at job interviews and personality traits such as extraversion, self-esteem, etc.
(Liden, Martin and Parsons 1993, Caldwell and Burger 1998, Cook, Vance and Spector
2000), and a correlation of these personality traits with subjective well-being (Hayes
and Joseph 2002, Emmons and Diener 1985). The findings of the present analysis
suggest that the strong negative effects of job satisfaction on quitting identified by
Clark, Georgellis and Sanfey (1998) in data of the same source as used here is actually
no direct effect but an indirect effect running via job search activities.
The results of the pooled linear probability model also suggest that the effect of
job search on actual job changes is stronger when tenure is short, when GDP growth
is high, when regional unemployment is low, when workers are better educated, and
9As the previous analysis has shown, there is a strong association between job search and job satis-
faction. Including both variables in the job change regression might potentially cause multicollinearity.
I therefore also repeated the estimation excluding job satisfaction as a regressor from the job change
equation (results available upon request). The magnitudes of coefficients, significance levels and the
variance inflation factors computed after the linear regression were very similar. Multicollinearity due
to the job satisfaction variable therefore does not seem to be harmful to the present regression.
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when workers are employed in the private sector. These results carry over to the fixed-
effects regression. Some of the remaining regressors at first sight have counter-intuitive
signs in the linear pooled and fixed-effects regressions. For example, GDP growth as a
regressor on its own (not interacted with job search) decreases job changes, education as
a regressor on its own decreases job changes, and public sector affiliation as a regressor
on its own increases job changes. These regressors therefore seem to exert their expected
effects on job changes through their interaction with search, but taken on their own,
they show opposite effects. For some of these opposite effects, there are plausible
explanations: Better economic conditions (GDP growth) may not only improve the
job-finding rate, but also improve the future expectations with the present employer,
for example, regarding future promotions or wage rises and may therefore affect job
changes negatively. If they search more, better educated people have higher probabilities
of changing their jobs, because they may be more efficient in searching and are faced
with more job opportunities. However, when job search and job satisfaction are held
constant, they are apparently more attached to their present employer, probably because
they have better opportunities of making a career with their present employer, and
because employers put more effort into attaching highly educated workers to the firm
than lower educated workers.
4.4 Conclusion
Using German panel data, this chapter has analyzed the effects of detailed job charac-
teristics on job satisfaction as well as the conditions under which low job satisfaction
leads to job search, and under which job search leads to job changes. In sum, the results
of Bo¨ckerman and Ilmakunnas (2007) for Finland can be confirmed also for Germany:
adverse job characteristics decrease job satisfaction, which in turn increases job search,
which is an important predictor of actual job changes.
From a practical standpoint the results imply that firms that do not provide satis-
factory working conditions run the risk of experiencing high rates of fluctuation. Non-
pecuniary job aspects are found to be very important determinants of job satisfaction.
For example, bad relations with colleagues depress job satisfaction so heavily that pay
would need to be more than doubled to compensate for this effect. As a wage rise of
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this extent appears improbable, this implies that a bad atmosphere in the workplace
can hardly in practice be compensated by higher wages. Task diversity, conflicts with
supervisors, and worries about job security have equally strong effects. The remaining
job characteristics analyzed also have considerable effects on job satisfaction.
The analysis has also shown that job satisfaction is a strong determinant of the
probability of engaging in on-the-job search. The more an employee is dissatisfied, the
more likely he / she is to search for a new job. This effect is stronger for workers with
lower tenure, young workers and workers in the private sector. According to the results
of pooled probit regressions, job security (a proxy for a good economic situation) leads
to a stronger effect of dissatisfaction on search, but this result is not robust when a
linear model is used and fixed effects are included in the analysis.
Finally, job search is found to be an important determinant of the probability of
actually changing jobs. Job satisfaction modifies this relationship: at low levels of job
satisfaction, the effect of job search on the probability of changing jobs is stronger. This
can be interpreted in the way that dissatisfaction increases not only the probability of
searching for a job but also the search effort. However, after holding the probability of
search and the search effort constant, job satisfaction was found to increase the prob-
ability of changing jobs. This seems to show that more satisfied people fare better
in job interviews. The results also show that job search is more likely to lead to job
changes when workers are employed in the private sector, when job tenure is low, eco-
nomic conditions are good, and education is high. Especially those firms that rely on a
highly educated workforce should therefore worry about the risk of high turnover due
to unsatisfactory working conditions.
There remains scope for further research. As the analysis in this chapter is based
on household survey data, it was possible to include firm characteristics only by in-
troducing firm size and sector as control variables. Furthermore, job security was not
available as an objective piece of information at firm level but was only available as a
subjective variable at individual level and as a highly aggregated variable at regional
or national level. Further research into this topic should therefore aim at using linked
employer-employee data providing much more detailed firm-level information. However,
in Germany linked employer-employee data sets currently include neither job satisfac-
tion nor detailed characteristics of individual jobs.
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4.5 Tables
Tab. 4.1: Overview of job characteristics
Table 1 Overview of job characteristics
Variable Surveyed Wording
Activity corresponds to job (A) Is [your] position the same as the profession for which you were
educated or trained?
Fringe benefits (A) Did you receive any of the following additional payments from
your employer last year? (13th month salary, 14th month salary,
Additional Christmas bonus, Vacation pay, Profit-sharing,
premiums, bonuses, Other or ‘No, I received none of these’.)
What is your attitude towards your job security - are you concerned
about it?
Some worries about job
security
(A) Somewhat concerned
Strong worries about job
security
(A) Very concerned
Fixed-term contract (A) Is your contract of employment for an unlimited or limited period?
I would like to know more about work and the conditions at your
place of employment. Please answer the following questions by
stating whether it applies to your work completely, partly or not
at all.
Conflicts, difficulties with
supervisor
(B) Do you often have conflicts and difficulties with your boss?
Exposed to adverse
environment
(B) Are you exposed to undesirable working conditions (cold, heat,
wetness, chemicals, gases)?
Get along well with
colleagues
(B) Do you get along well with your colleagues?
Hard manual labor (B) Do you have to do hard manual labor at your job?
Stress (B) Does your work involve a high level of stress?
Independence (C) Do you decide yourself how to complete the tasks involved in your
work?
Influence on pay and
promotion of others
(C) Do you have an influence in determining whether employees
receive more pay or promotion?
Learning opportunities (C) Do you often learn something new on the job, something which is
relevant for your career?
Shift work (C) Do you work the night shift or another type of special shift?
Strict control of
performance
(C) Is your work strictly monitored?
Task diversity (C) Is your job varied?
Subjective probability of
promotion
(B) How likely is it that the following career change will take place in
your life within the next two years: receive a promotion at your
current place of employment? Please estimate the probability of
such a change according to a scale from 0 to 100.
Deviation of actual from
desired work time
(D) Difference of desired actual work time. Desired work time is taken
from the question ‘‘If you could choose your own number of
working hours, taking into account that your income would
change according to the number of hours: How many hours
would you want to work?’’
Actual work time (A) How many hours do your actual working-hours consist of including
possible over-time?
T. Cornelißen
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In models of on-the-job search (Mortensen 1986; Mortensen and Pissarides 1999),
employed workers engage in job search if the marginal return from searching exceeds its
marginal cost. Search effort is adjusted so as to equate the marginal return and the marginal
cost of searching. The marginal return increases if the difference between the utility
derived from the current job and the expected utility from alternative jobs is high. The
lower the utility from the current job (proxied by job satisfaction), the higher is the
probability of finding alternative jobs of higher quality, and the higher is the probability of
engaging in job search and of choosing a high level of search effort. Search costs, costs of
job mobility, the time preference, and the payoff period of a new job (the remaining time
up to retirement) also influence job search. From this theoretical framework, the following
hypotheses on the effects of job satisfaction and socioeconomic characteristics can be
derived. Older people are closer to retirement and have a shorter payoff period in the new
job. They are therefore less likely to engage in on-the-job search. Labor market flows are
known to respond to cyclical fluctuations. For example, Frederiksen and Westergaard-
Nielsen (2007) estimate that an increase in growth in the economy increases flows into new
jobs, and Erlinghagen and Knuth (2002) find for Germany that job entry and exit rates are
procyclical, i.e. labor mobility is greater during upswings. A good labor market situation
(high growth rates and low regional unemployment rates) increases the likelihood of
finding good job offers and therefore can be expected to increase the probability of on-the-
job search. In downswings, when job vacancies are generally lower, on-the-job search is
less likely. However, a poor individual job situation, as opposed to poor labor market
conditions in general, is likely to increase job search. The threat of losing one’s job is
likely to increase on-the-job search. A high individual level of education is likely to affect
the chances of receiving outside job offers and makes job search more likely. In the public
sector, outside job offers are likely to be less frequent than in the private sector, so that on-
the-job search by public sector employees is likely to be lower. Finally, male and female
workers may differ in their propensity to engage in on-the-job search. A dummy for gender
is therefore also included among the determinants.
Human capital theory (Becker 1962) also provides an important argument for the
determinants of job search. The longer an employee has worked for a given employer, the
more firm-specific capital he/she has accumulated. Firm-specific capital designates those
abilities of the worker that are of value to the current employer but which are of no value to
different employers. Firm-specific capital therefore creates a wedge between the wage
earned with the current employer and the wage that can be expected with a different
Table 1 continued
Variable Surveyed Wording
Logarithm of net wage (A) How high was your income from employment last month? If you
received extra income such as vacation pay or back pay, please
do not include this. Please do include overtime pay. Fill in your
net income, which means the sum after deduction of taxes, social
security, and unemployment and health insurance.
Wage growth rate (A) =Logarithm of net wage [t] - Logarithm of net wage [t - 1]
(A) Yearly; (B) 1985, 1987, 1989, 1991 to 1994, 1996, 1998, 1999, 2001, 2003, 2005; (C) 1985, 1987, 1989,
1995, 2001; (D) yearly, except 1996
The Interaction of Job Satisfaction, Job Search, and Job Changes
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Tab. 4.2: Descriptive statistics of job characteristics
learning and promotion opportunities, a higher task diversity and higher wages. But they
also report more worries about job security, being more exposed to environmental risks,
hard manual labor, stress, shift work, being more strictly controlled, and longer working
hours. For the remaining job characteristics there are only small differences between men
and women.
In the following sections, the estimation results of the Eqs. 1–3 are presented. The
estimations will first be made without the individual fixed effects, and then fixed effects
will be included. When fixed effects are included, the time-invariant characteristics (gender
and education) are dropped. Age is also dropped in the fixed-effects estimations, because in
a fixed-effects model age is perfectly collinear with the time dummies.
Table 2 Descriptive statistics of job characteristics
Variable Unit of
measurement
Female Male Total
Mean Mean Mean Std.
Dev.
Min Max
Job satisfaction (d) 7.29 7.33 7.31 1.94 0 10
Activity corresponds to job (a) 0.65 0.63 0.63 0.48 0 1
Fringe benefits (a) 0.92 0.95 0.94 0.24 0 1
Some worries about job security (a) 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.20 0 1
Strong worries about job security (a) 0.29 0.33 0.31 0.46 0 1
Fixed-term contract (a) 0.06 0.08 0.07 0.26 0 1
Conflicts, difficulties with supervisor (a) 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.16 0 1
Exposed to adverse environment (a) 0.07 0.22 0.17 0.37 0 1
Get along well with colleagues (a) 0.80 0.79 0.80 0.40 0 1
Hard manual labor (a) 0.09 0.14 0.12 0.32 0 1
Stress (a) 0.27 0.31 0.30 0.46 0 1
Independence (a) 0.39 0.40 0.40 0.49 0 1
Influence on pay and promotion of
others
(c) 0.13 0.26 0.21 0.41 0 1
Learning opportunities (a) 0.32 0.38 0.36 0.48 0 1
Shift work (c) 0.14 0.20 0.18 0.38 0 1
Strict control of performance (c) 0.45 0.52 0.50 0.50 0 1
Task diversity (a) 0.58 0.67 0.64 0.48 0 1
Subjective probability of promotion (b) 0.12 0.21 0.18 0.38 0 1
Deviation of actual from desired work
time
Weekly hours 6.35 6.24 6.28 7.63 0 70
Actual work time Weekly hours 34.66 43.36 40.14 9.90 1.00 80.00
Logarithm of net wage Log monthly
wage
6.75 7.31 7.11 0.52 5.00 9.07
Wage growth rate Diff. log wage 0.07 0.05 0.06 0.21 -2.15 2.40
N = 11,294
(a) Fraction saying the job characteristic applies to their job
(b) Coded from 1 = unlikely to 4 = certain
(c) Fraction saying the job characteristic applies or partly applies to their job
(d) Coded in integers from 0 = totally unhappy to 10 = totally happy
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Tab. 4.3: Job satisfaction regressions
According to the effects of the control variables, highly educated workers are less
satisfied, which may be explained by their higher aspirations. Male workers are less
satisfied, a result which has been previously discussed by Clark (1997). Furthermore,
Table 3 Job satisfaction regressions
Model Pooled ordered probit Pooled
linear (a)
Fixed-effects
linear (a)
Activity corresponds to job 0.008 (0.023) 0.008 (0.021) -0.002 (0.040)
Fringe benefits 0.192*** (0.042) 0.179*** (0.039) 0.161** (0.065)
Some worries about job security -0.275*** (0.023) -0.256*** (0.021) -0.183*** (0.031)
Strong worries about job security -0.536*** (0.040) -0.507*** (0.038) -0.301*** (0.055)
Fixed-term contract 0.020 (0.050) 0.019 (0.046) 0.027 (0.075)
Conflicts with supervisor -0.820*** (0.061) -0.785*** (0.056) -0.484*** (0.076)
Exposed to adverse environment -0.103*** (0.030) -0.096*** (0.028) -0.119*** (0.042)
Good relation with colleagues 0.357*** (0.024) 0.337*** (0.023) 0.203*** (0.032)
Hard manual labor -0.151*** (0.034) -0.143*** (0.031) -0.040 (0.048)
Stress -0.252*** (0.023) -0.236*** (0.021) -0.167*** (0.032)
Independence 0.149*** (0.022) 0.136*** (0.020) 0.124*** (0.028)
Influence 0.095*** (0.027) 0.088*** (0.025) 0.135*** (0.038)
Learning opportunities 0.208*** (0.023) 0.193*** (0.021) 0.126*** (0.029)
Shift work 0.069** (0.028) 0.061** (0.026) -0.050 (0.049)
Strict control of performance -0.123*** (0.021) -0.113*** (0.019) -0.162*** (0.027)
Task diversity 0.360*** (0.022) 0.336*** (0.021) 0.231*** (0.030)
Subj. probability of promotion 0.115*** (0.027) 0.106*** (0.025) 0.105*** (0.033)
Deviation of actual from desired
work time
-0.011*** (0.001) -0.010*** (0.001) -0.006*** (0.002)
Actual work time -0.002 (0.001) -0.001 (0.001) -0.002 (0.002)
Logarithm of net wage 0.139*** (0.035) 0.128*** (0.033) 0.275*** (0.066)
Wage growth rate 0.143*** (0.047) 0.131*** (0.044) 0.181*** (0.061)
Regional unemployment rate 0.009** (0.004) 0.008** (0.004) 0.006 (0.014)
Public sector 0.045 (0.034) 0.042 (0.032) -0.071 (0.066)
Gender: male -0.056** (0.027) -0.050** (0.025)
Age -0.007 (0.008) -0.007 (0.008)
Age squared/100 0.009 (0.010) 0.009 (0.010) -0.011 (0.016)
Years of job tenure -0.003 (0.004) -0.002 (0.004) -0.016*** (0.006)
Job tenure squared/100 0.001 (0.011) -0.0001 (0.010) 0.015 (0.018)
Years of education -0.035*** (0.005) -0.032*** (0.005)
Intermediate job position -0.035 (0.029) -0.033 (0.027) 0.071 (0.045)
High job position -0.003 (0.044) -0.001 (0.041) 0.036 (0.065)
Job move last year 0.058 (0.038) 0.052 (0.035) 0.063 (0.045)
Constant – 0.018 (0.338) -1.632** (0.712)
R2 – 0.179 –
N 11,294 11,294 11,294
* p \ 0.10, ** p \ 0.05, *** p \ 0.01, standard errors clustered on regions in parentheses
Year, sector, and firm size dummies included
Data: GSOEP 1985, 1987, 1989, 1995, 2001
(a) Dependent variable ‘‘cardinalized’’ as described in Appendix A1
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Tab. 4.4: Job search regressions
changing jobs, as was hypothesized in Sect. 2. However, the remaining effects differ
quite substantially in some cases between the nonlinear probit model and the pooled
linear model (columns 1 and 2 of the table). The most frequent difference is that effects
are not significant in the probit model but become significant in the linear model. This is
true of the interaction terms of job search with GDP growth, the regional unemployment
rate, and the public sector, as well as for the regional unemployment rate and job
satisfaction as regressors on their own. In the following, I interpret the results of the
linear probability model, but it should be kept in mind that some of these results are not
robust against employing the nonlinear probit model and should therefore be interpreted
with caution.
With these reservations, the results of the pooled linear probability model suggest that
the effect of job search on actual job changes is stronger when workers are more dissat-
isfied. Higher dissatisfaction hence increases search effort and raises the chances of finding
a new job. However, job satisfaction as a regressor in simple form (not interacted with job
Table 4 Job search regressions
Model Pooled ordered
probit
Pooled linear (a) Fixed-effects linear
(a)
Lagged job satisfaction -0.157*** (0.017) -0.139*** (0.011) -0.095*** (0.020)
Lagged satisfaction 9 male -0.008 (0.007) -0.005 (0.004) -0.004 (0.005)
Lagged satisfaction 9 tenure 0.001*** (0.001) 0.002*** (0.000) 0.002*** (0.000)
Lagged satisfaction 9 GDP growth 0.002 (0.002) 0.002 (0.001) -0.001 (0.002)
Lagged satisfaction 9 regional
unemployment
0.0001 (0.001) 0.0001 (0.001) -0.001 (0.001)
Lagged satisfaction 9 job insecurity 0.019*** (0.007) 0.0001 (0.004) 0.004 (0.006)
Lagged satisfaction 9 age 0.001** (0.000) 0.002*** (0.000) 0.001*** (0.000)
Lagged satisfaction 9 education -0.005*** (0.001) -0.006*** (0.001) -0.002 (0.001)
Lagged satisfaction 9 public sector 0.021** (0.009) 0.024*** (0.005) 0.018* (0.010)
Gender: male 0.143*** (0.046) 0.098*** (0.030)
Age 0.026*** (0.004) -0.019*** (0.003)
Age squared/100 -0.086*** (0.006) -0.022*** (0.004) -0.029*** (0.008)
Years of job tenure -0.060*** (0.004) -0.047*** (0.003) -0.005 (0.003)
Job tenure squared/100 0.090*** (0.011) 0.070*** (0.006) 0.021** (0.008)
Real GDP growth rate -0.062 (0.048) -0.037 (0.029) 0.021 (0.044)
Regional unemployment rate -0.010 (0.008) -0.007 (0.005) -0.009 (0.006)
Subjective job insecurity 0.184*** (0.041) 0.193*** (0.025) 0.140*** (0.043)
Fixed-term contract 0.516*** (0.031) 0.391*** (0.025) 0.266*** (0.045)
Years of education 0.096*** (0.010) 0.085*** (0.007)
Public sector -0.397*** (0.079) -0.319*** (0.050) -0.162* (0.077)
Constant 0.690*** (0.116) 0.574*** (0.175)
R2 0.249 0.053
N 36,952 36,952 36,952
* p \ 0.10, ** p \ 0.05, *** p \ 0.01, standard errors clustered on regions in parentheses
Year, sector, and firm size dummies included
Data: GSOEP 1985, 1987, 1989, 1991, 1993, 1994, 1996, 1998, 1999, 2001, 2003, 2005
(a) Dependent variable ‘‘cardinalized’’ as described in Appendix A1
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Tab. 4.5: Job change regressions
search) increases job changes.8 Job satisfaction may increase job changes, because more
satisfied people (holding search effort constant) give a better impression in job interviews
and are therefore more likely to get a job. This interpretation is supported by empirical
results from personnel psychology that show a link between success at job interviews and
personality traits such as extraversion, self-esteem, etc. (Liden et al. 1993; Caldwell and
Burger 1998; Cook et al. 2000), and a correlation of these personality traits with subjective
well-being (Hayes and Joseph 2002; Emmons and Diener 1985). The findings of the
present analysis suggest that the strong negative effects of job satisfaction on quitting
identified by Clark et al. (1998) in data of the same source as used here is actually no direct
effect but an indirect effect running via job search activities.
The results of the pooled linear probability model also suggest that the effect of job
search on actual job changes is stronger when tenure is short, when GDP growth is high,
Table 5 Job change regressions
Model Pooled probit Pooled OLS Fixed-effects linear
Subj. probability of job search 0.215*** (0.066) 0.069*** (0.014) 0.065*** (0.021)
Search 9 satisfaction -0.010* (0.006) -0.004*** (0.001) -0.005*** (0.001)
Search 9 male -0.024 (0.023) -0.000 (0.002) -0.001 (0.005)
Search 9 tenure 0.012*** (0.003) -0.002*** (0.000) -0.001*** (0.000)
Search 9 GDP growth -0.009 (0.007) 0.004*** (0.001) 0.003*** (0.001)
Search 9 regional unemployment -0.002 (0.003) -0.002*** (0.000) -0.001 (0.001)
Search 9 experience 0.003*** (0.001) 0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000)
Search 9 education 0.015*** (0.004) 0.002** (0.001) 0.002** (0.001)
Search 9 public sector -0.018 (0.022) -0.020*** (0.003) -0.018*** (0.004)
Job satisfaction 0.002 (0.017) 0.006*** (0.001) 0.004** (0.002)
Gender: male 0.115* (0.067) 0.004 (0.003)
Years of job tenure -0.141*** (0.010) -0.003*** (0.000) 0.004*** (0.001)
Job tenure squared/100 0.288*** (0.024) 0.013*** (0.001) 0.006* (0.003)
Real GDP growth rate -0.018 (0.139) -0.011 (0.009) -0.033*** (0.011)
Regional unemployment rate -0.011 (0.007) 0.002** (0.001) 0.003* (0.001)
Years of work experience 0.029*** (0.006) 0.002*** (0.000) -0.015*** (0.002)
Work experience squared/100 -0.133*** (0.016) -0.005*** (0.001) 0.004 (0.003)
Years of education -0.035*** (0.012) -0.003*** (0.001)
Public sector -0.240*** (0.080) 0.018*** (0.003) 0.015* (0.009)
Constant -1.376*** (0.226) -0.024 (0.018) 0.065** (0.029)
R2 0.073 0.052
N 47,175 47,175 47,175
* p \ 0.10, ** p \ 0.05, *** p \ 0.01, standard errors clustered on regions in parentheses
Year, sector, and firm size dummies included
Data: GSOEP 1985, 1987, 1989, 1991, 1993, 1994, 1996, 1998, 1999, 2001, 2003, 2005
8 As the previous analysis has shown, there is a strong association between job search and job satisfaction.
Including both variables in the job change regression might potentially cause multicollinearity. I therefore
also repeated the estimation excluding job satisfaction as a regressor from the job change equation (results
available upon request). The magnitudes of coefficients, significance levels and the variance inflation factors
computed after the linear regression were very similar. Multicollinearity due to the job satisfaction variable
therefore does not seem to be harmful to the present regression.
T. Cornelißen
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4.6 Appendix: Details of the estimation
Equations (4.1)-(4.3) form a recursive system of equations that can be estimated by
treating each of the equations separately. The inclusion of fixed effects is not so straight-
forward in models for binary or more general ordinal dependent variables such as the
(ordered) probit and the (ordered) logit model. The fixed-effects probit model leads to
inconsistent parameter estimates (see for example Baltagi 2001, p. 206 or Hsiao 2003,
p.194), and the fixed-effects logit model can only be estimated on the subsample of
individuals that have longitudinal variation in the dependent variable, which leads to
small sample sizes and selective samples10. To circumvent these problems, I applied
linear fixed-effects models to the binary and to the ordinal dependent variables. In
the case of multinomial ordered variables with more than two classes (job satisfaction
and job search), I rescaled the dependent variable before applying the linear regression
model as proposed by van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonel (2004). The rescaling makes
the coefficients of the linear model comparable with the coefficients of the ordered
probit model. Van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonel (2004) call this probit-adapted OLS
(POLS). The rescaling consists of deriving those Z-values of a standard normal distri-
bution that correspond to the cumulative frequencies of the different categories of the
ordinal dependent variable. Suppose an ordinal variable x coded from 1 to 4 has the
following distribution: p(x=1)=0.1, p(x=2)=0.3, p(x=3)=0.5, and p(x=4)=0.1. The
cumulated frequencies are then P(x=1)=0.1, P(x=2)=0.4, P(x=3)=0.9, and P(x=4)=1,
and the corresponding Z-values of the standard normal distribution are: Z0.1 = −1.28,
Z0.4 = −.25, Z0.9 = 1.28, and Z1 = ∞. For a given value of the original ordinal vari-
able, the value of the ’cardinalized’ dependent variable is constructed by considering
the expectation of a standard normally distributed variable under the condition that it
is in the interval between those two Z-values that correspond to the class of the value
of the original variable. In the above example, this means that cardinalized variable xc
takes on the values:
10If the job change equation is estimated by a fixed-effects logit model instead of the linear fixed-
effects model, the sample size shrinks from 47175 to 7050 and individuals in the restricted sample differ
systematically from those in the complete sample. For example, the sample quit rate rises from 0.035
to 0.21 and mean work experience in the sample falls from 21 to 17 years.
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xc =

E(Z|Z < −1.28) = −φ(−1.28)
Φ(−1.28) if x = 1
E(Z| − 1.28 < Z < −0.25) = φ(−1.28)− φ(−0.25)
Φ(−0.25)− Φ(−1.28) if x = 2
E(Z| − 0.25 < Z < 1.28) = φ(−0.25)− φ(1.28)
Φ(1.28)− Φ(−0.25) if x = 3
E(Z|1.28 < Z) = φ(1.28)
1− Φ(1.28) if x = 4
,
where Z is a standard normal random variable, φ being the standard normal probability
density function, and Φ being the standard normal cumulative density function, which
leads to:
xc =

−1.75 if x = 1
−.70 if x = 2
.42 if x = 3
1.75 if x = 4
In principle, I follow this approach but I replace the Z-values from the standard normal
distribution by the cutoff points from the ordered probit regression instead. I prefer this
approach because it uses the information of the whole model and not only the frequency
distribution of the dependent variable for the re-scaling.
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Part II
Methodological tools
Chapter 5
Standard errors of marginal effects in the
heteroskedastic probit model 1
The analysis of the effect of wage rigidity on job mobility in chapter 2 relies on the
estimation of heteroskedastic probit models. In such a non-linear regression model
coefficients cannot be interpreted as marginal effects. The marginal effect of a regressor
is obtained by calculating the derivative of the outcome probability with respect to the
regressor. The derivative can be calculated analytically or numerically.
Standard errors of marginal effects also need to be derived to allow inference and
hypothesis testing. If the marginal effect is a non-linear transformation of the regression
coefficients, the standard error of the marginal effect can only be calculated approxi-
mately by methods such as the delta method (see section 5.2). This involves calculating
the derivatives of the marginal effect with respect to all coefficients. Again, the deriva-
tives can be computed analytically or numerically.
For the heteroskedastic probit model, the analytical form of the marginal effect is
commonly stated (see for example Greene 2003, p. 680), but the derivatives of the
marginal effect needed for calculating its standard errors are not. In the statistical soft-
ware package Stata, the hetprob command computes coefficients and standard errors
of coefficients of the heteroskedastic probit model. When marginal effects are needed,
Stata offers the mfx command which numerically computes marginal effects and their
standard errors after regression commands. In the case of the heteroskedastic probit
1This chapter is available as Discussion Paper No. 320 of the discussion paper series of the Faculty
of Economics and Business Administration at Leibniz Universita¨t Hannover.
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model and when many regressors are involved, this procedure is somewhat time con-
suming.2
This chapter presents the analytical computation of the standard errors of the
marginal effects in a heteroskedastic probit regression and the associated Stata ado-
file mehetprob that is downloadable for public use. The method presented here was
used in the analysis presented in chapter 3 of this thesis.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.1 describes the marginal effect of
a regressor in the heteroskedastic probit model. Section 5.2 covers the delta method
and section 5.3 applies the method in order to derive the standard errors of the het-
eroskedastic probit model. Section 5.4 provides information on how to access the Stata
ado-file and presents an application which compares the analytical calculation with the
numerical one. Section 5.5 concludes.
5.1 The marginal effect in the heteroskedastic pro-
bit model
The heteroskedastic probit model extends the simple probit model by introducing het-
eroskedasticity of the error term of the latent variable. Let the latent variable be
y∗i = x
′
iβ + i, (5.1)
where i indexes observations, x is an s×1 vector of covariates including the regressor 1,
β a corresponding coefficient vector and  a normally distributed error term satisfying
E[i] = 0, (5.2)
V [i] = σ
2
i = [exp(z
′
iγ)]
2, (5.3)
and
Cov[i, j] = 0, i 6= j, (5.4)
2This depends very much on the size of the model and the data set and on which release of Stata is
used. In Stata 8, the computation of marginal effects with mfx after hetprob can take hours, while in
Stata 9 it has been speeded up to the range of minutes. See section 5.4 for running times of a practical
application.
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where z is a t × 1 vector of regressors determining the variance of the error term, and
γ is the corresponding coefficient vector.
Let the observed binary variable y depend on the latent variable y∗ such that
yi =
1 if y
∗
i > 0
0 if y∗i ≤ 0,
(5.5)
then the probability of a success is given by
P (Yi = 1) = P (i > −x′iβ) = 1− Φ
( −x′iβ
exp(z′iγ)
)
= Φ
(
x′iβ
exp(z′iγ)
)
(5.6)
where Φ is the c.d.f of the standard normal distribution.
Unite the x and z regressors in vector w′ = (x′, z′) of length l = s + t. For each
regressor wk, k = 1, . . . , l, a marginal effect has to be derived.
Corresponding to the l × 1 vector w define coefficient vectors b and g of the same
length l such that
bk =
βj if wk is the jth element of x0 otherwise, (5.7)
and
gk =
γj if wk is the jth element of z0 otherwise. (5.8)
The kth element of b contains the β coefficient associated with wk if wk is part of
the x vector, otherwise it is 0. Similarly, the kth element of g contains the γ coefficient
associated with wk if wk is part of the z vector, otherwise it is 0.
Suppose a regressor that is part of x and z, then it will appear two times in w, say
wi = wj. Consequently, bi = bj and gi = gj. The marginal effects and standard errors
of the marginal effects derived for wi and wj will then be the same.
The marginal effect of one regressor wk is function of all β and γ parameters that
may be assembled in a vector θ′ = (β′, γ′) of same length (l = s+ t) as w.
If wk is to be treated as a continuous variable, the marginal effect of the outcome
probability with respect to this regressor, g(wk), is found by deriving (5.6) with respect
to wk, which yields
gC(wk) =
∂P (Y = 1)
∂wk
= φ
(
x′β
exp(z′γ)
)
bk − x′β · gk
exp(z′γ)
, (5.9)
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(see Greene 2003, p.680).
If wk is element of both, the x and the z vector, then bk and gk are the coefficients
associated with the regressor wk in the mean equation (5.1) and the variance equation
(5.3) respectively. If wk is only element of x but not of z, then gk is zero by definition,
i.e. only the first part of (5.9) applies, and if wk is only element of z but not of x,
then bk is zero by definition, i.e. only the last part of (5.9) applies. If wk is a dummy
variable, the marginal effect of the outcome probability with respect to this regressor,
g(wk), can alternatively, i.e. if the dummy variable is not to be treated as a continuous
variable, be calculated as
gD(wk) = Φ
(
x′1β
exp(z′1γ)
)
− Φ
(
x′0β
exp(z′0γ)
)
, (5.10)
where wk is set to 1 in x1 and z1 and set to 0 in x0 and z0 (provided that the regressor
is part of the respective vectors).
The marginal effect can be evaluated at different values of the regressors, i.e. a
marginal effect for each individual can be calculated. Usually a summary statistic is
warranted and thus the marginal effect is evaluated at a specific point, e.g. at means or
at the median. Alternatively, a (weighted) average of the individual specific marginal
effects can be calculated.
There is an important distinction between the normal probit model and the het-
eroskedastic probit model. In the normal probit model the marginal effect of a regressor
xk for individual i is given by φ(x
′
iβ) ·βk. As φ(·) is always positive, the marginal effect
has the same sign as the regression coefficient for all individuals in the sample. In the
heteroskedastic probit model, the sign of the marginal effect depends on bk − x′β · gk
(see equation (5.9)), which can switch sign in the sample for regressors that are part of
both x and z and for regressors that are only part of z. Therefore it can be of interest
to calculate the individual marginal effects and check for which fraction of the sample
the effect is positive or negative.
For the following application of the delta method suppose that one marginal effect
for each regressor wk, k = 1, . . . , l is calculated at specific values of the regressors (e.g.
at means). This leads to a l × 1 vector of estimated marginal effects λˆ.
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5.2 The delta method
The delta method is a popular way to estimate standard errors of non-linear functions
of model parameters. While it is straightforward to calculate the variance of a linear
function of a random variable, it is not for a nonlinear function. The delta method
therefore relies on finding a linear approximation of the function by using a first-order
Taylor expansion (see e.g. Davidson/MacKinnon 2004, p.202). In the multivariate case,
let λˆ = g(θˆ) be a l × 1 vector of monotonic continuously differentiable functions of the
n×1 coefficient estimator θˆ. Then, for a given estimated covariance matrix of the model
parameters, Vˆ (θˆ), the covariance matrix of λˆ, can be estimated according to the delta
method by
Vˆ (λˆ) = GˆVˆ (θˆ)Gˆ′, (5.11)
where Gˆ ≡ G(θˆ) is the l × n matrix ∂g(θ)/∂θ′. The ith row of G(θˆ) is the vector of
partial derivatives of the ith function with respect to θˆ′ or, in other words, the typical
element in row i and column j of G(θˆ) is ∂gi(θ)/∂θj (Davidson/MacKinnon 2004, p.
208).
5.3 Applying the delta method to standard errors
of marginal effects of the heteroskedastic probit
model
In the heteroskedastic probit model as defined above there is a (l = s + t) × 1 vector
w of regressors entering the model. For each regressor wk a marginal effect is derived,
which is function of all β and γ parameters that may be assembled in a 1× (l = s+ t)
vector θ′ = (β′, γ′).3
The l × 1 vector of marginal effects is λˆ = g(θˆ) with its kth element being the
marginal effect g(wk) as defined in (5.9) and (5.10).
The element (k, j) of the l × l matrix G(θˆ) contains the derivative of g(wk) with
respect to the coefficient θj, whereby θj may be (i) a β coefficient not associated with
3Recall that s is the length of x and β, t is the length of z and γ.
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wk, (ii) a β coefficient associated with wk, (iii) a γ coefficient not associated with wk,
or (iv) a γ coefficient associated with wk.
4 For these four cases, and if the regressors
are treated as continuous, the derivatives are:
(i) If θj is a β coefficient not associated with wk:
∂gC(wk)/∂θj = −bkwj(x′β)
φ
(
x′β
exp(z′γ)
)
[exp(z′γ)]3
−gkwj
φ
(
x′β
exp(z′γ)
)
exp(z′γ)
(
1− (x
′β)2
[exp(z′γ)]2
)
(5.12)
(ii) If θj is a β coefficient associated with wk:
∂gC(wk)/∂θj =
φ
(
x′β
exp(z′γ)
)
exp(z′γ)
− bkwj(x′β)
φ
(
x′β
exp(z′γ)
)
[exp(z′γ)]3
−gkwj
φ
(
x′β
exp(z′γ)
)
exp(z′γ)
(
1− (x
′β)2
[exp(z′γ)]2
)
(5.13)
(iii) If θj is a γ coefficient not associated with wk:
∂gC(wk)/∂θj = (bk − x′β · gk)
wj · φ
(
x′β
exp(z′γ)
)
exp(z′γ)
·
·
(
(x′β)2
[exp(z′γ)]2
− 1
)
(5.14)
(iv) If θj is a γ coefficient associated with wk:
∂gC(wk)/∂θj = (bk − x′β · gk)
wj · φ
(
x′β
exp(z′γ)
)
exp(z′γ)
(
(x′β)2
[exp(z′γ)]2
− 1
)
−
φ
(
x′β
exp(z′γ)
)
· x′β
exp(z′γ)
(5.15)
4The distinction whether wk is part of x, z or both enters through the components of b and g being
zero if wk is not in x or z, respectively.
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Hereby, all regressors are evaluated at the same values that have been chosen to
evaluate the marginal effect, e.g. at means. Recall that bk (gk) is zero by definition if
wk is only element of x (z). In that case, the derivatives simplify accordingly.
If regressor wk is a dummy variable that is not to be treated as a continuous vari-
ables, the derivative of gD(wk) in (5.10) is used, which is
(i) If θj is a β coefficient:
∂gD(wk)/∂θj = w1j ·
φ
(
x′1β
exp(z′1γ)
)
exp(z′1γ)
− w0j ·
φ
(
x′0β
exp(z′0γ)
)
exp(z′0γ)
(5.16)
(ii) If θj is a γ coefficient:
∂gD(wk)/∂θj =
−w1j · (x′1β)φ
(
x′1β
exp(z′1γ)
)
exp(z′1γ)
+
w0j · (x′0β)φ
(
x′0β
exp(z′0γ)
)
exp(z′0γ)
, (5.17)
where w0j and w1j are the jth element of the vectors w
′
0 = (x
′
0, z
′
0) and w
′
1 = (x
′
1, z
′
1),
respectively. The vectors x0, z0, x1 and z1 have been defined in the discussion of equation
(5.10).
These derivatives allow to compute Gˆ ≡ G(θˆ) = ∂g(θˆ)/∂θˆ′ and to calculate the
standard errors of the marginal effects by using equation (5.11).
5.4 Stata ado-file and application
The computation of marginal effects and their standard errors that has been derived
analytically in the preceding section has been programmed as a Stata ado-file called
mehetprob. This file and the associated help file are available for download at the Sta-
tistical Software Components (SSC) archive at the Boston College. The recommended
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way to download it is by typing ssc install mehetprob in the Stata command line.
Alternatively, to view a description type ssc describe mehetprob.5
In the following, an application is presented. A heteroskedastic probit regression is
run with data from the German Socio-Economic Panel. An overview of the data set
is provided by Haisken-DeNew/Frick (2003). West German private sector workers are
sampled. The dependent variable quit1 takes on the value 1 if a worker quits his job in
the next period and 0 otherwise. Explanatory variables are the hourly wage (w h4), the
actual working hours (hoursact), sex (male), dummies for increasing firm size categories
(fsize2, fsize3, fsize4), a dummy that indicates foreign nationality (foreign), age, age
squared (agesq), tenure and the regional unemployment rate (regunemp). All variables
enter the main equation (the x vector in terms of the notation used earlier), tenure and
the hourly wage also enter the equation for modelling the variance of the error term
(the z vector).
The output from the regression is:
Heteroskedastic probit model Number of obs = 57294
Zero outcomes = 54277
Nonzero outcomes = 3017
Wald chi2(11) = 829.77
Log likelihood = -10478.78 Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
quit1 | Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
quit1 |
w_h4 | .0117582 .0022307 5.27 0.000 .0073862 .0161303
hoursact | .0023257 .0011014 2.11 0.035 .000167 .0044845
male | -.0577722 .0223677 -2.58 0.010 -.101612 -.0139323
fsize2 | -.100491 .0245272 -4.10 0.000 -.1485634 -.0524186
fsize3 | -.2425828 .029201 -8.31 0.000 -.2998157 -.1853498
fsize4 | -.3415201 .032397 -10.54 0.000 -.4050171 -.2780231
foreign | -.210218 .0249594 -8.42 0.000 -.2591375 -.1612984
age | .0608655 .0074646 8.15 0.000 .0462352 .0754959
agesq | -.0010025 .0001049 -9.56 0.000 -.0012081 -.0007969
tenure | -.1485081 .0070428 -21.09 0.000 -.1623117 -.1347045
regunemp | -.0199462 .0036634 -5.44 0.000 -.0271263 -.0127662
_cons | -1.646515 .1288987 -12.77 0.000 -1.899152 -1.393879
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
lnsigma2 |
tenure | .033426 .0015828 21.12 0.000 .0303239 .0365282
w_h4 | -.0083866 .0018145 -4.62 0.000 -.011943 -.0048302
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Likelihood-ratio test of lnsigma2=0: chi2(2) = 269.38 Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
All coefficients are highly significant and have the expected sign, at least for those
variables that are only in the main equation, as the sign of their marginal effect on the
5Type help ssc to get information on the ssc command that allows to manage the user written
software components from the SSC archive.
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propensity to quit must equal the sign of the regression coefficients. For tenure and the
hourly wage the sign of the marginal effect is not clear, because they enter the mean
and the variance equation and thus the sign can switch depending on the regressor
values at which the marginal effect is evaluated. The likelihood-ratio test reported at
the bottom of the regression output rejects a model without heteroskedasticity. Below
the output from mfx and mehetprob for the computation of marginal effects and their
standard errors is presented.
. mfx compute;
Marginal effects after hetprob
y = Pr(quit1) (predict)
= .02091509
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
variable | dy/dx Std. Err. z P>|z| [ 95% C.I. ] X
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
w_h4 | -.0003846 .00013 -2.91 0.004 -.000644 -.000126 11.8481
hoursact | .0000937 .00004 2.10 0.036 6.2e-06 .000181 39.5301
male*| -.0023583 .00092 -2.55 0.011 -.004168 -.000549 .63504
fsize2*| -.0039146 .00094 -4.18 0.000 -.005752 -.002077 .289297
fsize3*| -.008871 .00101 -8.75 0.000 -.010859 -.006883 .244615
fsize4*| -.011988 .00107 -11.25 0.000 -.014076 -.0099 .237774
foreign*| -.0078578 .00092 -8.51 0.000 -.009667 -.006049 .271756
age | .0024525 .00028 8.63 0.000 .001895 .00301 37.9823
agesq | -.0000404 .00000 -10.21 0.000 -.000048 -.000033 1572.87
tenure | -.0025629 .00011 -22.95 0.000 -.002782 -.002344 9.60174
regunemp | -.0008037 .00015 -5.38 0.000 -.001096 -.000511 8.54533
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
(*) dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
. mehetprob;
(obs=57294)
(obs=57294)
P(Y=1) in sample: .05265822
P(Y=1) mean of model prediction: .05267644
P(Y=1) predicted at means: .02091509
dP/dX - Marginal effect at means after heteroskedastic probit estimation:
Variable | dP/dX s.e. z P
-------------+--------------------------------------------
w_h4 | -.0003846 .0001321 -2.91 0.004
hoursact | .0000937 .0000446 2.10 0.036
male* | -.0023583 .0009232 -2.55 0.011
fsize2* | -.0039146 .0009374 -4.18 0.000
fsize3* | -.008871 .0010143 -8.75 0.000
fsize4* | -.011988 .0010654 -11.25 0.000
foreign* | -.0078578 .000923 -8.51 0.000
age | .0024525 .0002843 8.63 0.000
agesq | -.0000404 3.96e-06 -10.21 0.000
tenure | -.0025629 .0001117 -22.95 0.000
regunemp | -.0008037 .0001493 -5.38 0.000
----------------------------------------------------------
(*) dP/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
The results are exactly the same. All marginal effects at means are highly significant.
Wage and tenure have negative marginal effect at means. As would be expected, the
propensity to quit decreases with rising hourly wages and with longer tenure.
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Calculating the marginal effects at means with the mfx command takes a running
time of 3 hours and 25 minutes in Stata 8. In Stata 9, where the mfx command has
been speeded up, it takes 1 minute and 24 seconds. The calculation with the mehetprob
routine takes 3 seconds. Table 5.1 compares the running time of the calculation of the
marginal effects at means between the numerical computation by mfx in Stata 8 and
Stata 9 and the analytical computation by the mehetprob routine for two different
models.
Tab. 5.1: Comparison of computing time in different models
Small model Large model
Size
No. Regressors 11 44
No. Observations 57294 87487
Running Time (hh:mm:ss)a)
mfx Stata 8 03:25:00 > 39:00:00
mfx Stata 9 00:01:24 00:10:45
mehetprob 00:00:03 00:00:08
a) Hardware specification: CPU 1,92 Ghz, 200 MB RAM allocated to Stata
Model 1 is the one presented above with 11 regressors and 57, 294 observations. In
model 2 more regressors, e.g. time and sector dummies, are added and the sample is
extended to East German and public sector workers. This leads to 44 regressors and
87, 487 observations (regression results not reported here). While mehetprob took 8
seconds, mfx in Stata 9 took about 10 minutes and mfx in Stata 8 more than 39 hours.
Although the mfx command is considerably faster in Stata 9 as compared to Stata
8, the mehetprob routine still saves running time. It seems that the larger the model
and the number of observations, the greater is the factor by which mehetprob is faster.
For example, comparing mfx of Stata 9 with mehetprob shows that mehetprob is faster
by a factor of 28 (3 seconds versus 1 minute 24 seconds) in model 1 and by a factor of
81 in model 2 (8 seconds versus 10 minutes 45 seconds).
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5.5 Conclusion
This chapter has derived an analytical form of the standard errors of marginal effects
in a heteroskedastic probit model. The computation has been implemented as a Stata
ado-file which can be downloaded from the internet. This allows to compute marginal
effects at means and their standard errors in a heteroskedastic probit model faster than
by numerical calculation which is implemented in the mfx routine currently available in
Stata for that purposes. For users of Stata 8 the routine can save hours of computation
time, for users of Stata 9 it saves minutes, as the mfx command has been speeded up
considerably in the Stata 9 release.
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Chapter 6
The stata module felsdvreg to fit a linear model
with two high-dimensional fixed effects1
Fixed-effects models are popular in applied econometric work because they allow to
take into account time-constant unobserved heterogeneity that may be correlated with
observed characteristics. In recent years large-scale linked employer-employee data,
linked student-teacher data, and other types of linked data have become available. Such
data allow to include at least two fixed effects into the analysis, for example person and
firm effects or student and teacher effects. As the data sets involved usually include
high numbers of observations, these fixed effects are often high-dimensional, i.e. there
are a high number of panel units (workers, firms, teachers, students). Applications of
such models can be found in the fields of labor economics and educational economics.
For example, Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis 1999, Abowd, Creecy and Kramarz 2002
and Andrews et al. 2006a estimate wage equations including person and firm effects,
and Harris and Sass (2007) estimate a model of student achievement including student,
teacher and school effects. The analysis presented in chapter 3 of this thesis is another
example of such an application.
Due to the size of the data sets involved, the researcher often encounters computer
restrictions in terms of computer memory space and computing time. This chapter, and
the companion Stata module felsdvreg, deal with the first restriction, the limitation
1This chapter was originally published as: ’The stata module felsdvreg to fit a linear model with
two high-dimensional fixed effects’, The Stata Journal, 8(2), pp. 170-189. Publication within this
thesis with kind permission of The Stata Journal and StataCorp.
6.1. THE LINEAR FIXED-EFFECTS MODEL
of computer memory. I present a memory-saving way to estimate a fixed-effects model
with two high-dimensional fixed effects. It relies on the idea that a typical dummy
variable matrix of fixed effects, such as firm or teacher effects, is a sparse matrix.
Sparse matrices can be stored efficiently in compressed form. The method was used
for the analysis presented in chapter 3 and implemented in a ready-to-use Stata ado
file. This program takes care of the identification problem, computes the estimates and
provides useful summary statistics.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 6.1 presents the model. Section 6.2
points out the computer restrictions and describes how the estimation can be organized
in a memory-efficient way. Section 6.3 summarizes the steps of the estimation. Section
6.4 presents the implementation of the method in a Stata ado-file and comments the
output of the program. Section 6.5 concludes.
Throughout the chapter I refer to linked employer-employee data sets calling the two
effects to be estimated person and firm effects. I refer to stayers as those individuals
that are observed in only one firm and to movers as those who are observed in several
firms. Despite the terminology used the method can be directly transfered to other
types of matched data sets.
6.1 The linear fixed-effects model with two
high-dimensional fixed effects
Consider the following model which can be applied to linked employer-employee panel
data including data on individuals and firms. The model is
y˜ = X˜β + D˜θ + F˜ψ + ˜, (6.1)
where X˜(N∗ ×K) is the design matrix of time varying characteristics; D˜(N∗ ×N)
is the design matrix for the person effects; and F˜ (N∗ × J) is the design matrix for the
firm effects. N∗ is the number of person-years in the dataset, J is the number of firms,
N is the number of persons and K is the number of time varying regressors. The ˜
reflects that (6.1) is the untransformed model.
Further effects, such as fixed time effects, are subsumed in X˜ together with the
other time-varying regressors. In a student-teacher context, further effects subsumed
94
CHAPTER 6. THE STATA MODULE FELSDVREG
in X˜ might be school effects. But any fixed effects remaining in X˜ should not be high-
dimensional (relative to the computer memory available), because only the effects in D˜
and F˜ are in the following treated as high-dimensional.
A common way to estimate such a model is to include one of the effects (here
the firm effect) as dummy variables, and to sweep out the other effect (here the person
effect) by the within transformation or fixed effects transformation. This transformation
consists in subtracting the group mean (here the person mean) for all observations. The
D matrix becomes the null matrix, the person effects are eliminated from the model.
Write the transformed model as:
y = Xβ + Fψ + , (6.2)
where  is an error term satisfying the assumptions of the classical linear regression
model. Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis (1999) note that this procedure is algebraically
equivalent to the full dummy variable model. Andrews et al. (2006a) call this procedure
the ”FEiLSDVj” method in order to emphasize that the model combines the classical
fixed effects (FE) model and the least squares dummy variable model (LSDV), as one
effect is eliminated by the fixed effects transformation and the other included as dummy
variables. As pointed out by Greene (2003, p. 293), this procedure is adequate for
balanced and unbalanced panels alike2.
The system of normal equations is:
A
 β
ψ
 = B (6.3)
with
A =
 X ′X X ′F
F ′X F ′F
 and (6.4)
B =
 X ′y
F ′y
 (6.5)
Solving this system of equations delivers the coefficient estimates.
2For a more general treatment of the matrix algebra involved in representing multiple-way error
components models with unbalanced data structures see Davis (2001).
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6.2 Creating the moment matrices in a memory-
efficient way
In big data sets the design matrix (X,F ) can be too large to fit the memory, as most
software packages such as Stata require the design matrix to be stored in memory. To
illustrate the memory requirement with the explicit creation of all dummy variables
consider the following example: A data set contains N∗ = 2, 000, 000 observations,
N = 100, 000 persons, J = 20, 000 firms and K = 50 further right-hand side regressors.
Assume that one cell of the data matrix consumes 8 bytes (which is the case when work-
ing in high-precision mode). The creation of the time-demeaned firm dummies implies
storing the design matrix (X,F ) in the computer memory. The size of this matrix is
N∗ · (K + J) · 8 bytes = 320.8 gigabytes. This is far more than the computer memory
available at present to most researchers. It therefore seems that the estimation of per-
son and firm effects using the ”FEiLSDVj” method with several millions of observations
and several thousands of firms would be impossible with restricted memory resources.
However, note that while the design matrix (X,F ) is of dimension (N∗× (K + J)),
the cross-product matrices A and B given in (6.4) and (6.5) are of dimension ((K+J)×
(K + J)) and ((K + J)× 1) only. They require much less storage space. In the above
example, the memory requirement for A = (X,F )′(X,F ) is only (K+J)2·8 bytes = 3.21
gigabytes, which is considerably smaller3.
In fact, A and B can be computed without explicitly creating the full design matrix
(X,F ). A solution for that problem lies in the fact that each element of A and B is a
cross product sum of no more than two regressors. This implies that for computing one
element of A or B, only two regressors need to be stored in memory. While the X-part
of the design matrix is provided as a dataset, the F-part of the cross-product matrix
can be created during the estimation process without actually generating the F-part of
the design matrix, i.e. the dummy variables. The information needed for that purpose
is condensed in the group identifiers. In other words, the group identifiers provide
a compressed storage format of the sparse dummy variable matrices. The following
decomposition is based on the fact that the F matrix is a sparse matrix, i.e. large parts
3The cross product matrix B = (X,F )′y is negligibly small compared to the matrix A.
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of it are null sub-matrices which deliver no contribution to A or B. Therefore, in the
process of the formation of A and B, only certain parts of the F matrix need to be
created and time and memory can be saved.
Let the persons in the dataset be indexed by i (i = 1 . . . N) and the time periods
for each individual be indexed by t (t = 1 . . . Ti). Ti is the number of time periods that
individual i is observed. The total number of observations is then N∗ =
∑
i
Ti. The
vector y and the design matrices X and F in (6.2) have row dimension N∗ and rows
are indexed by the index it. The columns of X are indexed k (k = 1, . . . K) and the
columns of F are indexed j (j = 1 . . . J).
The memory-saving way to create A and B starts from the idea that these matrices
can be decomposed by observations or subsets of observations4. For example, A (B)
can be represented as a sum of matrices Ai (Bi) for each individual:
A =
∑
i
Ai =
∑
i
 X ′iXi X ′iFi
F ′iXi F
′
iFi
 and (6.6)
B =
∑
i
Bi =
∑
i
 X ′iyi
F ′iyi
 , (6.7)
where Xi is (Ti ×K), Fi is (Ti × J) and yi is (Ti × 1). The matrices involve only those
observations that are associated with individual i. For the current purpose it makes
sense to do the individual-wise decomposition only for those parts of the matrices, where
the F matrix is involved, i.e.:
A =
 X ′X 0
0 0
+∑
i
 0 X ′iFi
F ′iXi F
′
iFi
 and (6.8)
B =
 X ′y
0
+∑
i
 0
F ′iyi
 . (6.9)
The decomposition continues with the idea that the F matrix has a different struc-
ture for stayers and for movers. In this context movers are defined as workers who
change employer at least once during the whole observation period and stayers are
those workers who never change employer.
4The possibility of an observation-wise computation of a cross-product matrix is usually presented
in econometrics textbooks by two alternative ways of writing the OLS estimator. For example, in
Wooldridge (2002, p. 53) it is stated that X′X =
∑
i
x′ixi, where xi are the rows of X.
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Recall that the model is a transformed model. Group means by person have been
subtracted (time-demeaning / within-transformation). As stayers never change firms,
the time-demeaned firm dummies are all zero. The F matrix for stayers is the null
matrix. Therefore we get:
A =
 X ′X 0
0 0
+ ∑
i ∈ Movers
 0 X ′iFi
F ′iXi F
′
iFi
 and (6.10)
B =
 X ′y
0
+ ∑
i ∈ Movers
 0
F ′iyi
 . (6.11)
(6.10) and (6.11) are important simplifications of (6.8) and (6.9). As the F matrix is
the null matrix in the sub sample of stayers, the cross product sub matrices X ′F , F ′F
and F ′y only need to be computed for movers5. As these matrices can be computed
individual by individual, the F matrix does not need to exist completely at any point of
time. For example, it suffices to create the matrix Fi for one individual and to compute
X ′iFi, F
′
iFi and F
′
iyi. Fi is of dimension (Ti × J) and therefore should fit into the
memory. However, by analyzing the structure of Fi more precisely, the matrix can be
reduced further and more memory space can be saved.
Look at Fi∗ for a worker i
∗ who is observed at Ti∗ = 3 different points in time and
changes the firm once. The non time-demeaned matrix F˜i∗ is:
F˜i∗ =

1 0 0 0 0 . . . 0
1 0 0 0 0 . . . 0
0 0 0 1 0 . . . 0
 (6.12)
Worker i∗ is employed during two time periods in firm 1 and during the third time
period in firm 4. He is never employed in any other firm, which means that to the
right the individual F matrix is filled up with zeros. The corresponding time-demeaned
design matrix of the firm effects for individual i∗ is:
Fi∗ =

1/3 0 0 −1/3 0 . . . 0
1/3 0 0 −1/3 0 . . . 0
−2/3 0 0 2/3 0 . . . 0
 (6.13)
Note that for each worker, only very few columns of Fi∗ will be different from null
vectors, because a given worker is employed in very few firms relative to the total set
5The matrix F ′X is the transpose of X ′F an therefore in what follows it is not discussed separately.
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of firms. Consequently, many elements of the cross product matrices X ′iFi, F
′
iFi and
F ′iyi are equal to zero. In the appendix (section 6.6), (X
′
i∗Fi∗), (F
′
i∗Fi∗) and (F
′
i∗yi∗)
are computed for the above example. In (F ′i∗Fi∗) the only non-zero elements are those
where both row and column indices refer to a firm where worker i was employed at
some moment of time. In (X ′i∗Fi∗) only the columns that are indexed with reference to
a firm where worker i was employed are non-zero. In (F ′i∗yi∗) only the rows that are
indexed with reference to a firm where worker i was employed are non-zero.
A typical worker is usually employed in very few firms and thus contributes to only
very few elements of the cross product matrices. Fi is a sparse matrix, and so are
(X ′i∗Fi∗), (F
′
i∗Fi∗) and (F
′
i∗yi∗). One can write Fi more compactly by leaving out the
zero columns. Call this reduced matrix F Si . This is a Ti × s matrix, where s is the
number of firms in which individual i was employed. In the above example, F Si would
be a (3× 2) matrix which reads:
F Si∗ =

1/3 −1/3
1/3 −1/3
−2/3 2/3
 (6.14)
Instead of computing (X ′iFi), (F
′
iFi) and (F
′
iyi) one can compute (X
′
iF
S
i ), (F
S′
i F
S
i )
and (F S′i yi), which saves memory and time. However, one needs the information to
which firm the columns of F Si refer, because once the cross products are computed, the
results need to be added to the correct elements of the A and the B matrix, which is not
a problem because this information is stored in the group identifiers. The next section
summarizes the algorithm for the fixed effects estimation of the linear three-way error
component model in a memory-saving way.
6.3 The algorithm to compute the least squares so-
lution
The memory-saving way to compute the matrices A and B of the normal equations
uses the information in which firm a given worker is employed. This allows to compute
only those elements of A and B that the worker contributes to. The zero elements of
the sparse matrices involved are dropped from the computations.
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The steps are the following:
1. Create null matrices A of dimension ((K + J) × (K + J)) and B of dimension
((K + J)× 1).
2. Compute X ′X and X ′y on the combined sample of movers and stayers. Fill in
these cross products at the appropriate sub matrices of A and B as shown in (6.8)
and (6.9).
3. For each mover i(i ∈ Mover) create the time-demeaned matrix Fi but leave out
columns that are zero, call this reduced matrix F Si . This is a Ti× s matrix, where
s is the number of firms in which individual i was employed. Now,
a. form F S′i F
S
i and update the A matrix by adding the resulting cross-products
to the appropriate elements of A,
b. form X ′iF
S
i as well as its transpose (X
′
iF
S
i )
′ = F Si
′Xi and update the A
matrix by adding the resulting cross-products to the appropriate elements of
A,
c. form F S′i y and update the B matrix by adding the resulting cross-products
to the appropriate elements of of A.
4. Once A and B are completed, solve for the coefficient vector (β, ψ).
6.4 Implementation in Stata
The method is implemented in Stata in the ado-file felsdvreg, the core of which is
programmed in Mata. Using Mata in the context of large data sets is an advantage.
First, provided that there is enough computer memory, Mata can handle matrices of a
dimension of up to 2 billion × 2 billion compared to only 11,000 × 11,000 in the Stata
environment (Stata SE). Second, Mata provides computer routines with high numerical
precision which is more important in large data sets than in small data sets6.
6In addition to using high-precision routines, cross-checking the results obtained with those obtained
in similar but smaller data sets is another way to test whether the size of the data set poses problems
of numerical precision. Helpful comments about that topic can be found under the thread ”data set
larger than RAM” on the Statalist discussion board http://www.stata.com/statalist/archive/.
100
CHAPTER 6. THE STATA MODULE FELSDVREG
Other ways to handle the estimation problem are the approximate procedures as well
as two-step and iterative solutions solutions to the exact problem presented in Abowd,
Kramarz and Margolis (1999), Abowd, Creecy and Kramarz (2002), Andrews et al.
(2006a) and Gru¨tter (2006)7. If the sole aim is to control for unobserved heterogeneity
and not to compute the person and firm effects explicitly, the ”spell fixed effects”method
proposed in Andrews et al. (2006a) is a good alternative to the ”FEiLSDVj” method8.
In the following, a small simulated linked employer-employee data set is used in
order to illustrate the Stata implementation of the estimation method presented in the
previous sections. The data set used for the illustration has 100 observations. It com-
prises 20 workers, for which the dummy variables p1 . . . p20 have been created, and 15
firms, for which the dummy variables f1 . . . f15 have been created. The dependent vari-
able is called y, the two independent time-varying regressors are called x1 and x2. The
pattern of worker mobility between firms is important because it determines whether
person and firm effects can be identified. The firms with movers can be divided into
groups within which there is worker mobility, but between which there is no mobility.
The table shows to which group the firms with movers belong9:
Group Firms
1 3,4,5
2 6,7,8,9
3 10,11,12
4 13,14,15
Within each such group, one effect is not identified and serves as the reference. If
7The classical minimum distance estimator proposed by Andrews et al. (2006a) delivers the same
coefficient estimates as the ”FEiLSDVj” method, but it delivers different standard errors, because it is
based on separate estimations for movers and stayers, and the error term variance of both estimations
is not constrained to be equal.
8An alternative Stata module to compute a model with two high-dimensional
fixed effects is a2reg based on Abowd, Creecy and Kramarz (2002) and available at
http://vrdc.ciser.cornell.edu/guides/cg2/html/index.html. This module solves for the coefficient
estimates using a solver algorithm suitable for sparse matrices. More generally, all mathematics or
statistics packages that include sparse matrix functions could be used as alternatives to the method
described here.
9An algorithm to determine the groups is derived in Abowd et al. (2002).
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the firm with the smallest firm ID is chosen as the reference firm in each group, the
effects of firms 3, 6, 10 and 13 are not identified. Furthermore, the effects of firms
without movers (firms 1 and 2) are not identified because they can be thought of as
forming single groups with only one firm per group.
A common way to estimate a model with person and firm fixed effects is to include
the firm effects as dummies and to eliminate the person affects by the within transfor-
mation (”FEiLSDVj” method). Knowing that the effects of firms 1, 2, 3, 6, 10 and 13
are not identified in the given example, this can be implemented as follows:
. xtreg y x1 x2 f4-f5 f7-f9 f11-f12 f14-f15, fe i(i)
Fixed-effects (within) regression Number of obs = 100
Group variable (i): i Number of groups = 20
R-sq: within = 0.6518 Obs per group: min = 1
between = 0.0015 avg = 5.0
overall = 0.0913 max = 9
F(11,69) = 11.74
corr(u_i, Xb) = -0.5330 Prob > F = 0.0000
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
y | Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
x1 | 1.029258 .2151235 4.78 0.000 .6000987 1.458418
x2 | -.709482 .2094198 -3.39 0.001 -1.127263 -.2917009
f4 | 13.2617 3.258081 4.07 0.000 6.762004 19.76139
f5 | 13.95499 2.818964 4.95 0.000 8.331314 19.57867
f7 | 8.559977 3.882525 2.20 0.031 .8145504 16.3054
f8 | 5.433107 3.908214 1.39 0.169 -2.363566 13.22978
f9 | 11.44951 4.792492 2.39 0.020 1.888749 21.01027
f11 | 16.76837 3.245567 5.17 0.000 10.29364 23.2431
f12 | 10.01551 3.407205 2.94 0.004 3.218319 16.8127
f14 | -10.19694 3.074528 -3.32 0.001 -16.33046 -4.063427
f15 | 2.526721 3.844219 0.66 0.513 -5.142287 10.19573
_cons | -6.044057 1.03021 -5.87 0.000 -8.09927 -3.988844
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
sigma_u | 10.169633
sigma_e | 5.4861156
rho | .77458273 (fraction of variance due to u_i)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
F test that all u_i=0: F(19, 69) = 8.64 Prob > F = 0.0000
The person effects can be looked at by:
. predict peffxt, u
. table i, c(m peffxt)
------------------------
i | mean(peffxt)
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----------+-------------
1 | -9.345165
2 | -3.751444
3 | 12.98728
4 | -4.665943
5 | -3.879235
6 | 1.137969
7 | -.4461367
8 | .4524156
9 | -16.23423
10 | -12.18615
11 | -.4041495
12 | -3.953967
13 | -11.94854
14 | -4.272363
15 | 1.732473
16 | -11.58673
17 | -13.57038
18 | 21.66491
19 | 14.42718
20 | 11.0613
------------------------
As described in the previous section, the explicit creation of all firm dummies com-
bined with the use of xtreg (let alone the creation of all person and firm dummies with
the use of reg) can require more computer memory than is available. In the case when
there is a large number of firms it can therefore be necessary to apply a memory-saving
way to the solution of the ”FEiLSDVj” estimator. I have programmed the algorithm
presented in the preceding section as a Stata ado-file called felsdvreg. This routine
can be applied to the present data set as follows:
felsdvreg y x1 x2, i(i) j(j) f(feffhat) p(peffhat) m(mover) g(group)
xb(xb) r(res) mnum(mnum) pobs(pobs)
The options are the following: The option i() is used to pass the variable name of
the person ID, the option j() does the same for the firm ID. The options p() and f()
define names of new variables to be created in order to store the person and firm effects
after estimation. So do the options xb() and res() to store the linear combinations x′βˆ
and the residual ˆ. The remaining options define names of new variables that store a
dummy variable indicating a person who is a mover, m(), a group variable indicating
the groups of firms connected through mobility, g(), a variable containing the number
of movers per firm, mnum(), and a variable indicating the number of observations per
persons, pobs(). The output reads:
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. felsdvreg y x1 x2, i(i) j(j) f(feffhat) p(peffhat) m(mover) g(group) xb(xb) r(res)
mnum(mnum) pobs(pobs)
Memory requirement for moment matrices in GB:
2.17600e-06
Computing generalized inverse, dimension: 11
Start: 6 Mar 2008 18:06:02
End: 6 Mar 2008 18:06:02
N=100
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
x1 | 1.029258 .2151235 4.78 0.000 .6000987 1.458418
x2 | -.7094819 .2094198 -3.39 0.001 -1.127263 -.2917009
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
F-test that person and firm effects are equal to zero: F(28,69)=9.81 Prob > F = 0
F-test that person effects are equal to zero: F(19,69)=8.64 Prob > F = 0
F-test that firm effects are equal to zero: F(9,69)=9.97 Prob > F = 0
In big data sets, the crucial steps of the estimation concerns the question whether
the moment matrices fit into the memory, and how much computing time is required
when solving for the coefficients (computing the inverse). Therefore, the above default
output contains information on these points. The person and firm effects can be dis-
played as follows:
. table j, c(m feffhat)
-------------------------
j | mean(feffhat)
----------+--------------
1 | 0
2 | 0
3 | 0
4 | 13.2617
5 | 13.95499
6 | 0
7 | 8.559977
8 | 5.433106
9 | 11.44951
10 | 0
11 | 16.76837
12 | 10.01551
13 | 0
14 | -10.19694
15 | 2.526721
-------------------------
. table i, c(m peffhat)
-------------------------
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i | mean(peffhat)
----------+--------------
1 | -15.38922
2 | -9.795502
3 | 6.943222
4 | -10.71
5 | -9.923292
6 | -4.906089
7 | -6.490194
8 | -5.591642
9 | -22.27829
10 | -18.23021
11 | -6.448206
12 | -9.998024
13 | -17.99259
14 | -10.31642
15 | -4.311584
16 | -17.63079
17 | -19.61444
18 | 15.62085
19 | 8.383124
20 | 5.017239
-------------------------
The firm effect of the firm without movers and of the reference firm in each group
are set to zero. The firm effects are exactly the same as in the xtreg estimation (p.102).
The person effects differ from the effects of the xtreg regression only by the constant
-6.044057 of the xtreg model, because felsdvreg does not by default normalize the
sum of the person effects to zero10.
Using the option noisily allows to generate additional output. This option will
generate the following additional tables to analyze the structure of the data set:
Unique worker-firm combinations: 41
Number of firms workers are employed in:
Number of |
firms | Freq. Percent Cum.
------------+-----------------------------------
1 | 7 35.00 35.00
2 | 7 35.00 70.00
3 | 4 20.00 90.00
4 | 2 10.00 100.00
------------+-----------------------------------
Total | 20 100.00
10If the option cons is chosen in felsdvreg, it does normalize the sum of the person effects to zero
and displays a regression constant.
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Number of movers (0=Stayer, 1=Mover):
Mover | Freq. Percent Cum.
------------+-----------------------------------
0 | 7 35.00 35.00
1 | 13 65.00 100.00
------------+-----------------------------------
Total | 20 100.00
Number of observations per person:
Obs. per |
person | Freq. Percent Cum.
------------+-----------------------------------
1 | 3 15.00 15.00
2 | 3 15.00 30.00
4 | 3 15.00 45.00
5 | 1 5.00 50.00
6 | 4 20.00 70.00
7 | 1 5.00 75.00
8 | 2 10.00 85.00
9 | 3 15.00 100.00
------------+-----------------------------------
Total | 20 100.00
Number of movers per firm:
Movers per |
firm | Freq. Percent Cum.
------------+-----------------------------------
0 | 2 13.33 13.33
1- 5 | 7 46.67 60.00
6- 10 | 5 33.33 93.33
11- 20 | 1 6.67 100.00
------------+-----------------------------------
Total | 15 100.00
The first table summarizes in how many firms the workers are employed. The seven
workers employed in only one firm are stayers. Out of the remaining 13 workers, 7
are observed in two firms, 4 in three firms and 2 in four firms. The second table is a
summary of the first and gives the total number of stayers and movers. The third table
indicates the numbers of observations per person. For example, 3 workers are observed
only at one point in time, 3 workers are observed 9 times, etc. The fourth table shows
the distribution of the number of movers per firm. The purpose of this table is to get
an impression of the quality of the estimation of the firm effects. The estimation of the
firm effects is better the more movers there are and one might think of the firm effects
that are identified by few movers as effects that are poorly estimated. In this example
data set two firms have no movers and all 15 firms have less than 20 movers.
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The 15 firms can be divided into groups within which there is worker mobility, but
between which there is no mobility. As noted above, within each such group, one firm
effect is not identified, i.e. one firm effect has to be taken as the reference, and all other
firm effects are expressed as differences from the reference. The felsdvreg program
goes on by defining these groups11:
Groups of firms connected by worker mobility:
Person-years Persons Movers Firms
----------------------------------------------------------------------
group | N(__000000) N(__000009) sum(__00000D) N(__000008)
----------+-----------------------------------------------------------
0 | 10 5 0 2
1 | 26 5 3 3
2 | 15 2 2 4
3 | 24 5 5 3
4 | 25 3 3 3
|
Total | 100 20 13 15
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: Group 0 in the table regroups firms without movers.
No firm effect in group 0 is identified.
15-2-4 = 9 firm effects are identified.
(number of firms - number of firms without movers - number of groups excl. group 0)
The two firms without movers are gathered in group 0. The remaining firms of the
sample are divided into 4 groups. The table shows the number of person-years, persons,
movers and firms in each of the groups. As indicated, only 9 of the 15 firm effects are
identified because 2 firms have no movers and their firm effects cannot be identified,
and 4 more firm effects are not identified because they serve as reference in their groups.
The option noisily finally generates also the following output:
If the covariances are positive, the following may indicate the importance in explaining
the variance of y:
Cov(y, xb) / Var(y): .10029458
Cov(y, peffhat) / Var(y): .56511312
Cov(y, feffhat) / Var(y): .15341486
Cov(y, res) / Var(y): .18117743
11The grouping algorithm incorporated in felsdvreg draws on -a2group-, which is a Stata port by
Amine Ouazad of the original FORTRAN code written by Robert Creecy and Lars Vilhuber.
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This variance decomposition gives an indication of how strongly the four components
(i) observed time-varying characteristics, (ii) person effects, (iii) firm effects and (iv)
the residual contribute to explaining the variance of the dependent variable. The shares
sum to 1, however, the covariances indicated can become negative and then it becomes
difficult to interpret the numbers as shares.
After the estimation, the researcher may be interested in correlating the person and
firm effects with each other or with other regressors. However, it should be kept in
mind that what is actually identified are relative person and firm effects within each
group, and that person and firm effects of different groups can only be compared if one
is willing to take certain assumptions. This can be illustrated by computing the corre-
lation of person and firm effects over all groups with different normalizations. The first
command correlates the person and firm effects over all groups, the second command
correlates only the effects of group 1:
. corr feffhat peffhat
(obs=100)
| feffhat peffhat
-------------+------------------
feffhat | 1.0000
peffhat | -0.5645 1.0000
. corr feffhat peffhat if group==1
(obs=26)
| feffhat peffhat
-------------+------------------
feffhat | 1.0000
peffhat | -0.2006 1.0000
Now the firm and person effects are normalized so that they sum to zero within each
group by subtracting the average group firm effect and the average group person effect.
A new variable gmean captures the sum of the mean firm and the mean person effect of
each group. After this normalization, the person and firm effects are deviations from
the group means. After this, the correlation over all groups and the correlation using
only the effects of group 1 are again computed:
. by group: egen pmean=mean(peffhat)
. by group: egen fmean=mean(feffhat)
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. gen peffnorm=peffhat-pmean
. gen feffnorm=feffhat-fmean
. gen gmean=pmean+fmean
. table group, c(m gmean)
-----------------------
group | mean(gmean)
----------+------------
0 | -7.385707
1 | -1.236314
2 | -2.610044
3 | -7.291342
4 | 4.825048
-----------------------
. corr feffnorm peffnorm
(obs=100)
| feffnorm peffnorm
-------------+------------------
feffnorm | 1.0000
peffnorm | 0.0227 1.0000
. corr feffnorm peffnorm if group==1
(obs=26)
| feffnorm peffnorm
-------------+------------------
feffnorm | 1.0000
peffnorm | -0.2006 1.0000
The normalization has changed the result from the correlation over all groups12. It is
now 0.0227 whereas before it was -0.5645. The result of the correlation within the group
of -0.2006 is unchanged. One could argue that the normalization of person and firm
effects to an equal group mean makes comparison across groups more appropriate and
therefore the correlation over all groups after normalization is appropriate whereas the
one before normalization was not. However, it seems difficult to argue that a deviation
of +1 from a group mean of -7.29 of group 3 means the same as a deviation of +1 from
the group mean of 4.82 in group 4. The normalization does not change the fact that
relative firm effects within groups are identified but relative firm effects between groups
are not identified. It is therefore preferable to correlate only effects of the same group.
12This normalization is not exactly implemented in felsdvreg, But the program has two options
for normalization: The option normalize normalizes the firm effects to mean zero within each group
and adds the mean firm effects that are subtracted in each group to the person effects. The option
cons normalizes the person effects to sum to zero over all observations and displays the overall mean
person effect as the regression constant. Both options can be combined.
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Andrews et al. (2006b) show that the correlation between worker and firm effects
is biased and that the bias is greater the lower the observed worker mobility between
firms. After estimation one may therefore want to select firm and person effects that
fulfill certain minimum requirements with respect to the minimum number of movers
per firm or the minimum number of observations per person. This is possible with the
variables defined in the options mnum() and pobs() and returned by felsdvreg.
Even though the algorithm described above is memory-saving, some applications
in large data sets will still reach the limit of the computer memory available. It is
therefore important to observe the following remarks. The memory intensive part of
the program runs in Mata. Mata can only use memory which is not allocated to Stata
by the -set mem- command. The user should therefore not allocate too much memory
to Stata. The error message ”unable to allocate real” indicates that Mata is running out
of memory. In this case memory allocated to Stata by -set mem- should be reduced.
The error message ”no room to add more observations / variables” indicates that Stata
is running out of memory. In this case the memory allocated to Stata by -set mem-
should be increased. If there is not enough memory available to run felsdvreg on
the complete sample, it might be worthwhile to run it on a sub-sample. In order to
maximize the number of identified firm effects in a sub-sample, one could chose sub-
samples such that the mobility groups remain intact. For example, one might chose a
large mobility group as a sub-sample and remove the remaining groups. In this case
felsdvreg should first be run with the option grouponly. This runs only the grouping
algorithm creating the group variable. This variable can be used to chose a sub-sample
of the original sample on which felsdvreg can then be run.
The program felsdvreg can also be used for instrumental variable (IV) estimation
in order to cope with endogenous regressors. In order to produce IV estimates, the two
stages of the 2SLS (two-stage least squares) estimation have to be carried out manually.
In the second stage estimation, felsdvreg needs to be told the names of the regressors
which have been predicted from a first stage, as well as which original regressors belong
to the predicted regressors. For example, say that in a regression of y on z1, x2, x3 and
two-way fixed effects the variables x2 and x3 are to be instrumented by the IVs z2 and
z3. A 2SLS estimation can be carried out in the following way:
110
CHAPTER 6. THE STATA MODULE FELSDVREG
1. Run a first stage regression for x2 and generate its prediction x2hat:
felsdvreg x2 z1 z2 z3, i(i) j(j) xb(xb) p(phat) f(fhat) [...]
gen x2hat=xb+phat+fhat
2. Run a first stage regression for x3 and generate its prediction x3hat:
felsdvreg x3 z1 z2 z3, i(i) j(j) xb(xb) p(phat) f(fhat) [...]
gen x3hat=xb+phat+fhat
3. Run the second stage regression:
felsdvreg y z1 x2hat x3hat, i(i) j(j) xb(xb) p(phat) f(fhat) hat(x2hat x3hat)
orig(x2 x3) [...]
In the second stage regression hat(x2hat x3hat) and orig(x2 x3) tell felsdvreg that
x2hat and x3hat are first-stage predictions of x2 and x3. This allows felsdvreg to
adjust the residual sum of squares and the standard errors of the second stage regression
(see for example Greene 2003, p.400).
The program felsdvreg includes the options of computing robust and clustered
standard errors. However, the memory-saving design of the estimation is especially
costly in terms of computing time when robust or clustered standard errors are com-
puted. Computing robust or clustered standard errors may in some cases therefore be
prohibitively time consuming.
The program felsdvreg checks for collinearity between the explicit right-hand-side
regressors right at the start. But collinearity between regressors and fixed effects also
poses a problem. Sometimes it is easy to avoid regressors that are collinear with the
fixed effects. For example, one can easily avoid to include time-constant variables like
gender in a model with individual fixed effects. But other cases are more difficult. For
example, if school dummies are added as explicit right-hand side regressors to a model
including teacher and student fixed effects it is hard to know a priori which school
effects are collinear with the teacher and student effects. Such collinearity will only
be detected by felsdvreg at the moment when the inverse of the moment matrices is
computed in order to solve for the coefficient vector. At that step the program uses the
Mata function invsym(), which automatically drops collinear regressors. This is the
advantage of using invsym() at that stage. However, felsdvreg provides the option
cholsolve in order to use the Mata solver cholsolve(). Using a solver has advantages
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in terms of precision, but the disadvantage would here be that it does not simply drop
collinear regressors but instead fail and issue the error message ”matrix has missing
values”13.
A further option is feffse(varname) allowing to pass a name of a new variable to store
the standard errors of the fixed effects of the second effect (firm effect). All options are
also described in detail in the help file accompanying felsdvreg.
6.5 Conclusion
This chapter has proposed a memory-saving decomposition of the design matrix to
facilitate the estimation of a linear model with two high-dimensional fixed effects. This
is applicable, for example, to linked employer-employee data sets but it is also applicable
to other matched data that allow to estimate multiple-way fixed-effects models, such as
linked student-teacher data, etc.
A common way to estimate such a model is to take into account one of the effects by
including dummy variables, and to sweep out the other effect by the within transforma-
tion (fixed effects transformation). If the number of groups is high, creating and storing
the dummy variables can require much computer memory space. The decomposition
of the design matrix presented in this chapter reduces the storage requirements. The
Stata ado file felsdvreg for the memory-saving computation of the fixed effects model
has been described. Besides implementing the memory-saving estimation method, the
program also implements a grouping algorithm to determine the identified effects and
provides useful summary statistics.
13felsdvreg uses the currently available Mata functions to solve for the coefficient estimates. This
is not the most efficient procedure for the present problem, because not only the design matrix (X,F )
but also the moment matrix A is sparse. A has zero entries in all cells where there is no direct worker
mobility between the row firm and the column firm. For the solution of systems of linear equations
involving sparse matrices there are more efficient algorithms than the standard algorithms used here.
However, as explained above, the advantage of using invsym() here is that regressors collinear with
the fixed effects can be handled.
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6.6 Appendix
In the above example, X ′i∗Fi∗ , F
′
i∗Fi∗ and F
′
i∗yi∗ are:
F ′i∗Fi∗ =

1/3 1/3 −2/3
0 0 0
0 0 0
−1/3 −1/3 2/3
0 0 0
...
...
...
0 0 0


1/3 0 0 −1/3 0 . . . 0
1/3 0 0 −1/3 0 . . . 0
−2/3 0 0 2/3 0 . . . 0

=

φi11 0 0 φi14 0 . . . 0
0 0 0 0 0 . . . 0
0 0 0 0 0 . . . 0
φi14 0 0 φ44 0 . . . 0
0 0 0 0 0 . . . 0
...
...
...
...
...
...
0 0 0 0 0 . . . 0

, (6.15)
φi11 = (
1
3
)2 + (
1
3
)2 + (
−2
3
)2
φi14 = (
1
3
)(
−1
3
) + (
1
3
)(
−1
3
) + (
−2
3
)(
2
3
)
φi44 = (
−1
3
)2 + (
−1
3
)2 + (
2
3
)2
X ′i∗Fi∗ =

xi11 xi21 xi31
xi12 xi22 xi32
...
...
...
xi1K xi2K xi3K


1/3 0 0 −1/3 0 . . . 0
1/3 0 0 −1/3 0 . . . 0
−2/3 0 0 2/3 0 . . . 0

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=

ξi11 0 0 ξi14 0 . . . 0
ξi21 0 0 ξi24 0 . . . 0
...
...
...
...
...
...
ξiK1 0 0 ξiK4 0 . . . 0
 , (6.16)
ξij1 = (
1
3
)xi11 + (
1
3
)xi21 + (
−2
3
)xi31
ξij4 = (
−1
3
)xi11 + (
−1
3
)xi21 + (
2
3
)xi31
F ′i∗yi∗ =

1/3 1/3 −2/3
0 0 0
0 0 0
−1/3 −1/3 2/3
0 0 0
...
...
...
0 0 0


yi1
yi2
yi3
 =

υi1
0
0
υi4
0
...
0

(6.17)
υi1 = (
1
3
)yi1 + (
1
3
)yi2 + (
−2
3
)yi3
υi4 = (
−1
3
)yi1 + (
−1
3
yxi2 + (
2
3
)yi3
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